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How do we come to the decision that we like a face?  This thesis investigates this important 
aspect of social processing and communication by examining preference decisions for faces 
and the role that visual behavior plays in the process.  I present a series of studies designed to 
investigate face preference formation and gaze patterns using eye-tracking and self-reported 
preference ratings.  I tested healthy control subjects and two clinical populations known to have 
deficits in social processing: people with autism and patients with amygdala lesions.  In studies 
one and two, I explore whether known social cognition deficits in people with autism and 
amygdala lesions also impair subjective decision-making regarding the attractiveness of faces.  
In study three, I investigate the flexibility of rule-based visual strategies used by these 
populations during face perception.  Additionally, I present a custom algorithm developed to 
process raw eyetracking data, which was used to analyze all eyetracking data in this thesis.  
People with autism and patients with amygdala lesions are known to have general deficits in 
social processing, including difficulty orienting toward and evaluating faces.  Nevertheless, I 
find that their behavior is markedly similar in many areas where we would expect them to have 
abnormalities or deficiencies.  Their preference decisions when judging facial attractiveness 
were highly correlated with those made by controls, and both groups showed the same biases 
for familiar faces over novel faces.  In addition, people with autism exhibit the same visual 
sampling behavior linking preference and attentional orienting, but reach their decisions faster 
than controls and also appear insensitive to the difficulty of the choice.  Finally, gaze to the eye 
region appears normal in the absence of an explicit decision-making task, but only when 
analyzed in a similar manner as previous studies.  However, when face sub-regions were 
analyzed in greater detail, people with autism demonstrate abnormalities in face gaze patterns, 
failing to emphasize the most information-rich regions of the face.  Furthermore, people with 
autism demonstrate impairments in their ability to update those gaze patterns to accommodate 
different viewing restrictions.  Taken together, these findings support the idea that the normal 
formation of face preferences can be preserved in the presence of general social processing 
impairments.  Patterns in the eyetracking and behavioral data indicate that this is made 
possible, in part, by compensatory atypical processing and visual strategies.  
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 C h a p t e r  I  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Overview  
Human faces and facial expressions are central to social communication.  Our ability to 
accurately evaluate and make decisions about faces is a vital component of social functioning, 
enabling us to perceive emotions, decode others’ intentions, and form social bonds.  The visual 
and cognitive mechanisms involved in face processing are in large part subconscious and 
automatic, yet they wield an enormous influence on our judgments about faces and emotional 
expressions and, ultimately, on our social behavior.  While most of the extant research on face 
processing focuses on visual behavior during objective decision-making tasks, such as face 
discrimination or emotion recognition, few studies investigate the influence of visual behavior 
on subjective decision-making with regard to faces.  Much of our day-to-day social behavior is 
not based on objective and explicit processing, but is instead based on cues that are processed 
subjectively and automatically.  As such, an important but overlooked aspect of social decision-
making processes is the question of how we evaluate faces and ultimately determine if we like 
them.  While subjective judgments and the behavior that accompanies them can be more 
difficult to operationalize than objective judgments with empirically correct answers, subjective 
decision-making can be at least partially quantified through scientific methods such as 
eyetracking and behavioral measures in an effort to better understand how we subjectively 
evaluate faces. 
Autism is a pervasive developmental disorder in which social perception, and the processing of 
faces in particular, is disrupted.  Research has shown that individuals with autism spectrum 
disorders (ASD) have deficits in evaluating and making social judgments about faces, and 
demonstrate atypical gaze behavior toward social stimuli including inattention to faces and 
direct gaze aversion.  By examining the visual behavior of individuals with autism in social 
processing tasks, we can investigate the role of automatic responses to faces, as well as learn 
about the essential components involved in the formation of preference judgments for faces.  
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The aim of this thesis is to investigate the automatic and subconscious components of visual 
behavior that influence how we examine faces, and how these components of visual behavior 
can affect the way in which we subjectively evaluate faces.  Specifically, how do we come to 
the decision that we like a face or not?  One way to explore this question is to compare clinical 
populations that demonstrate impairments in social functioning, such as individuals with autism 
or amygdala lesions, to healthy controls (also referred to as neurotypicals) during social 
processing tasks.  We know that subjects with autism show deficits in orienting towards and 
processing socially-salient stimuli, with a particular deficit in the evaluation of faces, which 
may in turn be linked to amygdala dysfunction.   
The current research involves a series of studies investigating specific elements of visual 
behavior and preference formation for faces across three populations: healthy controls, people 
with autism, and amygdala lesion patients.  In the first study, I explore visual behavior during 
preference decision-making for both social stimuli and non-social stimuli.  When comparing 
healthy controls to autism and amygdala lesion patients, I examine whether the processes that 
are disturbed in making objective judgments about faces also affect subjective decision-making 
about faces.  In the second study, I investigate one well-known aspect of face preference 
formation reported in healthy populations—a preference bias for familiar faces over those that 
are novel—in order to examine whether social processing deficits affect preference formation 
for familiar faces.  In the last study, I explore the use and flexibility of atypical face viewing 
strategies that can partly compensate for social processing deficits.  
In the remainder of this Introduction, I will review the literature that is necessary for 
understanding the studies and results in this thesis.  First, I will present an overview of social 
attention and face processing in neurotypicals, and discuss what is known regarding face 
processing deficits in ASD.  Second, I will review neuroanatomical abnormalities that are 
linked to social processing deficits in ASD, and the possible association with amygdala 
dysfunction.  Lastly, I will present an outline of my dissertation and high-level findings from 
each of the studies. 
  
3 
1.2 Background and Context 
1.2.1 Social attention and face perception in neurotypicals 
Faces and facial expressions are a meaningful source of social and affective information, and 
studies show that faces and facial expressions have a unique ability to attract and hold our 
attention.   There is extensive research available on the social attention and face perception of 
neurotypicals, which is briefly reviewed in this section.  One powerful methodology used by 
researchers to study face processing is eye-tracking, whereby a person’s eye movements are 
recorded to analyze where a subject is looking and directing their attention in relation to a 
visual stimulus.  Eye movement patterns are widely regarded as an indicator of visual and 
attentional processes involved in performing a task.  Tracking subjects’ eye movements during 
viewing of social stimuli, such as faces, therefore provides a useful measure of where people 
are directing their attention during social and face processing tasks. 
In 1967, in one of the earlier eyetracking studies examining the social saliency of faces, Alfred 
Yarbus showed participants the painting Unexpected Visitors (Repin, 1884) and examined how 
the viewers’ gaze moved across the picture (Yarbus, 1967).  Yarbus recorded the participants’ 
eye movements using a homemade eyetracking device affixed directly to the eye with suction.  
He found that the faces of people depicted in the painting attracted the most visual attention 
compared to the rest of the elements in the scene.  That is, the viewers’ eyes would often pause, 
or fixate, upon faces rather than other parts of the picture.  Since Yarbus’s research, the social 
saliency of faces for neurotypicals has been demonstrated in many other studies (Palermo & 
Rhodes, 2007; Posamentier, 2003; Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006; Vuilleumier, 2000), 
particularly through experiments using increasingly more modern techniques such as 
eyetracking and neuroimaging.   Such experiments have demonstrated the important role that 
social attention plays in human interaction. 
As social animals, humans have a heightened attentional bias for biologically relevant stimuli, 
such as human figures and faces.  For example, neurotypicals show preferential attention for 
exploring social stimuli, including depictions of people and social interactions (Birmingham, 
Bischof, & Kingstone, 2008; Tipper, Handy, Giesbrecht, & Kingstone, 2008). Interestingly, 
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the attentional bias toward human figures is evident even in the first fixation made after an 
image is presented (Fletcher-Watson, Findlay, Leekam, & Benson, 2008), indicating that the 
presence of a person in an image can be processed rapidly and subconsciously prior to the first 
fixation.  This finding points to face-sensitive perceptual mechanisms that function pre-
attentively or within the bounds of attention, but at a remarkably swift speed, meaning a great 
deal of social processing occurs subconsciously and automatically.  This is particularly 
intriguing with respect to the amygdala, a key neural structure involved in directing social 
attention.  The relationship between social processing and the amygdala will be discussed later 
in this chapter.  
Several studies have examined the visual preference choices made by neurotypical individuals.  
For example, Shimojo and colleagues (2003) have shown that preference and gaze interact in a 
positive feedback loop to produce a phenomenon known as the “gaze cascade” effect (S. 
Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003).  The effect is observed when choosing between 
social stimuli, as well as when choosing between non-social stimuli.  When observers are 
shown pairs of images and instructed to choose which of the two they prefer, their gaze is 
equally likely to be on either picture.  However, in the few seconds before a decision is made, a 
gaze bias builds toward the stimulus that is eventually chosen, increasing until the person 
makes a decision.  The bias occurs outside of the person’s awareness, and is present before the 
person is conscious of his or her final preference.  It is hypothesized that this increasing gaze 
bias reflects a positive feedback loop between two behavioral factors that are critical for 
forming the eventual preference:  people tend to look more at an image they prefer, and people 
tend to prefer images that they have seen more.  
With regard to the latter factor, it is known that our preferences are strongly influenced by our 
previous experiences with certain stimuli.  Repeated visual exposure to a stimulus is known to 
increase our preference for it up to a certain point (Zajonc, 1968), a phenomenon termed the 
“mere exposure” effect since even subliminal exposure is sufficient for increasing preference 
for geometric stimuli.  More recent studies, however, have suggested that the familiarity 
preference is specific to certain stimulus categories but not others (Liao, Yeh, & Shimojo, 
2011; Park, Shimojo, & Shimojo, 2010).  When subjects are presented with pairs of faces, and 
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instructed to judge for preference, people prefer the faces that are familiar.  But the opposite 
occurs with nature scenes: when presented with pairs of nature scene images, people prefer the 
images that are novel.   In other words, healthy controls demonstrate a familiarity bias for faces 
but a novelty bias for nature scenes.  The authors suggest the familiarity preference for faces, 
which will be discussed further in Chapter 3.4, might be driven by the preferential attention that 
is afforded to faces over other non-social stimuli. 
There is considerable evidence to indicate that faces enjoy preferential attentional capture in 
normally developing individuals (Vuilleumier, 2000).  The reflexive attraction to faces is so 
robust in neurotypicals that it occurs even when it would be beneficial to inhibit it (Bindemann, 
Burton, Hooge, Jenkins, & De Haan, 2005; Gilchrist & Proske, 2006; Theeuwes & Van der 
Stigchel, 2006).  That is, by showing a face in the field of view, individuals cannot help but 
employ attentional resources to process it, even when doing so subsequently distracts from the 
goals of a competing task.  In one study, Langton and colleagues (2008) reported that 
participants were slower to find a non-social image when a face was also present on-screen 
compared to when a face was absent (Langton, Law, Burton, & Schweinberger, 2008).  In other 
words, a face that had no relevance to the visual target for which participants were searching 
slowed their ability to search for a different target because the face automatically engaged 
viewers’ attention.  These findings demonstrate that faces are not only spontaneously detected 
and attended to, but also indicate that it is harder to disengage from a face compared to a non-
face object once one’s attention has been captured by it.   
Healthy individuals have also been shown to be more attuned to changes involving faces than 
those involving other objects (Beck, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001).  A study by Ro, Russell, and 
Lavie (2001) found that changes involving faces—such as a face changing to a different face—
are detected faster and more accurately than changes in other object categories, such as pictures 
of food or musical instruments (Ro, Russell, & Lavie, 2001).  Interestingly, reaction times for 
detecting changes to a face increased the less complex the scene was.  The authors interpreted 
this effect to indicate that the more competition there is for visual attention in a scene, the more 
privilege faces are afforded.  That is, faces have even greater saliency when competing against 
  
6 
other non-face stimuli for attention.  Thus, in typically developing people, faces enjoy 
privileged status, engaging and holding attention quicker and longer than non-social objects. 
The preference in attention toward faces and face-like configurations over other objects in the 
environment seems to be innate in many respects.  For example, spontaneous orienting to faces 
is a behavior present from birth: newborn infants (participants in the study were an average of 
nine minutes in age) show heightened interest in faces, turning their heads more frequently to 
gaze at images whose internal elements are configured to resemble actual faces than at images 
with the same internal elements scrambled, or a blank image (Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 1975).  
Infants also direct their first fixations to face-like patterns more often than would be observed 
by chance, even when other stimuli are competing for visual attention (Gliga, Elsabbagh, 
Andravizou, & Johnson, 2009). These results show that the basic neural architecture for 
attending to and evaluating faces for social information is present in some form even at an early 
age. 
Indeed, the brain is primed to attend to faces even in their most basic configuration and the 
presence of specific rudimentary visual cues automatically elicits face processing in 
neurotypicals.  One such cue is the arrangement of facial elements in an upright, T-shaped 
configuration.  In other words, neurotypicals rely more on the arrangement of facial features 
rather than on individual facial features while performing face processing tasks (Calder & 
Young, 2005).  For example, inverted faces are harder to recognize than upright ones, 
(Kanwisher, Tong, & Nakayama, 1998; Tanaka & Farah, 1993), and faces that are presented 
whole are detected more quickly than faces whose elements are scrambled (Hershler & 
Hochstein, 2005), indicating that facial features alone do not receive preferential attention, but 
that the appropriate configuration is preferentially processed and detected.  These findings 
highlight a key component of face perception in neurotypicals, which is configural processing.  
The tendency to attend to an upright, T-shaped configuration as a potential social stimulus is so 
entrenched in neurotypicals that the presence of actual facial elements is not necessary to 
capture visual attention—schematic faces (for example, a grey oval overlaid with two black 
circles positioned above a third black circle to resemble two eyes and a mouth) also elicit the 
same effect: individuals are quicker to direct attention to an upright schematic face than an 
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inverted one (Tomalski, Csibra, & Johnson, 2009).  Taken together, these findings 
demonstrate that the brain is primed to recognize and evaluate faces in even their most basic 
configurations. One reason behind these findings may be that the face holds special 
significance in its ability to communicate social information, which will be discussed next.  
1.2.2 Social processing of faces 
Faces communicate a wealth of information regarding people’s emotions, attention, and future 
intentions, and neurotypical individuals quickly and effortlessly evaluate faces to process this 
social information. One vital component underlying neurotypicals’ ability to process facial 
information is the spontaneous tendency to prioritize gaze to specific facial features over other 
parts of the face.  When viewing faces, individuals’ fixations are largely clustered around the 
key facial features that communicate the greatest amount of emotional and social information: 
first the eyes, followed by the mouth and nose (Luria & Strauss, 1978; Stephen, Wellens, 
Goldberg, & Dell'Osso, 1978; Walker-Smith, Gale, & Findlay, 1977).   At a glance, these 
regions are evaluated and processed to form an impression of another person’s mental state.  
Anger is quickly recognized by the downward turn of the inner eyebrows (Jones, 1974; 
Yarbus, 1967), combined with pursed or scowling lips (Kohler et al., 2004), disgust is 
perceived from a wrinkled nose and raised upper lip (Rozin, Lowery, & Ebert, 1994; McIntosh, 
2006), and fear is recognized by the widening of eyes and increased amount of visible sclera 
(Whalen et al., 2004), along with a stretched mouth (Kohler et al., 2004).  In addition to a 
smile, genuine happiness is recognized by the contraction of muscles surrounding the eyes, 
known as orbicularis oculi (Williams, Senior, David, Loughland, & Gordon, 2001).    
The eyes in particular are central to social communication and they convey an extensive 
amount of information regarding stable physical traits, such as age (Nguyen, Isaacowitz, & 
Rubin, 2009) and gender (Brown & Perrett, 1993), as well as dynamic, transient states such as 
intention and emotion (Kleinke, 1986).  Eye gaze direction, for instance, is a highly salient cue 
for establishing social intention and interaction, signaling either initiation or avoidance of social 
contact (Argyle et al., 1973; Argyle & Cook, 1976).  Direct eye gaze indicates a person’s 
attention is directed at the perceiver and that the person intends to engage with the perceiver, 
while averted gaze indicates a person’s attention is directed elsewhere (for a review of levels of 
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social gaze and their meaning, see Emery, 2000).  Emotions are another dynamic cue that can 
be communicated just by the eye region.  Complex emotional states—such as admiration, 
arrogance, boredom, and guilt—can be identified just as well from the eyes as from the whole 
face (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997).  Thus, the eyes are a highly salient cue for 
social communication and interaction.  For this reason, in social processing tasks and in tasks 
investigating where neurotypicals naturally orient their gaze, the eyes are the elements of the 
face that are fixated upon most frequently and for longer durations of time than other regions of 
the face (Itier, Villate, & Ryan, 2007; Stephen et al., 1978).  Like the general salience of the 
face, the salience of the eyes is also present in early infancy.  Infants direct more of their 
attention to faces with open eyes compared to closed eyes (Batki, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Connellan, & Ahluwalia, 2000), as well as to faces showing direct gaze compared to averted 
gaze (Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002).   
The visual cues contained in faces, such as emotional expressions and direction of eye gaze, 
also guide our attention to facilitate further processing.  For example, behavioral studies have 
shown that detection and discrimination of faces is enhanced when the faces depict emotional 
expressions.  Faces expressing happiness, surprise, or disgust are more likely to attract viewers’ 
first fixations and are also detected faster than neutral facial expressions (Calvo & 
Nummenmaa, 2008; Ro et al., 2001).  Calvo and Esteves (2005) reported that emotional 
expressions of anger, happiness, and sadness could be detected and discriminated in as little as 
25 milliseconds, whether faces were presented within or outside of the foveal field of view 
(Calvo & Esteves, 2005), indicating that facial cues can modulate attentional orienting.  Studies 
have also shown that emotional expressions can be perceived pre-attentively—meaning outside 
of conscious perception—and then guide our active attention to the face’s location (Eastwood, 
Smilek, & Merikle, 2001).   In addition to emotional expression, a similar facilitative effect is 
observed with direct eye contact.  Neurotypical individuals are quicker to detect faces showing 
direct gaze compared to averted gaze (Senju, Yaguchi, Tojo, & Hasegawa, 2003).  
Furthermore, studies have shown that direct eye contact facilitates recognition of gender 
(Macrae, Hood, Milne, Rowe, & Mason, 2002) and identity (Hood, Macrae, Cole-Davies, & 
Dias, 2003).  These studies demonstrate that the processing of certain basic social cues takes 
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place automatically and subconsciously, and that these cues can modulate further, and often 
more complex, social processing by directing visual attention.  
In addition to rapid processing of facial features for emotion and intention, people also form 
impressions of social traits based purely on facial features, and they do so in a remarkably brief 
amount of time.  With a quick glance at a person’s face, often as little as 50 milliseconds, 
people are able to make a variety of social judgments regarding others, evaluating intelligence, 
attractiveness, aggressiveness, and competence (Bar, Neta, & Linz, 2006; Olson & Marshuetz, 
2005; Rule, Ambady, & Adams, 2009).  The characteristics perceived in the initial stages of 
seeing a person’s face prove to be influential in determining the social traits ascribed to that 
individual. For example, one study showed that neurotypicals make inferences about 
attractiveness, trustworthiness, competence, and aggressiveness when perceiving a face in as 
little as 100 milliseconds after exposure (Willis & Todorov, 2006).  Additionally, judgments 
that were made in 100 milliseconds strongly correlated with judgments that were made in the 
absence of a time restriction, indicating that a time window of 100 milliseconds is sufficient to 
automatically invoke a variety of complex social inferences.  
The automatic and subjective inferences people make for characteristics such as trustworthiness 
and attractiveness affect social judgments and behavior in neurotypicals.  For example, research 
has shown that these social inferences affect election outcomes (Ballew & Todorov, 2007), 
professional success (Dipboye, Arvey, & Terpstra, 1977; Shahani-Denning, 2003), 
consumption behavior (Winkielman, 2005), and even sentencing leniency in the judicial 
system (Stewart, 1980).  Furthermore, people attribute different qualities based on perceptions 
of attractiveness: more attractive people elicit more positive impressions of competence (Eagly, 
Ashmore, & Makhijani, 1991) and even more attractive babies are viewed as being more 
responsive and intelligent than their less attractive peers (Langlois et al., 2000).   
The social and affective information communicated by faces, therefore, is largely evaluated 
subconsciously and automatically, and based on this information, neurotypicals make 
inferences that affect social behavior and real-world outcomes.  While the automatic processing 
and evaluation of faces is a crucial domain of social processing in neurotypicals, it has been 
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shown to be compromised in individuals with social disorders such as autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD) (Dawson et al., 2004; Katarzyna, Fred, & Ami, 2010; Remington et al., 
2012).  Studying face processing in people with ASD can provide insight into both the 
neurological processes underlying face perception and the underlying symptomology in ASD 
and other disorders in which social processing is impaired.  
1.2.3 Social saliency in autism 
Autism is a pervasive developmental disorder with core diagnostic criteria that include 
restricted and repetitive behaviors and interests, and deficits in social communication and 
interaction (Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - 5th ed.; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013).  Individuals with autism have impairments across a variety of domains, 
including deficits in orienting towards social cues such as eye gaze (Dawson et al., 2004; 
Elsabbagh et al., 2012; Jones, Carr, & Klin, 2008), and difficulty processing social and 
emotional information (Ashwin, Chapman, Colle, & Baron-Cohen, 2006; Forgeot d’Arc et al., 
2014; Smith, Montagne, Perrett, Gill, & Gallagher, 2010).  
Few studies exist on face preference formation in ASD.  Moreover, the two studies that have 
directly investigated face preference have drawn mixed conclusions.  Da Fonseca, Santos, 
Rosset, and Dereulle (2007) reported people with ASD have similar attractiveness preferences 
as neurotypicals, and moreover, they demonstrate a similar tendency to attribute more positive 
qualities to faces perceived as more attractive (Da Fonseca, Santos, Rosset, & Deruelle, 2011).  
While a study by White, Hill, Winston and Frith (2005) also reported that attractiveness 
judgments in ASD did not differ from the judgments made by neurotypicals, in contrast to da 
Fonseca and colleagues (2007), they found that people with ASD were impaired in the ability 
to judge attractiveness of faces if they were the same sex as the participant (White, Hill, 
Winston, & Frith, 2006). 
Studies examining social perception in ASD have found reduced saliency of social stimuli 
relative to non-social stimuli in the disorder (Dawson, Webb, & McPartland, 2005).  In addition 
to a decreased attentional bias in response to faces, when people with autism do look at faces, 
they demonstrate atypical fixation behavior towards them (Fletcher-Watson, Leekam, Benson, 
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Frank, & Findlay, 2009), fixating more on the mouth than neurotypicals (Klin, Jones, 
Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002; Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley, & Piven, 2007), as well as 
showing reduced eye contact (Jones & Klin, 2013; Katarzyna et al., 2010).   
Although the exact abnormalities characterizing atypical eye gaze are still a matter of debate, a 
number of studies report differences in the eye gaze patterns of people with ASD, indicating 
they either avoid or simply lack interest in the eye region.  Eyetracking studies have revealed 
that individuals with autism look less at the eyes of an emotionally expressive face than do 
neurotypicals (Corden, Chilvers, & Skuse, 2008; Dalton et al., 2005; Klin et al., 2002; 
Pelphrey et al., 2002; Riby & Hancock, 2008).  Moreover, extant research has also indicated 
that people with autism fail to use information from the eyes to identify complex mental states 
such as shame or envy (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997), and that they rely more on the mouth 
than the eyes for social information (Neumann, Spezio, Piven, & Adolphs, 2006).   
Atypical gaze behavior is also linked to abnormalities in individuals’ ability to evaluate social 
information expressed through faces.  For example, some studies have reported that high- and 
low-functioning individuals with autism present impaired recognition of facial expressions 
compared to controls (Hobson, 1986; Tantam, Monaghan, Nicholson, & Stirling, 1989).  While 
these impairments might be restricted to the recognition of specific emotions such as fear, 
anger, and sadness (Ashwin et al., 2006; Bal et al., 2009; Wallace, Coleman, & Bailey, 2008), 
there is also evidence to suggest a more global impairment in emotion recognition (Rutherford 
& McIntosh, 2006; Tardif, Lainé, Rodriguez, & Gepner, 2007).  
Social deficits in autism might also differ based on levels of intellectual disability.  In people 
with high-functioning autism (which generally refers to diagnosed individuals who can 
communicate, carry out basic tasks, and have less intellectual impairment), there is evidence to 
suggest social impairments are restricted to higher-order social judgments rather than basic 
aspects of social perception.  While social attributions that require higher-order judgments, 
mentalizing, or theory-of-mind inferences are more consistently impaired in individuals with 
high-functioning autism, some studies report that lower-level social processes are not impaired, 
such that basic skills, like emotion perception, remain intact (Adolphs, Sears, & Piven, 2001; 
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Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997).  The pathways associated with complex aspects of 
processing facial and emotional expressions—such as the retrieval of social knowledge that 
allows us to recognize a familiar face, conceptual information about others’ mental and 
emotional states, or the generation of complex emotional responses in the viewer—might be 
separate from or compensated for by other pathways that allow for basic social processing, 
such as the recognition of simple emotions or face preference judgments.  Therefore, high-
functioning autistic individuals’ ability to process more basic social information might not be 
affected by the face processing deficits commonly observed in autism. Such heterogeneity in 
symptoms among ASD sub-groups is common and, as discussed below, has led to some 
difficulty in finding consistent symptomology across the entire ASD population. 
1.2.4 Divergent behavioral findings in autism research 
Social processing deficits in ASD are poorly understood in relation to diagnostic sub-groups as 
well as the known heterogeneity in symptomology.  To add to this complexity, individuals 
within the same sub-group can express different subsets of reported symptoms, and differ in the 
severity of those symptoms.  Consequently, the large body of extant studies on face processing 
in ASD has generated somewhat mixed results.  Although researchers initially expected that 
people with ASD would present significant, overt deficits in the processing of faces and other 
social stimuli, it is now understood that social perception in autism is heterogeneous, resulting 
in widely varying reports of social impairment. Such highly conflicting results led to the 
conclusion in a recent review by Harms et al. (2010) that social perception in ASD depends on 
numerous factors, including the known heterogeneity in ASD in terms of symptom variability 
and severity, participant demographics (e.g., age, gender, etc.), experimental differences in 
stimuli and task demands, and the use of compensatory strategies in high-functioning 
individuals with ASD (Harms, Martin, & Wallace, 2010).  
Various studies have shown that the differences between high-functioning individuals with 
ASD and neurotypicals often appear to be subtle due to the use of compensatory, top-down 
strategies in autism that mask social deficits (Rutherford & McIntosh, 2006; Teunisse & de 
Gelder, 2001; Wong, Fung, Chua, & McAlonan, 2008).  For example, Grossman and 
colleagues reported that when children with ASD were shown pictures of basic emotional 
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expressions with matching labels, there was no impairment in recognizing emotions 
(Grossman, Klin, Carter, & Volkmar, 2000).  However, when faces were presented with 
mismatched labels, children with ASD had difficulty recognizing the emotions, indicating that 
the subjects had likely relied on the labels—perhaps even subconsciously—to facilitate 
emotion recognition.   
Recent research has expanded on the findings related to top-down strategies in autism by 
exploring the import of shorter response windows for emotion recognition. Clark and 
colleagues (2008) reported that while individuals with ASD could extract emotional 
expressions from faces at long presentation durations as well as neurotypicals could, emotion 
recognition in the autism group was impaired at shorter presentation durations (Clark, 
Winkielman, & McIntosh, 2008).  This suggests that, with longer presentation times, people 
with ASD might rely on higher-level cognitive skills to identify emotions, but that rapid, 
automatic processing is impaired.  Taken together, these results indicate that some high-
functioning individuals with ASD can compensate for social processing deficits by using top-
down, cognitive strategies.  However, it is important to note that the studies demonstrate that 
atypical strategies are limited in flexibility since they cannot be applied in uncommonly 
encountered situations.      
Perceptual (i.e., implicit) strategies for visual processing have also been shown to differ in 
individuals with ASD, enabling them to outperform controls in certain types of visual 
perception tasks with non-social stimuli.  Evidence in support of this visual processing 
advantage comes from studies that have shown faster reaction times among individuals with 
autism in finding embedded figures (Jarrold, Gilchrist, & Bender, 2005; Keehn et al., 2008), as 
well as enhanced detection of targets in visual search tasks (O'Riordan, Plaisted, Driver, & 
Baron-Cohen, 2001; O'Riordan & Plaisted, 2001).  Explanations for this effect have highlighted 
the use of implicit processing strategies that emphasize local over configural information by 
people with ASD (Dawson et al., 2005; Rondan & Deruelle, 2004).  More importantly, 
however, this atypical processing strategy is also believed to underlie the lack of a face 
inversion effect reported in the literature for ASD (Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988; Langdell, 
1978; Tantam et al., 1989), which enables people with ASD to outperform controls in face 
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perception tasks emphasizing featural processing.  These findings indicate that atypical 
processing confers individuals with ASD an advantage in non-social perception tasks, which 
also extends to certain face perception tasks. 
These differences in face processing may be explained by differences in the default style of 
processing employed by neurotypicals versus individuals with ASD (Krysko & Rutherford, 
2009; Lahaie et al., 2006).  While neurotypicals generally engage a configural style of face 
processing, there is evidence that in some situations, individuals with ASD use a local, more 
feature-based style as their default (Dawson et al., 2005).  Some researchers have argued that 
in ASD, the face is examined and processed in terms of individual features rather than as a 
whole, perhaps through use of rule-based strategies.  Particularly with respect to emotion 
processing, people with ASD may learn to recognize social cues by identifying rules that 
characterize specific facial features in an expression, such as raised corners of the mouth for 
happiness or a scrunched nose for disgust (Rutherford & McIntosh, 2006).  In contrast to this 
explicit rule-based strategy, neurotypicals rely more often on a holistic, template-based 
strategy, processing the configuration of the entire set of facial features (Calder & Young, 
2005).  This is not to say that configural processing is entirely absent in individuals with ASD, 
as global processing can be engaged by other mechanisms such as attention cueing (Behrmann 
et al., 2006; Nishimura, Rutherford, & Maurer, 2008), but it does indicate that there is a bias 
among people with ASD for using local processing strategies as the default.  Taken together, 
the results from these and other face processing tasks point to the likelihood that high-
functioning individuals employ as their default a local, feature-based processing to process 
social information rather than the global, configural-based processing that is used by 
neurotypicals.  This suggests that atypical processing and compensatory strategies can be used 
to partially counteract deficits in face processing and may help to explain the seemingly 
divergent results of previous research on ASD individuals.  
1.2.5 Abnormal brain structure and connectivity in autism 
Altered brain connectivity and neuroanatomical differences are thought to contribute to many 
of the symptoms observed in individuals with ASD, particularly in the area of social behavior.  
Current theories regarding brain abnormalities in people with autism emphasize differences in 
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connectivity between regions, or anomalies in several functionally related structures that can 
affect a number of cognitive processes and result in the behaviors commonly observed in 
people with ASD.  Early abnormal overgrowth is found in regions underlying functions that are 
known to be impaired in autism, such as language, social skills, and cognitive skills.  
Courchesne (2004) reported abnormal overgrowth in both white and grey cerebral matter—
particularly dorsolateral and medialfrontal regions—and white cerebellar matter.  In addition, 
atypical growth of the cerebellum is believed to play a role in cognitive and motor dysfunctions 
that lead to the stereotyped behaviors and reduced exploration commonly reported in children 
with autism (Courchesne, 2004; Pierce & Courchesne, 2001).  Bilateral amygdala enlargement 
and cerebellar and hippocampal enlargement have also been reported in young children 
(Courchesne, 2004) and older children (Schumann, 2004) with autism.  In particular, the degree 
of enlargement in the amygdala is closely associated with the severity of impairment in social 
and communication skills (Munson, Dawson, Abbott, & Faja, 2006), including difficulty 
recognizing facial expressions (Bachevalier, 2006) and detecting eye gaze (Howard et al., 
2000).   
Regions that show overgrowth and enlargement in early childhood also show atypically slow 
growth as well as degeneration and volumetric loss later in life, in some cases.  In adolescents 
and adults with autism, the structures comprising the limbic system—particularly the 
amygdala, hippocampus, basal ganglia, and prefrontal cortices—are most often implicated in 
symptoms related to social dysfunction (Uddin, Menon, Young, Ryali, & Chen, 2011).  
Amygdala dysfunction is known to contribute to disruptions in face perception, which includes 
decreased eye movements to key features of the face and a lack of orienting toward social and 
emotional information.  However, the exact nature of this abnormality is unclear.  For example, 
Howard et al. (2000) reported impairment in facial expression recognition associated with an 
increase in amygdala volume (Howard et al., 2000), whereas Nacewicz et al. (2006) found 
smaller than normal amygdalae in people with autism (Nacewicz et al., 2006).   
Studies have also revealed structural abnormalities in the Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS) in 
the form of decreased gray matter (Boddaert et al., 2004), and functional abnormalities in the 
STS in the form of decreased activity during social judgments (Pelphrey, Shultz, Hudac, & 
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Vander Wyk, 2011).  Disruptions in STS function may drive some of the impairments 
related to social perception in autism, such as communication deficits involving speech 
perception and difficulty in understanding the intentions of others from movements of the eyes, 
mouth, and body.  
There is increasing evidence that abnormal functioning of the cerebellum also contributes to 
motor and cognitive impairments in ASD.  The cerebellum is a key brain structure for 
coordination of cognitive functions involving attention and perception.  In children with autism, 
disruptions in cognitive functions are expressed behaviorally in a restricted range of interests, 
reduced exploration, and stereotyped behaviors—all three of which have been linked to 
cerebellar dysfunction (Pierce & Courchesne, 2001).  Cerebellar function may similarly be 
compromised in adults with ASD, as there is evidence of increased cerebellar volumes (Sparks 
et al., 2002), as well as abnormal neuronal densities in this region in the form of decreased 
numbers of Purkinje cells (Belmonte et al., 2004). 
In addition to the structural differences reported in key brain regions, there is substantial 
evidence of abnormal functional and structural connectivity linking the various brain regions in 
adults and adolescents with ASD.  The hypothesis of underconnectivity proposes that 
underfunctioning long-range circuitry in people with autism might cause functional deficits in 
integrating and synchronizing information between related brain regions (Just, Cherkassky, 
Keller, & Minshew, 2004), and such deficits would cause a wide range of impairments in 
language processing, motor coordination and social processing.  Structural abnormalities 
appear as atypically high neuronal connectivity between local regions and low neuronal 
connectivity between brain regions that lie further apart (Courchesne & Pierce, 2005; 
Kleinhans et al., 2008), and might also contribute to social impairments observed in autism. 
Indeed, one study by Barnea-Goraly and colleagues (2004) reported disruptions in white matter 
tracts between brain regions in subjects with autism (Barnea-Goraly et al., 2004).  These 
regions—including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate gyrus, superior 
temporal sulcus, and amygdala—are strongly implicated in social functioning.  Taken together, 
these studies demonstrate that the brain regions and functional connectivity involved in social 
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processing are abnormal in individuals with ASD, and that these abnormalities likely 
contribute to impairments in face processing.  
The role of the amygdala in ASD has also been given greater attention in recent years, as the 
amygdala’s function or connections may be compromised in autism (Adolphs, 2002; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2000).  In neurotypicals, the amygdala is an integral part of the cognitive network 
for processing social information, and modulates social processing by directing visual attention 
to salient features of the face (Adolphs, 1999; Brothers, 1990).  It is therefore important to have 
a broader understanding of the role the amygdala plays in social processing, which will be 
discussed next.  
1.2.6 The amygdala: a conductor of social attention 
While the recognition and processing of social information in faces draws on multiple brain 
regions, the amygdala plays a particularly important part. According to Adolphs (2002), the 
amygdala serves an expansive role in face processing for neurotypicals through a number of 
mechanisms (Adolphs, 2002).  First, the amygdala orients bottom-up attention to socially 
salient features of the face—such as the eyes or mouth—via feedback mechanisms to visual 
and attention areas (Amaral & Price, 1984).  Modulation of these feedback pathways results in 
heightened perceptual processing of social stimuli as well as subconscious processing of 
emotional cues (Amaral, Behniea, & Kelly, 2003; Sander et al., 2005).  That is, the amygdala 
attaches salience to visual input (Adolphs, 1999) and subsequently directs visual attention to 
the areas of the face that are most informative for further processing of social information.  In 
addition to emotional cues, another salient cue is direct gaze, which elicits heightened 
activation in the amygdala compared to averted gaze (Kawashima et al., 1999), indicating that 
the amygdala plays a role in specific aspects of gaze processing.   
Second, the amygdala, along with the orbitofrontal cortex, directs retrieval of associated social 
knowledge about emotions from other neocortical regions and the hippocampus (Adolphs, 
2002; Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Willis, Palermo, Burke, McGrillen, & Miller, 2010).  
Furthermore, it also links salient stimuli to the affective response felt by the viewer (Thomas et 
al., 2001).  In this way, the amygdala modulates not only emotional processing but also guides 
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interpretation of those emotions to form social judgments. Thus, through a variety of 
mechanisms, the amygdala influences attention to and processing of socially salient stimuli, 
which in turn influences the further processing of the information conveyed by faces.  
Many aspects of social processing that are linked to healthy amygdala functioning are known to 
be compromised in ASD.  Faces are less likely to draw the attention of people with autism, who 
show reduced orienting and attention to social stimuli (Dawson et al., 2004), less attention to 
the eye region (Dalton et al., 2005; Klin et al., 2002; Pelphrey et al., 2002), and impairments 
in processing social and affective information (Harms, Martin, & Wallace, 2010; Schultz, 
2005), functions which are associated, at least in part, with amygdala function in 
neurotypicals.  The exact nature of the dysfunction in ASD is unclear, but two plausible 
explanations include a failure of the amygdala to assign social saliency to faces (Aggleton, 
Burton, & Passingham, 1980), and a failure of the amygdala to signal feedback pathways that 
are necessary for processing social stimuli (Schultz, 2005).  Nonetheless, while the specific 
impairments remain an open question, neuroimaging studies in people with ASD do support a 
general link between abnormal amygdala functioning and social processing impairments, 
reporting hypoactivation of the amygdala in a range of face perception tasks (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1999; Pelphrey et al., 2011; Pierce, Müller, Ambrose, Allen, & Courchesne, 2001; 
Schultz, 2005).  These findings highlighting the importance of the amygdala in social 
processing, and the impairments that can arise from abnormal functioning have been further 
validated in studies involving subjects with amygdala lesions. 
1.2.7 Amygdala lesion studies 
As discussed below, lesion studies have been particularly informative for illuminating the role 
of the amygdala in social cognition.  Amygdala lesion patients demonstrate many similar social 
processing impairments to those reported in ASD, and there is a great deal of overlap in how 
both populations view and evaluate faces.  For example, amygdala lesion patients demonstrate 
diminished eye contact (Adolphs et al., 2005; Spezio, Huang, Castelli, & Adolphs, 2007) and 
greater reliance on information from the mouth rather than the eyes (Birmingham, Cerf, & 
Adolphs, 2011).  Individuals with amygdala lesions are also significantly impaired in 
recognizing the expression of complex mental states—specifically related to social emotions 
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such as guilt, admiration, flirting, and arrogance—from both the whole face and from the 
eyes alone (Adolphs, Baron-Cohen, & Tranel, 2002).  Amygdala lesion patients also have 
deficits in making social judgments regarding traits such as trustworthiness and approachability 
(Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 1998).  A study on a patient referred to as SM who has complete 
bilateral amygdala lesions found that her impairment in recognizing mental states arises from a 
failure to spontaneously orient to the salient parts of a face rather than from impaired ability to 
recognize the actual expression (Adolphs et al., 2005).  When viewing facial expressions, the 
proportion of fixations that patient SM would direct to the eye region was atypically low 
regardless of the emotion.  Furthermore, although her recognition of fear was significantly 
worse relative to controls, this impairment was reversed with a simple instruction to direct her 
gaze to the eyes. 
The findings of the study with patient SM had several implications.  First, the results indicated 
that the amygdala was not necessary for the recognition of emotions.  The fact that lesion 
patients retain a basic capacity to identify basic emotions and show varying degrees of 
impairment means that there likely exist parallel or redundant pathways for social processing.  
This also suggests that feedback between those pathways may overlap.  Second, the authors 
interpreted that, while patient SM’s gaze behavior was not spontaneous, deficits in emotion 
perception could be partially mitigated by active evaluation (Adolphs, 2006).  The fact that 
patient SM’s recognition of fear could be reversed with top-down control meant that in addition 
to spontaneously orienting to emotional cues, people can also learn to actively examine faces in 
order to judge the emotion.   These findings also demonstrate that there are multiple pathways 
for processing of social information. 
Given that research has found that the amygdala plays a major role in explaining social 
processing deficits, especially as it relates to autism, amygdala lesion subjects provide an 
interesting corollary to better understand the underlying neuroanatomical source of ASD social 
processing deficits and unimpaired social processing in neurotypicals.  Furthermore, studying 
visual behavior in response to faces in these two clinical populations can tell us about how we 




1.3 Study Summary and Thesis Structure 
In this thesis, I investigate how we arrive at the decision that we like a face and find it 
attractive.  I use eyetracking and self-reported behavioral data to gain insight into the visual 
behavior that accompanies face gaze and preference decisions in people with autism and 
amygdala lesions.  Along the way, I also explore the use of atypical face gaze strategies in 
high-functioning autism and amygdala lesion patients.  To examine these topics, I utilized a 
variety of experimental paradigms and measures.  In the first two studies, participants 
performed a 2-alternative forced-choice task.  They made preference choices amongst pairs of 
social stimuli and pairs of non-social stimuli and indicated which image of the pair they 
preferred (eye gaze was recorded in the “Gaze Cascade” study).  In the third study, participants 
viewed images presented individually on-screen as eye gaze was tracked, and they were 
instructed to avoid specific salient features of the face.  Experiments and participants are 
summarized in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1. Summary of dissertation structure and participants in studies. 
Study Chapter Participants 
Eyetracking 









3a 12 12 3 3 
Familiarity 
versus Novelty 
3b 12 12 -- -- 
Don’t Look 4 12 13 3 3 
 
I aimed to answer specific questions in each of the three studies.  In healthy controls, we have 
seen that gaze bias contributes to preference decision-making for both social and non-social 
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objects.  Based on this evidence, in the gaze cascade study I explored whether gaze 
contributes to social decision-making in autism in the same manner as it does in neurotypicals.  
That is, to what extent do social processing deficits impair preference judgments about faces?  
Moreover, do known deficits in objectively evaluating faces also interfere with the temporal 
evolution of those preference choices?  In the second study, “Familiarity versus Novelty,” I 
examined whether intact social processing is necessary for forming a preference bias for 
familiar versus novel faces.  Does a preference for familiar faces develop even in populations 
with diminished face expertise?  In the third and final study, I investigated atypical face 
viewing strategies.  There is evidence to indicate that people with autism—particularly those 
who are high functioning—compensate for social deficits by using compensatory viewing 
strategies, which give the general appearance of normal viewing behavior.  Based on this 
evidence, I ask, if people with social processing deficits use atypical face gaze strategies, to 
what extent are these strategies flexible across different situations (i.e., task demands)?  Are 
they flexible enough to resemble neurotypical viewing behavior even in situations that are not 
commonly encountered?   
My thesis is organized in the following structure.  In Chapter I, I discuss social processing in 
healthy controls and individuals with autism, particularly as it relates to faces and the key brain 
structures involved in face processing.  One of the vital structures that I reviewed is the 
amygdala, which plays an important role in identifying socially salient information in the 
environment, and whose function may be compromised in social disorders such as autism.  I 
also discuss sources of heterogeneity in autism that have led to divergent results, underscoring 
the necessity of developing new ways of identifying and classifying subtypes of autism in the 
future.   
In Chapter II, I review a custom eyetracking algorithm that I developed to address the limited 
transparency offered by commercially available analysis software, which was used to analyze 
all eyetracking data presented in this thesis.  I also review the types of eye movements that are 
analyzed in eyetracking studies, present an overview of the most commonly-used analysis 
filters, discuss how they contribute to extracting relevant eye movement data, and present 
pseudocode for the algorithm.   
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In Chapter III, I present the results of two studies examining face preference in which we 
tested two clinical populations: autism patients and amygdala lesion patients.  The first study 
investigates the link between gaze and face preference formation in autism and amygdala lesion 
patients, and the second study investigates preference decisions for familiar versus novel faces 
in autism.  I found that individuals with autism and amygdala lesions made similar preference 
choices as controls in judging face attractiveness and that people with autism demonstrated a 
similar, yet faster, visual sampling process compared to controls.  The second study in Chapter 
III looks at whether social processing deficits affect preference biases for familiar faces over 
novel faces.  We found intact familiarity preferences for faces and novelty preferences for 
social stimuli in individuals with ASD.   
In Chapter IV, I study face viewing strategies decoupled from explicit decision-making in 
controls and the same two clinical populations—ASD and amygdala lesion patients—and I 
manipulate face viewing strategies by instructing participants to avoid socially-salient features 
of the face.  I found that individuals with autism exhibit atypical face gaze—and, unlike 
controls—inflexible viewing strategies.  Moreover, amygdala lesion patients showed hints of 
more subtle abnormalities in face gaze.  
In Chapter V, I summarize my findings and discuss the contributions of my work to our 
understanding of autism and social decision-making. Additionally, I suggest some open 
questions and future directions for the field. 
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 C h a p t e r  I I  
A CUSTOM ALGORITHM FOR ANALYSIS OF EYETRACKING DATA 
2.1 Overview 
Eye movements constitute an objective reliable measure of where a person’s attention is 
directed, and as such we can use eye movement recordings as a quantifiable measure of visual 
and attentional processes involved in social processing tasks.  Eye-tracking metrics, such as the 
number of fixations people make on a feature, or the total dwell time in a region, provide 
information about what elements of a stimulus attract the most attention, require more 
processing, or provide the most relevant information.  The metrics that are derived from eye-
tracking data, however, are highly dependent upon the choice of parameters that are used to 
define and extract the various eye movements from the raw data, for example, the minimum 
duration for a fixation, or what amount of spread to allow in successive data points before 
dividing a fixation into two.  Different tools have been developed for the collection and 
analysis of eye-tracking data.  Most commercial eye-tracking systems also come with their own 
analysis software, and there are many open-source packages available online as well.  
Unfortunately, commercially-available analysis software cannot be modified beyond a set 
number of parameters.  Beyond this, there is a great deal of processing that occurs in the data 
collection stage and in the analysis stage that is not easily accessible to the user.  Furthermore, 
the software cannot be modified or used to analyze data collected across different platforms. 
So why develop a custom algorithm?  First, a custom algorithm is flexible across multiple 
platforms, accepting eye-tracking data recorded from any system in a simple text file format.  
This was advantageous for the studies in this dissertation, since data was collected using three 
different eyetrackers from two different companies, each with their own data parsing steps at 
the collection stage, and their own filters at the analysis stage.  Second, by analyzing all data in 
this dissertation with the same algorithm, we remove the variance that is introduced by using 
different analysis software based on the eye tracker used to collect the data.  Lastly, a custom 
algorithm offers consistency and transparency.  There is consistency in the filters that were 
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applied, without the addition of any steps that were unnecessary for our analysis, and the 
parameters used.  Additionally, I understand the necessity of every step of the process from 
input to output and can explain exactly why my data looks the way it does.  
After much research, coding, and trial and error, I determined a combination of filters and 
settings that was best suited for our data, and for our variables of interest.  In this chapter, I 
introduce the algorithm, discuss the data processing functions that were implemented as filters, 




Eye-tracking research has been growing in popularity in recent years, with researchers using 
the method to study a variety of visual and cognitive processes including reading, scene 
perception, face processing, and decision-making.  This chapter will introduce a custom 
algorithm developed for analyzing eyetracking data used in the current study.  The algorithm 
uses a combination of velocity and acceleration thresholds to detect fixations and saccades, and 
implements filters to address noise and loss of signal in the data stream.  We also employ a 
data-driven methodology to derive threshold values.  Many commonly-available software 
packages, including commercially-available software such as Eyelink and Tobii systems, and 
open-source codes, use combinations and variations of the methods used in the algorithm we 
describe here.  By testing and tuning each of the individual subcomponents, I gained an 
understanding of their limitations, and also some insights into the technique of eyetracking 
itself.  The final algorithm thus has components selected and calibrated specifically for my 
research goals, equipment characteristics, and subject population.  This flexible, straight-
forward analysis pipeline is suitable for analyzing that data collected across different platforms 
and in different eye-tracking tasks, and can be further modified and expanded upon based on 
analysis needs.  
In describing the algorithm, I will first review and define various types of eye movements 
described in the literature.  Second, I will discuss the current methods being used to analyze 
eyetracking data as well as advantages and limitations of those techniques, and finally, I will 
describe the custom algorithm I developed based in an effort to address some of these 
limitations.  All the eye-tracking data in this thesis have been analyzed using this custom 
algorithm. 
2.3 Defining and Identifying common eye movements 
2.3.1 Fixations 
In the terminology of vision science, fixations are periods during which the eye remains still or 
makes minimal movement.  During these periods, the brain registers the visual input it receives 
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and begins to process this information (Irwin, 2004), and as such, fixations are regarded as a 
metric that can be associated with a number of cognitive functions, including a person’s 
interest, attention, and processing strategies for visual stimuli.  Surprisingly, there is no formal 
consensus as to how fixations should be mathematically defined, though nearly all definitions 
require that the point of gaze remain in a small spatially restricted area for some minimum 
amount of time (Lowenthal, 2007).  There is little agreement under this definition as to what 
the specific duration and spatial restrictions should be since there is a range of variability in 
these measures depending on factors such as task demands, subject population, and the analysis 
methods that are used derive them.  As a result, the specific values are predominantly 
determined by experimenter preference, the type of study, and the nature of the stimuli.  A 
review of major eye-tracking studies shows that the temporal restrictions generally range from 
50 to 500 milliseconds, and spatial restrictions range between one-half of a degree to five 
degrees of visual angle.  
The range of values reflects the range of reasons that researchers use eye-tracking equipment.  
For researchers interested in oculo-motor mechanisms, even the smallest displacements or 
pauses may have significance, signifying a series of short fixations in a small region.  However, 
for researchers interested in the visual information that is being gathered by an observer, the 
sustained inspection of a particular visual detail could be considered a single fixation, even if it 
involves many tiny movements.  This underscores the importance of tuning eye movement 
algorithms to ones research goals, rather than simply using a generic “industry standard.” 
2.3.2 Saccades 
Saccades are defined as the rapid eye movements that take place in between fixations.  During 
a saccade, eye position, and by extension visual attention, is shifted from one target toward 
another, and during this shift visual input from the eyes is suppressed.   However, saccades are 
short in duration, lasting from 10 to 40 milliseconds, such that the gap in visual input is 
generally imperceptible to the human brain and little visual processing takes place.  The speed 
of a saccade is not under conscious control and once underway, the eventual target cannot be 
changed. Saccades differ quantitatively from fixations in that they have greater spatial 
dispersion and higher velocity.  Consequently, in an algorithm they are usually identified by a 
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velocity threshold, and in some cases, a concurrent acceleration threshold.  Periods during 
which one or both of these thresholds are surpassed are classified as saccades. 
2.3.3 Other eye movements 
While fixations and saccades are the primary types of eye movements, there are other types of 
eye movements, such as smooth pursuit movements, glissades, and blinks (Nyström & 
Holmqvist, 2010; Purves, 2012).  Typically, however, not all movements are relevant to the 
specific research questions of interest, so algorithms are constructed such that they filter only 
the types of eye movements that are of interest.  Remaining eye movements are classified as 
either saccades or fixations depending on the choice of thresholds. 
2.4 Critical Data Processing Filters and What They Do 
2.4.1 Measures used in event detection 
At their most rudimentary level, eyetracking algorithms function to differentiate fixations from 
saccades, which are traditionally identified using a variety of spatial and temporal thresholds.  
Eyetracking data is recorded in the form of sequential (x,y) gaze position coordinates (see 
Figure 2.1).  From these coordinates, several other measures, such as velocity, acceleration, and 
dispersion, are calculated that are subsequently used for event detection (e.g. separating 
fixations from saccades).  By comparing the calculated values to spatial and temporal 














Figure 2.1. Examples of raw eye gaze traces for the x and y position of the right eye 
recorded at (A) 250 Hz and (B) 500 Hz. 
The combination of filters that are implemented and the threshold settings used can 
dramatically impact the output returned by eye-tracking algorithms, affecting the accuracy of 
virtually all metrics that are collected (Blignaut, 2009; Shic, Chawarska, & Scassellati, 2008).   
For example, velocity or acceleration thresholds that are too high can result in short saccades 
being categorized as part of a fixation.  If this occurs, multiple fixations are merged and 
reported as a single fixation.  On the other hand, thresholds that are too low result in noise 
being categorized as saccades, which will incorrectly break up fixations into multiple smaller 
ones and even discard them completely. As such, any conclusions drawn from this data would 
be invalid. 
2.4.2 Addressing data quality 
Gaze position data contains noise and gaps that must be filtered out in order to get valid and 







































precision of measurements by introducing false position coordinates or erroneous gaps that 
affect the accurate measurement of fixations and saccades. Noise can be introduced from 
various sources, including participant movement, the experimental setting, as well as eye-
tracking hardware and software.  To mitigate the effect of noise on the data analysis, two 
different types of filters are commonly used: the first seeks to fill in short gaps of missing 
position data and the second to reduce noise.  
Noisy or ‘flickery’ data (i.e. meaning data containing gaps in the data stream during which the 
signal was lost) leads to incorrect classification of saccades, affecting both fixation duration and 
fixation number (Wass, Smith, & Johnson, 2012).  If a long fixation is incorrectly split into two 
smaller ones, and both parts of the fixation are above the minimum duration, the single long 
fixation will be reported as two short fixations.  As a result, the average duration calculation 
will be shorter and the average number of fixations will be greater than is actually the case. If 
one or both fixations are below the minimum duration, they would be discarded, resulting in 
calculations showing shorter and less frequent fixations.   
2.4.2.1 Gap fill-in and blink detection 
Gaps occur in eyetracking data when the camera briefly loses track of the eye or when a 
position sample is collected but fails to get relayed due to hardware or software malfunction 
(Holmqvist, Nyström, & Mulvey, 2012; Olsen, 2012).  These types of gaps are usually quite 
short in duration, ranging from 2 to around 60 milliseconds.  If they are allowed to remain in 
the data, the start of a gap will be incorrectly identified as the end of a fixation, cutting the 
fixation duration short.  Therefore, shorter gaps are filled in with position information from 
neighboring data points (see Figure 2.2). Gaps shorter than a pre-defined duration are filled in 
using a weighted scaling factor and the nearest valid samples, using the method described by 
Olsen and colleagues, and subsequently implemented in the Tobii system (Olsen, 2012).  With 
this method, missing points are interpolated based on proximity to two points: 1) the last valid 
position sample before the gap and 2) the first valid position sample after the gap. If a missing 
point is closer to one of these samples than the other, the position of the new point is 
proportionally weighted to give greater influence to the nearer valid sample.  A point positioned 
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in the middle of the gap is equally weighted by both valid samples, and is equal to the 











Figure 2.2.  Eye gaze traces showing (A) raw gaze data recorded at 500 Hz, and (B) gaze 
data after gap interpolation has been performed.  Gaps are selectively filled based on 
duration.  Note that the smaller gaps (just before 500 ms, at 1500 ms, and at 
approximately 1750 ms) due to signal loss in (A) have been filled in the traces in (B), but 
the larger gaps (250-570 ms, and at approximately 1600 ms), which are blinks or gaps 
that are too large to interpolate without compromising data quality, have been retained. 
Blinks also appear as gaps in the data, usually as points where the gaze coordinates and/or pupil 
size is 0.  Gaps due to blinks are longer than those due to hardware or software malfunction, 
lasting at least 100 milliseconds (Olsen, 2012).  For our purposes, we retain blinks as valid 
gaps rather than interpolate them, so that a fixation interrupted by a blink will be registered as 
two distinct fixations.  To avoid interpolating missing data caused by blinks, the maximum gap 
duration parameter is chosen so that it is shorter than the duration of a normal blink, roughly 
100 milliseconds (Stava, Huffman, Baker, Epstein, & Porter, 1994; VanderWerf, 2003).  Gaps 
that are shorter than this parameter are interpolated, and gaps that are longer remain in the data. 








































2.4.2.2 Noise reduction 
Noise is a significant issue affecting data quality, particularly for high frequency recordings, 
due to the large number of samples collected per unit of time.  However, there is an advantage 
with high-frequency recordings in that noise can be detected and smoothed with less 
modification to the data than in low frequency recordings.  Noise in the position data artificially 
increases the distance traveled by the eye from one sample to the next.  As a result, the 
calculated velocity is also artificially inflated, and appears as random spikes in the velocity data 
stream.   
There are a variety of methods that can be used to reduce noise spikes found in time series data, 
such as a moving average or moving median filter, Savitzky-Golay filtering or loess filtering.  
We decided to use the “rLOESS” filter, short for “robust locally weighted scatterplot 
smoothing,” because of its flexibility and ease of use.  Loess smoothing uses a locally-weighted 
linear regression and a second-degree polynomial to smooth the data, filtering the x and y 
dimensions separately (see Figure 2.3).  Moreover, the robust version of “LOESS” assigns 
lower weight to outlier points, reducing distortion of smoothed values (The Mathworks, Curve 
Fitting Toolbox: User's Guide, 2002). There are a few caveats to note when using rLOESS: 
first, as is the case with other least squares methods, a large number of outliers can still skew 
results. Second, LOESS can be computationally intensive particularly for large data sets with 
many trials and subjects, and finally, as is the case with many noise reduction filters, there will 









Figure 2.3. Sample gaze data showing the stages of filtering used to address data 
quality.  (A) shows the raw gaze data, (B) shows the same data after gap interpolation, 
and (C) shows the effect of smoothing interpolated gaze data by applying an “rLOESS” 
filter for noise reduction. 
A symmetric moving window is iterated through the data stream, and the center point in this 
window is replaced by the new smoothed value.  There are several options for how to define 
the size of this window.  Matlab offers the option of setting window size equal to a predefined 
percentage of the total number of data points.  However, the disadvantage of this method is 
that, all other things being equal, trials of different length will receive different degrees of 
smoothing.  An alternative method is to set the window size equal to a specific number of 
samples.  This, however, leads to different degrees of smoothing when sampling frequency 









































differs.  To allow for comparison of fixation data recorded at different frequencies, we 
specify a window duration, which is then converted to a specific number of data points before 
being passed to the Matlab filter.  With this approach, a greater number of points are used for 
smoothing data recorded at a higher frequency, an approach that addresses the larger amount of 
noise in high versus low frequency recordings.  
2.4.3 Separating events (fixations and saccades) 
2.4.3.1 Velocity and acceleration calculation 
Velocity and acceleration are the measures most often used by common algorithms to define 
fixations and saccades. While Tobii systems use only a velocity calculation, the Eyelink system 
uses a combination of both in their algorithm.  
In our algorithm, a velocity value and acceleration value is computed for each timepoint in the 
data stream.  Calculating velocity between two consecutive points could potentially introduce a 
large amount of noise into the data, particularly for higher frequency recordings.  Thus, we 
calculate velocity and acceleration for each point as an average of the neighboring points in a 
symmetric window, with the point of interest positioned in the middle.  This method is similar 
to the approach used in Tobii systems (Olsen, 2012).  
To determine velocity for a sample, the Euclidean distance between the first and last point in 
the window is calculated and converted into degrees of visual angle, and then divided by the 
difference in timestamps between the first and last point in the window (see Figure 2.4).  
Acceleration is computed similarly to velocity, with the exception that the visual angle 
computation should be replaced with the absolute value of the difference in velocity between 













Figure 2.4.  (A) Interpolated gaze traces and (B) corresponding velocity and 
acceleration traces calculated from the interpolated data using a moving average 
window.  Note that for illustrative purposes, velocity and acceleration are not drawn to 
scale. 
2.4.3.2 Determining thresholds 
The velocity and acceleration values computed above are compared to threshold values that are 
calculated separately for each trial (see Figure 2.5).  If the velocity or acceleration value is 
below threshold, the algorithm marks this time point as a potential fixation in the data stream, 
otherwise it is marked as a potential saccade.   
Most fixation detection algorithms use a static threshold that is applied across all subjects and 
all trials.  However, static thresholds do not account for imprecision in the data and several 
studies have shown that fixation and saccade calculations are highly sensitive to variations in 
noise levels (Holmqvist et al., 2012; Wass et al., 2012) and may also vary between tasks and 
individuals (Lans, Wedel, & Pieters, 2010; Rayner, Li, Williams, Cave, & Well, 2007). As a 
result, if the threshold is too low, noise spikes are mistaken for saccades and fixations are 
incorrectly split, decreasing fixation durations and increasing the number of fixations.  If the 


























threshold is too high, short saccades are categorized as noise and incorporated into the 
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Figure 2.5. (A) Interpolated and smoothed gaze data for one trial, (B) the 
corresponding velocity trace (gold) and adaptive velocity threshold (dashed gray), and 
(C) acceleration trace (green) and adaptive acceleration threshold (dashed gray).  
Velocity and acceleration thresholds are calculated for each trial individually.  The 
saccade detector then checks each data point that exceeds either threshold (i.e. above 
the dashed lines) to determine if spatial dispersion criteria have been exceeded. If so, the 
points are marked as a potential saccade.  If not, it is re-classified as a fixation point. 
 
In contrast to a static threshold, another method is to use variable thresholds based on the 
amount of local noise.  Adapting the method described by Nyström and Holmqvist (Nyström & 
Holmqvist, 2010), we used an iterative, data-driven approach to calculate velocity and 
acceleration thresholds.  The strength of this approach is that it takes into account the variability 
in data quality across subjects and trials and also addresses the issue of differences in 
characteristics of fixation behavior, rather than using a one-size-fits-all approach that ignores 
differences across eye-trackers, individuals, and trials. 
This is especially important in our case, as we compare data across several eye-trackers and 
between different subject populations.  Tobii, Eyelink II, and Eyelink 1000 trackers sample at 
different frequencies and have different levels of noise.  Participants with high-functioning 
autism sometimes have more difficulty interfacing with the eye tracker, leading to different 
levels of noise. 
The steps in the adaptive threshold calculation outlined by Nyström and colleagues are as 
follows: first, the algorithm is given an initial starting threshold that can be any value as long as 
it lies in the range of observed velocities for that trial.  For all samples below this threshold, the 
mean and standard deviation are calculated.  The new threshold is updated by setting it equal to 
the mean plus a multiplier of the standard deviation.  (While Nyström and colleagues found that 
a multiplier of six was a reasonable value, here we found that a value of three worked best for 
our data.)  Again, the mean and standard deviation of all samples below this new threshold are 
calculated and the threshold is again updated. This process iterates until the new threshold is 
less than one degree per second greater than the previous threshold for velocity.  
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2.4.3.3 Displacement calculation 
In addition to velocity and acceleration thresholds, a motion (or displacement) threshold is also 
used to delay saccade onset until the eye has moved a minimum distance out of the most recent 
fixation.  This filter is similar to one implemented by Eyelink systems and adds an additional 
layer of security against false saccade onset.  While this calculation can be performed a number 
of different ways, here we calculate the distance between each potential saccade point and the 
nearest preceding fixation point to determine whether displacement since the previous fixation 
exceeds threshold.   
2.4.3.4 Saccade detector 
The saccade detector makes two passes through the data stream, once before the motion 
calculation and once after.  In the first pass, the detector checks the velocity and acceleration of 
each individual sample against the data-derived thresholds (see Figure 2.5 above).  If either 
velocity or acceleration exceeds threshold, the point is marked as a potential saccade. 
Otherwise, the point is marked as a potential fixation.  After performing the motion calculation 
described below, the saccade detector makes a second pass through the data stream, checking 
each point marked as a potential saccade against the displacement threshold. If this threshold is 
not surpassed, then the point likely belongs to the most recent fixation and it is re-classified as a 
fixation.  
2.4.4 Rejecting false saccades and fixations 
2.4.4.1 Saccade classifier 
As added insurance against imprecision in the data, the saccade classifier is triggered only 
when there have been a sufficient number of sequential samples identified as potential 
saccades, followed by a specific number of samples identified as potential fixations (see Table 
2.1 below).  This filter makes it so that the classifier is not activated by short, alternating 




Table 2.1. Illustration of the saccade classifier filter. Potential saccade points are 
marked as zeros, and potential fixations as ones.   In the example below, the minimum 
number of saccade points that must appear sequentially is two, and the minimum 
number of fixation points is 5, such that the saccade classifier does not signal the start of 
a saccade until a minimum fivef two saccade points appear sequentially, after which the 





















2.4.4.2 Merging fixations 
Despite addressing data quality issues with gap interpolation and noise smoothing, there will 
still be gaps in the data that cause fixations to be incorrectly classified as multiple smaller ones. 
Other studies have shown the most accurate results are obtained if this step is performed near 
the end of the data processing pipeline.  Consequently, in our algorithm we implement this 
filter in the second to last step, before short fixations are discarded.  
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To address the issue of incorrectly split fixations, consecutive fixations are checked to 
determine whether they are spatially and temporally close.  If both these criteria are met, it is 
highly likely the two fixations were originally part of one larger fixation. These fixations are 
subsequently merged on the basis of two criteria: the time interval between the fixation groups 
must not exceed a pre-defined duration threshold and the distance between fixation groups 
must not exceed a pre-defined spatial threshold.   
2.4.4.3 Discarding short fixations 
Lastly, fixations with durations shorter than the minimum duration are discarded.  While there 
is no consensus for how short a fixation can be, most studies use a bottom duration limit of 50 
to 100 milliseconds.  See Figure 2.6 for the outcome of algorithm after merging fixations and 
discarding of fixations that do not meet the minimum duration threshold. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In summary, this algorithm employs a combination of velocity and acceleration thresholds to 
detect fixations and saccades, implements an rLOESS filter to address noise, and interpolates 
missing points due to signal loss in the data stream.  We also employ a data-driven 
methodology to derive threshold values.  This flexible, straight-forward analysis pipeline is 
suitable for analyzing that data collected across different platforms and in different eye-tracking 








Figure 2.6.  (A) Interpolated data, (B) corresponding fixation output showing fixations 
with no minimum duration, (C) final fixation classifier output (purple) and discarded 
fixations (green). 
2.6 Pseudocode of Event Detection Algorithm 
1. Filtering & de-noising 
a. Identify gaps in the data stream where eye position data is missing. 
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b. Separate gaps that are longer than the maximum gap duration parameter from gaps 
that are shorter. Gaps that are longer than this parameter are retained as valid gaps. 
Gaps that are shorter than this parameter continue to the next step for interpolation. 
c. Interpolate each data point in the gap separately, using the last valid data point before 
the gap begins (t1), the first valid data point after the gap ends (t2), and a scaling 
factor (α). 
i. Scaling factor (α): Subtract the timestamp at t2 from the timestamp of the point 
being replaced (t*), and then divide by the total duration of the gap (t2 - t1).  
Namely, define: 
α = (t2 – t*) / (t2 – t1) 
ii. Multiply the scaling factor by the position data at t1 (x(t1)).  
iii. Subtract the scaling factor from 1, and multiply by the position data at t2 x(t2). 
Add this result to the result from the previous step for the new interpolated 
position coordinates (x(t*)), such that:  
   x(t*) = α x(t1) + (1-α) x(t2) 
iv. Repeat for each point until all missing points in the gap are interpolated. 
v. Repeat steps i-iv for each gap in the data stream. 
d. Iterate a moving window through the data stream, calculating a local regression for 
each data point using the “rLOESS” function in Matlab. 
2. Calculation of adaptive thresholds 
a. Velocity calculation: Iterating a moving window through the data stream, determine 
angular velocity for each sample; calculate the Euclidean distance between the first 
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and last points in the window, and then convert the distance to degrees of visual 
angle. Next, divide the visual angle by the difference in timestamps to get angular 
velocity for the data point. 
b. Acceleration Calculation: Repeat the same method as above to determine acceleration 
for each sample, with the modification of replacing Euclidean distance with the 
difference in velocity between the first and last samples in the window. 
c. Calculate adaptive thresholds for velocity and acceleration using the method 
described in the text. 
3. Saccade detection & classification 
a. Compare velocity and acceleration of each data point against the thresholds and mark 
as a potential saccade if either threshold is exceeded.  Otherwise, mark the point as 
potentially belonging to a fixation. 
b. Motion Calculation: For each potential saccade point, calculate the motion travelled 
from the most recent fixation point.  If this distance does not exceed the motion 
threshold, re-classify point as a fixation. 
c. Moving through the data stream, mark the saccade detector as active for any data 
point for which the motion threshold is exceeded and either velocity or acceleration 
exceeds threshold. 
d. Classify saccades as periods where the saccade detector has been on and off for the 
minimum number of samples. All other points marked by the saccade detector are 
considered noise, and should be classified as samples belonging to fixations. 
4. Fixation identification 
a. Calculate the distance and timestamp difference between sequential fixations. 
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b. If neither the spatial nor the temporal threshold for merging fixations is exceeded 
for a pair of fixations, then merge the fixations into one. 
c. Discard fixations that do not meet the minimum duration parameter. 
2.7 Summary of Suggested Parameter Settings 
Filtering Step Parameter Value 
Gap Fill-in Maximum Gap Duration 75 ms 
Noise Reduction Filter Robust loess (rLOESS in Matlab) 
Noise Reduction Filter Window Duration 40 ms 
Velocity Calculation Velocity Window Duration 22 ms 
Acceleration Calculation Acceleration Window Duration 22 ms 
Calculating Thresholds Velocity and Acceleration Threshold Adaptive 
Motion Calculation Motion Threshold 0.45 degrees 
Saccade Classifier Minimum Samples for Saccade On 2 
Saccade Classifier Minimum Samples for Saccade Off 5 
Merging Fixations Maximum Angle between Fixations 0.5 degrees 
Merging Fixations Maximum Time between Fixations 75 ms 
Discarding Fixations Minimum Fixation Duration 100 ms 





C h a p t e r  I I I   
FACE PREFERENCE DECISION-MAKING AND VISUAL BEHAVIOR 
3.1 Overview 
Now that the methodological structure for analysis of the eyetracking data in Chapter II has 
been discussed, the attention should be turned to the empirical studies in this thesis.  Chapter III 
is composed of two studies that examine face preference and visual behavior.  In these studies, 
we tested people with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and amygdala lesion patients to address 
two important questions regarding social processing: 1) do known deficits in objectively 
evaluating faces also interfere with making subjective decisions about faces? And 2) are the 
visual behaviors that accompany face preference decisions in controls the same in people with 
social processing deficits? 
There is considerable evidence for abnormal social processing in people with ASD, specifically 
in the context of objective decision-making, such as identification of familiar faces and 
recognition of emotional expressions.  It remains unknown, however, whether reported deficits 
in social processing also extend to making preference-based decisions amongst social stimuli, 
such as those regarding face preference or attractiveness.  The aim of the studies in this chapter 
was to explore the extent to which these known aberrations in social processing interfere with 
preference decision-making. 
We present two studies in ASD and amygdala lesion patients that investigate whether 
preference decisions for faces are altered in these conditions.  Both studies utilized a 2-
alternative forced-choice task in which subjects inspected pairs of face stimuli or pairs of non-
face stimuli and made a decision about which stimulus they prefer.   
In the first study in this chapter, the “Gaze Cascade” study, we examined the link between gaze 
and preference formation in people with ASD and amygdala lesions.  Specifically, we were 
interested in investigating whether reported deficits in social processing influence the temporal 
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evolution of preference-based decisions among social stimuli, as well as the eventual 
outcome of those preference-based decisions.  Furthermore, we sought to examine whether the 
eye movements of people with ASD and amygdala lesions would indicate a fundamentally 
altered evaluation process when deciding among social stimuli.  
In the second study, the “Familiarity versus Novelty” study, we examined the evolution of 
category-specific preference biases by investigating in high-functioning autism a principle 
reported in the literature for neurotypicals: the preference for familiar faces over novel faces.   
We have seen that repeated visual exposure to a face increases preference for that face, and that 
the effect is likely linked to how we acquire and develop face expertise.  But what happens in a 
population, such as people with autism, who demonstrate impairments in developing face 
expertise?  In this study, we explored established preference principles for social and non-social 
stimulus categories that have been observed in controls.   
We found that people with ASD and amygdala lesion patients made similar preference 
decisions as controls in judging face attractiveness in the “Gaze Cascade” study, and that 
people with ASD demonstrated similar preference biases and visual orienting as controls in the  
“Familiarity versus Novelty” tasks.   In addition, both ASD and amygdala lesion patients 
demonstrated a similar visual sampling process, linking preference and attentional orienting.  
However, people with ASD displayed two key differences compared to neurotypicals: the ASD 
group was significantly faster in making preference decisions, and reaction times in the ASD 
group were insensitive to decision difficulty, particularly for social preference decisions. 
We suggest that the known perceptual advantage in ASD, coupled with the absence of higher-
order social attributions and diminished interest in social stimuli in ASD, could confer a 
response time advantage to the ASD group in the face preference tasks.  Evidence in the 
literature is consistent with this possibility and we discuss these points in the Discussion.  
Furthermore, it could also be the case that face preference formation is not significantly 
impaired by the alterations in observed face processing or perhaps even social processing, 
given that subjective attractiveness judgments do not require the retrieval of social knowledge 
or high-order mentalizing.   
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That the ability to form social preferences remains intact in a clinically diagnosed population 
with putative deficits in social processing suggests that social preference formation is an aspect 
of social processing that operates by way of a different or perhaps similar but less complex 
underlying cognitive mechanism than other aspects of social processing. The results contribute 
to the growing literature, showing that many basic elements of social processing are spared or 
compensated for, and that social processing impairments in high-functioning autism become 
more prominent during higher-order complex judgments that require linking perceptual 
information with relevant social knowledge.  In other words, impairments in social cognition 
that occur earlier in the processing stream could be compensated for, or simply not relevant to, 
some aspects of social functioning.  Indeed, the results from the gaze cascade study and 
familiarity/novelty studies in this chapter indicate that the mechanism linking gaze to 
preference formation for faces, and the ability to form preferences about faces as well as 
maintain those preferences, appears intact in ASD.  However, we also discuss evidence that 
there are underlying differences in the behavioral strategy used by individuals with autism. 
 
The gaze cascade study in ASD has been published as (Gharib, Mier, Adolphs, & Shimojo, 
2015).  Daniela Mier also assisted with data collection in the Familiarity versus Novelty study.
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3.2 Gaze Cascade Study in Autism 
3.2.1 Abstract 
People with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have been reported to show atypical attention and 
evaluative processing, in particular for social stimuli such as faces. The usual measure in these 
studies is an explicit, subjective judgment, which is the culmination of complex-temporally 
extended processes that are not typically dissected in detail.  Here we addressed a neglected 
aspect of social decision-making in order to gain further insight into the underlying 
mechanisms: the temporal evolution of the choice.  We investigated this issue by quantifying 
the alternating patterns of gaze onto faces, as well as nonsocial stimuli, while subjects had to 
decide which of the two stimuli they preferred. Surprisingly, the temporal profile of fixations 
relating to choice (the so-called “gaze cascade”) was entirely normal in ASD, as were the 
eventual preference choices. Despite these similarities, we found two key abnormalities:  
people with ASD made choices more rapidly than did control subjects across the board, and 
their reaction times for social preference judgments were insensitive to choice difficulty. We 
suggest that ASD features an altered decision-making process when basing choice on social 
preferences.  One hypothesis motivated by these data is that a choice criterion is reached in 
ASD regardless of the discriminability of the options.  
3.2.2 Introduction 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a pervasive developmental disorder characterized by 
impairments in social and cognitive processing.  One of the core diagnostic criteria for this 
disorder is a deficit in social communication and social interaction (DSM-V), which presents in 
real-life interactions as an inattention to faces and reduced eye contact, in addition to more 
complex social deficits such as difficulty recognizing emotional expressions and relating to 
others.   Several hypotheses propose that motivational or attentional social deficits in early life 
could disrupt a critical phase in normal brain development, during which early social orienting 
typically lays the framework for more complex social and cognitive processes to develop later 
in life (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012; Dawson et al., 2004; 2002).  In 
people with ASD, these early-onset motivational deficits may cause reduced social orienting 
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and learning from a young age, resulting in decreased attending to social stimuli, which 
further disrupts normal development of cognitive processes related to social perception (Mundy 
& Neal, 2000).  
A large number of studies examining these social impairments have found a reduced attentional 
bias towards faces in ASD.  When viewing complex social scenes, people with autism make 
fewer initial fixations to the person and to the face within a scene relative to controls, indicating 
thatthere is reduced spontaneous attentional capture by social stimuli (Fletcher-Watson et al., 
2009).  Similarly, in a selective attention task for which controls are unable to ignore irrelevant 
faces, people with ASD were found to be un-distracted, leading the authors to suggest that a 
deficit in the automatic processing of faces may underlie the diminished attentional bias for 
faces (Remington et al., 2012).   
In addition to the reduced saliency of faces for people with autism, many studies have found 
that when people with ASD do fixate on faces, the pattern of visual behavior with respect to 
facial features differs from neurotypical viewing behavior. The exact nature of these 
differences, however, is far from clear.  Some studies report reduced gaze to the eyes and 
increased reliance on information in the mouth region (Klin et al., 2002; Spezio, Adolphs, 
Hurley, & Piven, 2007), while other studies that similarly report reduced gaze to the eyes find 
little difference in gaze to the mouth region (Corden et al., 2008; Dalton et al., 2005).  
Pelphrey and colleagues even reported reduced fixation time to all socially-salient regions of 
the face, including the eyes, nose, and mouth, and increased gaze to non-feature regions of the 
face (Pelphrey et al., 2002).  The variable results have been attributed to a number of factors, 
including experimental differences in stimulus type (e.g., static/dynamic, computer-
generated/real faces) and task demand (e.g., emotion judgment, gaze direction, etc.).  However, 
a growing number of studies also propose that discrepant results arise, in part, due to the use of 
compensatory mechanisms or atypical processing strategies during certain types of face 
perception tasks, particularly by individuals who are high-functioning (Harms et al., 2010; 




Abnormal gaze behavior in ASD is often accompanied by difficulties evaluating social 
information conveyed by faces, such as recognizing emotional expressions.  Again, the findings 
are inconsistent, but some behavioral studies have found impaired recognition of basic 
emotions in ASD: compared to their neurotypical counterparts, people with autism are slower 
and less accurate in identifying certain negative emotional expressions such as anger, fear, and 
sadness (Ashwin et al., 2006; Bal et al., 2009; S. Wallace et al., 2008), though basic emotion 
recognition might still be preserved in high-functioning individuals (Castelli, 2005).  There is 
stronger evidence, however, in support of impairments recognizing complex emotions, such as 
jealousy and trustworthiness, and making higher-level social judgments from faces that involve 
attributions of mental state (Adolphs et al., 2001; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997).  Moreover, 
deficits in the ability to recognize facial expressions of emotions such as fear (Pelphrey et al., 
2002) and sadness by people with ASD (Corden et al., 2008) are correlated with abnormal gaze 
to central features of the face, and particularly the eyes.  
Two highly relevant aspects of social processing have, however, not been much investigated:  
our preference decisions among social stimuli, and the temporal evolution of preference-based 
choices.  First, most of the research on face processing to date focuses on emotion recognition 
or face perception in general, and few studies have investigated how these factors can influence 
our preferences of faces.  Thus far, much of the research examining visual behavior in ASD has 
focused on atypical visual behavior and the nature of these impairments specifically in the 
context of objective decision-making, such as correctly identifying emotional expressions.  
What is unknown, however, is whether these reported deficits also extend to making more 
subjective decisions, such as those involving face preference or attractiveness, which are just as 
relevant to social functioning, perhaps even more so.  Secondly, it remains unknown how 
abnormal social judgments about faces might arise—what is the timecourse and possible 
underlying mechanism as atypical choices unfold? 
Previous studies in typically developed individuals have investigated the cognitive processes 
involved in making preference choices. One class of models is known as drift diffusion models 
(DDM) and was initially proposed by Ratcliff and colleagues to describe two-choice decision 
processes (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008).  These models assume that evidence for 
  
50 
each alternative is accumulated and integrated over time until a decision threshold is reached.  
More recent studies have shown that integrating eyetracking data as an additional parameter in 
the DDM results in a model that better predicts choice and possibly reaction times (Krajbich, 
Armel, & Rangel, 2010). 
Similar in form to the drift diffusion models is the gaze cascade phenomenon proposed by 
Shimojo and colleagues (S. Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003), emphasizing the 
behavioral dynamics of preference choice.  In their model, it is proposed that preference and 
gaze mutually interact in a positive feedback loop to produce an effect known as a “gaze 
cascade.”  Given a choice between two stimuli, individuals are initially just as likely to inspect 
one image in the pair as the other. However, in the few seconds before a preference decision is 
made, an increasing gaze bias occurs toward the eventually-chosen stimulus. Shimojo and 
colleagues propose that in the moments before this decision is made, a positive feedback 
pathway is engaged in which the gaze bias towards the to-be-chosen image leads to increased 
preference, which in turn increases gaze bias further, and so on, until the preference signal 
surpasses threshold leading to a behavioral decision. Thus in this model, gaze orienting is 
intrinsically linked to and necessary for decision-making and vice versa.  Indeed, further 
evidence supporting the reciprocal effect of gaze on preference formation is demonstrated in 
experiment 2 of the same paper and a follow-up study using fMRI (Ito et al., 2014).  In both 
studies, one face in a pair is presented on screen for a longer duration than the other face.  After 
several repetitions, participants report a preference bias for the longer-presented face, indicating 
that manipulation of gaze can directly influence preference decisions.  While the gaze cascade 
effect has been observed in other studies examining preference choice (Noguchi & Stewart, 
2014; C. Simion & Shimojo, 2006), the effect may also extend to other types of visual 
decision-making tasks (Fiedler, 2012; Glaholt & Reingold, 2009; Wiener, Hölscher, Büchner, 
& Konieczny, 2011). 
Given that the literature suggests atypical viewing behavior in ASD is accompanied by deficits 
in processing social information, the current study sought to examine the influence of gaze on 
preference choice in autism and, specifically, whether eye movements reveal a fundamentally 
different evaluation process in ASD.  Eye-tracking was used to investigate gaze behavior in 
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adults with high-functioning autism while they made preference decisions amongst pairs of 
social and non-social stimuli.  Since direct gaze can elicit atypical visual behavior in ASD, we 
utilized face stimuli depicting open eyes as well as closed eyes so that we could determine 
whether a potentially abnormal “gaze cascade” effect was caused by an avoidance of direct 
gaze, or rather by an overall difficulty in making self-paced preference judgments for faces.  
Furthermore, we tested whether the typically robust gaze cascade would remain intact under 
time pressure by using a time restriction in one block.  Consistent with evidence that 
individuals with ASD have difficulty evaluating and making social judgments about faces, and 
given evidence of reduced attention to faces and direct gaze in ASD, we predicted that the ASD 
group would not have a normal gaze cascade, take longer than controls to make preference 
choices regarding faces, and end up making unusual preference choices.  To our surprise, we 
found an essentially typical gaze cascade, normal final preferences, and faster decision times in 
ASD.  
3.2.3 Materials and methods 
3.2.3.1 Participants 
Participants were a group of 12 high-functioning subjects with a DSM-IV diagnosis of Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (Mage = 35.4 years, SD = 12.8, age range = 22-58; Females = 3).  Sample 
size was determined by participant availability.  Diagnosis was confirmed by ADOS [Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule, (Lord et al., 2000)] and ADI-R  [Autism Diagnostic 
Interview-Revised, (Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994)] or SCQ [Social Communication 
Questionnaire, (Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003)].  The comparison group consisted of 12 healthy 
controls (Mage = 33.3 years, SD = 11.9, age range = 20-59; Females = 1), group-matched for 
age, gender, and IQ, with no family history of psychiatric illness.  Table 3.1 summarizes 
demographic and diagnostic information for participants. 
Independent samples t-tests showed that the groups were not significantly different in terms of 
age (t(22) = 0.44, p = .685), gender (p = .590, 2-sided Fisher’s Exact Test), and IQ (t(22) = -
0.87, p = .392), as measured by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 
1999).  All participants gave written informed consent to participate under a protocol approved 
by the Institutional Review Board of the California Institute of Technology. 
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Table 3.1. Demographic and diagnostic information for autism and control 
participants in the gaze cascade study. 
          Autism group Autism group: ADOS 
 Age Verbal IQ 
Full scale  
IQ 
SOC COM+SOC 
1 58 118 126 7 9 
  2 24 118 101 7 12 
3 22 102 107 14 21 
4 22 101 102 13 20 
5 42 80 93 14 20 
6 30 111 106 11 17 
7 57 119 102 8 12 
8 31 127 124 7 11 
9 26 89 93 7 10 
10 47 109 104 7 9 
11 29 117 115 14 20 
12 37 135 133 9 13 
Mean 35.4 110.5  108.8   
SD 12.8   15.5    12.9   
              Control group   
 
 Age  Verbal IQ 
Full scale  
IQ 
  
Mean 33.3 111.7 113.1   
SD 11.9 11.7 11.3   
a. Verbal IQ and full-scale IQ from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; 
ADOS: Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; SOC: social interaction subscale; 
COM+SOC: communication + social interaction subscales.  
 
3.2.3.2 Stimuli and apparatus 
Stimuli consisted of pairs of social stimuli (computer-generated human faces) or pairs of non-
social stimuli (nature scenes sourced from a google image search for “desert” and “mountain”).  
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Face images, generated using Facegen (Singular Inversions, Vancouver, Canada), were 
front-facing with neutral emotional expression and direct eye contact.   
To control for gaze bias due to differences in baseline attractiveness of the stimuli, all images 
were drawn from a larger set of face and nature scene stimuli pre-rated for attractiveness by a 
separate group of non-autistic participants on a scale of 1 (very unattractive) to 7 (very 
attractive) (n = 20, Females = 8; Mage = 28.2 years, SD = 7.5).  In accordance with the original 
gaze cascade study, images were then selected and paired such that half the pairs in each block 
had images that were equal in attractiveness pre-ratings (“high difficulty” trials) and the other 
half had a difference of 1.5 points (“low difficulty” trials).  Each image pair was presented in 
randomized order once per block, and the location of each image in a pair was left-right 
randomized.  The two Open Eyes blocks and the Roundness block (see Figure 3.1) used the 
same set of faces. For a further condition with a stricter time restriction, we created a novel set 
of face stimuli from the images that had been pre-rated by the same participants, in order to 
eliminate memory effects.  Image pairs in the Timed condition had the same mix of “high 
difficulty” and “low difficulty” trials as the untimed conditions.  
Images were presented on a 21” CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 100 Hz and pixel resolution 
of 1152 x 864.  The stimuli in each test pair were presented simultaneously on the left and right 
side of the screen.  At a viewing distance of approximately 57 cm, each stimulus pair had an 
overall size of 36.2 (width) x 14.4 (height) degrees of visual angle. 
Stimuli were presented using Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA), the Psychophysics toolbox 
(Brainard, 1997), and the Eyelink toolbox (Cornelissen, Peters, & Palmer, 2002).  Gaze data 
was collected using a head-mounted Eyelink II eye-tracking system (SR Research, Osgoode, 
Canada).  Corneal and pupil reflection were recorded at a sampling rate of 250 Hz.  At the 
beginning of each block, a 9-point calibration was performed.  Each trial began by requiring 
subjects to fixate on a central drift correction dot.  After the eye-tracker registered a successful 




Subjects performed various 2-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) tasks while eye-gaze was 
tracked (see Figure 3.1).  Subjects inspected a pair of simultaneously presented stimuli, then 
made the 2AFC choice by pushing either the left or right button. In advance of the experiment, 
subjects completed 20 trials with simultaneously-presented geometrical shapes in which they 
had to indicate which of the two was a triangle. This task was implemented to check for basic 
motor response time differences between groups. 
Experimental design consisted of five blocked conditions where either the stimulus or task 
instruction was varied (see Figure 3.1 for summary of experimental conditions and sample 
stimuli).  In three of the blocks, participants made self-paced preference decisions, viewing 
either faces with open eyes (Open Eyes), faces with closed eyes (Closed Eyes), or nature scenes 
(Nature Scenes), reporting which face (or nature scene) they liked the most.  In another block, 
participants viewed open-eyed faces but instead made objective decisions as to which face was 
rounder (Roundness), again with no time limit.  In the fifth block, participants viewed open-
eyed faces and made preference decisions, but were given only 1.5 seconds for each decision 
(Timed).  All blocks consisted of 40 trials, with the exception of our main condition of interest, 
Open Eyes, which consisted of 80 trials. Block order was counter-balanced across subjects.  
Lastly, we selected a subset of the images presented in the experiment (13-14% of all images) 
that had been given low, average, and high attractiveness pre-ratings and had all participants 
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Figure 3.1. Summary of experimental conditions and example stimuli. 
 
3.2.3.4 Analyses 
Data were analyzed using custom scripts written in Matlab.  In the four preference decision 
conditions (Open Eyes, Closed Eyes, Timed, and Nature Scenes), high difficulty trials were 
compared to low difficulty trials (as defined above in Stimuli & Apparatus).  For the objective 
Roundness condition, we defined difficulty by calculating a height to width ratio for each face, 
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and then ranking the stimulus pairs according to face ratio differences.  The 20 trials with the 
smallest differences were defined as high difficulty; the largest 20 differences, low difficulty.  
We used two analysis methods to examine the level of consistency in preference choices 
between the two groups.  First, we calculated a between-group correlation of the proportion of 
subjects in each group that chose a given image in each pair, collapsing across the two 
difficulty levels.  Second, we examined whether both groups’ preference choices in the low 
difficulty trials agreed with the attractiveness ratings made by the pre-rating group.  We limited 
this second analysis to low difficulty trials because only low difficulty trials had an objectively 
correct (i.e., higher-rated) image for the preference tasks, allowing us to define accuracy.  A 
binary logistic regression analysis was carried for each subject and each block, regressing the 
dependent variable of preference decision against the consensus-preferred image as defined by 
the pre-rating group.  This resulted in a set of beta weights representing the degree to which the 
higher-rated image (or rounder image in the case of the Roundness condition) predicted a 
subject’s preference choices in a given block.  We compared beta weights between groups 
using independent samples t-tests.   
To compare our gaze results to those obtained in the original gaze cascade study (S. Shimojo et 
al., 2003), a similar post-experiment analysis was conducted.  Eye tracking data from all trials 
in a condition were aligned to the time of decision (i.e., button press).  For each eye-tracking 
point from decision time going back to 1 second before decision time, a “true” value was 
assigned when gaze was on the to-be-chosen stimulus, and a “false” value when gaze was on 
the unchosen stimulus.   Points outside either stimulus were treated as “not a number.”  The 
ratio of “true” to “false” values for each time-point was averaged across trials and subjects in 
each group to obtain the likelihood of gaze bias toward the chosen stimulus at each time point.  
The data from the ASD group and from the control group were then each fit with a four-
parameter sigmoid regression curve for each condition (see Figure 3.2), with the four 
parameters representing the following: (1) bottom plateau – baseline comparison probability 
between the two stimuli, (2) top plateau – gaze bias at which the participant made the conscious 
behavioral choice, and (3 & 4) point of inflection and slope at point of inflection – timescale 
indicating the quickness of the decision.  Lastly, 95% confidence intervals were calculated for 
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the four parameter estimates.  Note that because each time point is averaged over multiple 
trials to interpolate the sigmoid function, the fit describes the time course of gaze probability at 
a given time point ahead of decision time (i.e., button press) rather than trial-by-trial gaze 
behavior.  
    
Figure 3.2. Protoypically-interpolated sigmoid with four parameters describing the time 
course of gaze probability at a given time point ahead of decision time (i.e., button press).  
Each time point of the group curve is calculated by averaging the true values across 40 
trials and 12 subjects (80 trials in the Open Eyes condition).  The parameters represent 
the following: (1) bottom plateau – baseline comparison probability between the two 
stimuli, (2) top plateau – gaze bias at which the participant made the conscious behavioral 
choice, and (3 & 4) point of inflection and slope at point of inflection – timescale 
indicating the quickness of the decision. 
 
To test whether the sigmoid parameters differed significantly between groups, non-parametric 
permutation tests were used, with the difference between control and autism group parameter 
estimates as test metrics.  We reshuffled the group labels (ASD, Control) to create 10,000 
synthetic data sets, calculating the sigmoid fit parameters for each.  The empirical distribution 
of the parameters was used to calculate the probability of seeing between-group parameter 






































differences greater than those observed in the present study.  Parameter estimates were 
considered significantly different between groups if the difference between estimates was in the 
top 2.5% or bottom 2.5% of the permutation distribution for that parameter (most extreme 
positive or negative differences). 
Reaction times (RTs) were log-transformed prior to statistical analysis to rectify the positively 
skewed distribution.  Raw values are reported in the text and figures.  Trials were excluded if 
reaction times were greater than 3 SD outside the group mean, or if no valid button press was 
registered (< 1% of the data). 
Baseline reaction times in the preliminary geometrical shape recognition task were compared 
between groups with a one-way ANOVA.  For the five experimental conditions, RTs were first 
analyzed with a 2 x 5 repeated-measures ANOVA, with a between-subjects factor of group 
(ASD, Control) and within-subjects factor of condition (Open Eyes, Closed Eyes, Timed, 
Roundness, Nature Scenes).  For the second level of analysis (examining the effect of decision 
difficulty on RTs), four (2 x 2 x 2) repeated-measures ANOVAs were carried out comparing 
the Open Eyes condition to each of the other four conditions, with a between-subjects factor of 
group and an additional two-level factor of decision difficulty (high difficulty, low difficulty).  
In RT analyses with decision difficulty as a factor, we analyzed all trials belonging to that 
difficulty level, regardless of eventual preference choice.  Post-hoc tests were conducted when 
appropriate (2-tailed independent sample t-test, unless otherwise indicated).  Degrees of 
freedom were Greenhouse-Geisser corrected when violations of sphericity occurred.  Mean 
fixation durations, fixation rates, and inverse efficiency scores were each analyzed with a 2 x 5 






3.2.4.1 Fixation behavior 
A preliminary analysis comparing mean fixation durations and fixation rates between groups 
revealed no significant interactions (ps > .663) or main effects of group (ps > .351).  Results are 


































































Figure 3.3. (A) Mean fixation duration (B) mean fixation rate and (C) latency to first 
fixation on either stimulus for the autism (red) and control (blue) groups.  Error bars 
denote standard error. * p < .05,  but main effect of group across conditions was not 
significant, p = .132, η2 = .10. 
 
3.2.4.2 Preference choices  
A correlation analysis was conducted to assess the agreement between preference choices in the 
ASD and control groups (see Table 3.2).  There was a significant positive correlation between 
preference choices made by the two groups in all five conditions, four of which survived 
correction for multiple comparisons.  Attractiveness ratings for the post-rated subsets of stimuli 
were also strongly correlated between groups (see Table 3.3). 
Table 3.2. Between-group correlation of preference choices in low and high difficulty 
trials combined. 
 Open Eyes Closed Eyes Timed Roundness Nature Scenes 
Pearson’s r .676 * .445 * .389  .830 * .618 * 





































a. * p < .01 (corrected for multiple comparisons).  Note that the listed 
significance is uncorrected. 
 
Table 3.3. Post-ratings of stimuli subset by control and autism participants (13-14% of 
all images presented in study) and between-group correlation of ratings.  A subset of the 
images covering a range of attractiveness ratings (low, average, and high) were rated by 
all participants for attractiveness on a scale of 1 (very unattractive) to 7 (very 
attractive). 
Stimulus Type Mean Rating SD Pearson’s r p value 
Female Faces     
Control 3.27 1.02 .784* .004 
Autism 3.35 0.59   
Male Faces     
Control 3.23 1.16 .739* .009 
Autism 2.81 0.45   
Desert Scenes     
Control 4.14 1.00 .914** < .001 
Autism 4.37 0.46   
Mountain Scenes     
Control 4.64 1.08 .942** < .001 
Autism 5.08 0.76   
a. * p < .0125, ** p < .0025 (corrected for multiple comparisons).  Note that the listed 
significance is uncorrected. 
 
To examine the degree to which each groups’ preference choices agreed with the attractiveness 
ratings made by the pre-rating group, a binary logistic regression analysis was carried out for 
the low difficulty trials, regressing the dependent variable of preference decision against the 
consensus-preferred image, and t-tests were performed on the resulting beta weights (see Table 
3.4). None of the group differences in beta weights were significant. 
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Table 3.4. Results of the binary logistic regression model for low difficulty trials, 
regressing the dependent variable of preference choice against the consensus-preferred 
image as defined by the pre-rating group (beta weight means and standard errors, and 
p values from 2-tailed t-tests). 
 Open Eyes Closed Eyes Timed Roundness Nature Scenes 
 Mean β SE Mean β SE Mean β SE Mean β SE Mean β SE 
Control 4.09 1.69 1.40 0.29 4.81 2.38 16.32 2.89 4.15 2.43 
Autism 1.89 0.31 2.83 1.81 1.19 0.32 16.20 3.06 2.97 1.86 
p value   .21   .45   .15     .98   .71 
 
 
3.2.4.3 Gaze cascade effect  
The likelihood that an observer’s gaze was on the to-be-chosen picture was plotted against time 
before decision (see Figure 3.4). The results showed that the gaze cascade effect was present 
for both groups in all five conditions.  For each group, a four-parameter sigmoid function 
(parameters: bottom plateau, top plateau, point of inflection, slope at point of inflection) fit the 



















Figure 3.4. The likelihood that a participant's gaze is directed at the to-be-chosen stimulus 
is plotted against time to decision for the autism group (red) and control group (blue) for 
(A) Open Eyes, (B) Closed Eyes, (C) Timed, (D) Roundness, and (E) Nature Scenes.  Dots 
represent raw data averaged across trials and subjects for each time point.  Four-







































































































































































parameter sigmoids (solid lines; Parameters: bottom plateau, top plateau, point of 
inflection, slope at point of inflection) were fit to each likelihood curve (all R2s > .942).  
Shading denotes 95% confidence bounds of the sigmoid fit. 
Based on non-parametric tests using 10,000 random group assignments, we calculated the 
empirical probability of seeing parameter differences greater than those observed in the present 
study.  To test whether the sigmoid parameters differed significantly between groups, 
parameter estimates for the control group were subtracted from parameter estimates for the 
ASD group and compared against the probability distribution from permutations testing (see 
Methods for details).  None of the parameter differences between groups in the five conditions 
reached p = .05 significance, even when a correction for multiple comparisons was not applied.  
Parameter estimates and results of permutation testing are summarized in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5. Permutation Analysis: Summary table of coefficient estimates for four-
parameter sigmoid fits (parameters: bottom plateau, top plateau, point of inflection, 
slope at point of inflection), 95% confidence intervals for estimates, and probability of 
observed difference in parameters from random group sampling. 
  
Control group Autism group p (observed 
 Condition Parameter Estimate 95% CIs Estimate 95% CIs difference) 
 Open Eyes Bottom Plateau 0.438 [0.435, 0.442] 0.449 [0.441, 0.450] .44 
 POI 134.0 [132.9, 135.0] 154.9 [152.8,157.1] .29 
 Slope 0.003  0.002  .89 
 Top Plateau 0.845 [0.838, 0.851] 0.855 [0.841, 0.867] .44 
 R2 0.997  0.996   
Closed Eyes Bottom Plateau 0.446 [0.443, 0.449] 0.485 [0.482, 0.489] .33 
 POI 137.6 [136.5, 138.6] 162.9 [160.6,165.2] .23 
 Slope 0.003  0.003  .59 
 Top Plateau 0.837 [0.831, 0.844] 0.855 [0.843, 0.867] .41 
 R2 0.997  0.993   
Timed Bottom Plateau 0.458 [0.454, 0.461] 0.463 [0.457, 0.469] .46 
 POI 176.5 [174.1, 178.9] 149.0 [146.0, 152.0] .82 
 Slope 0.004  0.003  .62 
 Top Plateau 0.800 [0.786, 0.813] 0.710 [0.699, 0.721] .91 
 R2 0.979  0.942   
Roundness Bottom Plateau 0.508 [0.504, 0.512] 0.477 [0.471, 0.483] .62 
 POI 169.0 [166.2, 171.9] 144.0 [140.6, 147.4] .68 
 Slope 0.003  0.002  .80 
 Top Plateau 0.865 [0.851, 0.878] 0.745 [0.731, 0.760] .78 
 R2 0.990  0.982   
Nature Scenes Bottom Plateau 0.428 [0.420, 0.436] 0.426 [0.416, 0.436] .51 
 POI 138.1 [135.3, 140.9] 139.7 [136.9,142.4] .49 
 Slope 0.002  0.002  .52 
 Top Plateau 0.777 [0.762, 0.792] 0.899 [0.876, 0.922] .14 
 R2 0.983  0.996   
 
 
3.2.4.4 Reaction times 
A one-way ANOVA comparing baseline reaction time in the preliminary geometrical shape 
recognition task confirmed the ASD and control groups did not differ in basic motor response 
times, F(1,22) = 0.02, p = .882. 
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Reaction times for the experimental conditions were first analyzed using a 2 x 5 ANOVA 
comparing all five experimental conditions (see Figure 3.5).  Compared to controls, the ASD 
group had faster reaction times overall, reflected in a near-significant main effect of group, 
F(1,22) = 4.23, p = .052, η2 = .16.  Post-hoc comparisons revealed significant group differences 
in the Closed Eyes condition (ASD: M = 2.16, SE = 0.32; Controls: M = 3.13, SE = 0.30), t(22) 
= -2.31, p = .030, and Timed condition (ASD: M = 1.22, SE = 0.14; Controls: M = 1.62, SE = 
0.14), t(22) = -2.13, p = .045, and a trend-level group difference in the Open Eyes condition 
(ASD: M = 2.04, SE = 0.20; Controls: M = 2.77, SE = 0.27),  t(22) = -1.93, p = .067.  
Differences in RTs in the Roundness and Nature Scenes conditions were not significant (p = 
.179 and p = .400, respectively).  
 
Figure 3.5. Mean reaction times for the preliminary geometrical shape recognition task 
and experimental conditions, for the autism (red) and control (blue) groups.  Error bars 
denote standard error. * p < .05, + p < .10. 
To investigate RT differences between groups in the Open Eyes condition in comparison to the 
other conditions, a (2 x 2 x 2) repeated-measures ANOVA (factors: group x condition x 































four experimental conditions, with a between-subjects factor of group (ASD, Control) and a 
two-level factor of decision difficulty (high difficulty, low difficulty).  Means and standard 
errors for RTs in the individual conditions are shown in Table 3.6.   
Face Preference: Open Eyes vs. Closed Eyes  
The ANOVA comparing the effect of Closed Eyes versus Open Eyes on RTs indicated there 
was a significant main effect of group, F(1,22) = 4.93, p = .037, η2  = .183, for faster RTs in the 
ASD group compared to the control group.  None of the other main effects or interactions 
reached significance (all ps > .146).   
Face Preference: Timed vs. Untimed   
The ANOVA comparing the Timed condition to the self-paced Open Eyes condition revealed a 
significant interaction between group and difficulty on RTs, F(1,22) = 6.12, p = .022,  η2  = 
.218, as well as a trend-level three-way interaction, F(1,22) = 3.69, p = .068, η2  = .144.  Paired-
samples t-tests indicated trend-level differences in the Timed condition for controls (Controls: 
High difficulty: M = 1.63, SE = 0.14; Low difficulty: M = 1.60, SE = 0.15), t(11) = -1.75, p = 
.109, but not for the ASD group (ASD: High difficulty: M = 1.23, SE = 0.14; Low difficulty: M 
= 1.21, SE = 0.14), t(11) = -0.73,  p = .484. There was also a significant group effect for faster 
RTs in the ASD group compared to controls, F(1,22) = 6.59, p = .018, η2  = .230. 
Face Preference vs. Face Roundness   
The ANOVA comparing the Roundness condition to Open Eyes revealed a significant 
interaction between condition and difficulty on RTs, F(1,22) = 15.56, p = .001,  η2  = .414, as 
well as a trend-level group effect, F(1,22) = 2.99, p = .098, η2  = .120.  Paired-samples t-tests 
indicated both groups took significantly longer for high difficulty compared to low difficulty 
decisions in the Roundness task (Controls: High difficulty: M = 2.58, SE = 0.24; Low 
difficulty: M = 2.01, SE = 0.18), t(11) = -3.41, p = .006, (ASD: High difficulty: M = 2.08, SE = 
0.32; Low difficulty: M = 1.74, SE = 0.25), t(11) = -2.66, p = .022.  
Social vs. Non-social Preference   
The ANOVA comparing the Nature Scenes condition to Open Eyes revealed a significant 
interaction between group and difficulty, F(1,22) = 7.01, p = .015, η2 = .242, indicating that 
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decision difficulty had a different effect on RTs in the control group than on those in the 
ASD group. There was also a main effect of difficulty, F(1,22) = 4.53, p = .045, η2 = .171.  
None of the other main effects or interactions reached significance (all ps > .177).   
To examine the effect of decision difficulty on RTs in each group, within-group comparisons 
were performed on pooled data from the Nature Scenes and Open Eyes conditions.  Paired-
samples t-tests showed the control group took longer to make decisions in high difficulty trials 
compared to low difficulty trials (High difficulty: M = 2.85, SE = 0.29; Low difficulty: M = 
2.70, SE = 0.27), t(11) = -2.97, p = .013, whereas there was not a significant effect of difficulty 
on RTs in the ASD group (High difficulty: M = 2.21, SE = 0.26; Low difficulty: M = 2.22, SE = 
0.26), t(11) = 0.32, p = .757.  
Inverse Efficiency Scores   
Lastly, we checked for a speed-accuracy tradeoff by analyzing RT and accuracy together, 
computing inverse efficiency scores (i.e., reaction time divided by accuracy) for each 
participant and condition in the low difficulty trials.  A 2 x 5 ANOVA with a between-subjects 
factor of group and within-subjects factor of condition indicated there was no interaction 
between condition and group (p = .805) and no significant difference between groups (p = 
.108). 
Correlation with AQ 
There were no significant correlations between Autism Quotient scores (AQ) and RTs for the 
ASD group, nor IQ and RTs for either group.  
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Table 3.6. Mean reaction times in seconds (non-transformed values) and standard 
errors for high and low difficulty trials, and mean accuracy scores for low difficulty 
trials. 
  Control group Autism group 
  Reaction Time Accuracy Reaction Time Accuracy 
 Condition  Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Shape Recognition  0.66 0.04 99.6% 0.00 0.69 0.07 100% 0.00 
 Difficulty Level         
Open Eyes          
 High  2.89 0.30 - - 2.01 0.19 - - 
 Low  2.66 0.25 75.8% 0.03 2.07 0.21 70.4 % 0.03 
Closed Eyes          
 High 3.20 0.35 - - 2.18 0.33 - - 
 Low 3.07 0.27 65.1% 0.03 2.15 0.32 62.8% 0.04 
Timed          
 High 1.63 0.14 - - 1.23 0.14 - - 
 Low 1.60 0.15 59.6% 0.03 1.21 0.14 55.7% 0.03 
Roundness          
 High 2.58 0.24 - - 2.08 0.32 - - 
 Low 2.01 0.18 89.6% 0.06 1.74 0.25 92.5% 0.02 
Nature Scenes           
 High 2.81 0.32 - - 2.41 0.37 - - 
 Low 2.73 0.37 61.7% 0.04 2.36 0.35 65.4% 0.05 
 
3.2.5 Discussion 
Here, we found that individuals with ASD and controls made similar preference decisions in 
judging the attractiveness of faces, and that they arrived at those decisions using similar 
sampling processes, displaying the “gaze cascade” interaction between internal preference and 
attention bias.  Where the ASD group differed from controls was in faster decision times, and 
also in an insensitivity to task difficulty in the facial preference tasks.  Whereas reaction times 
generally increased for difficult judgments in controls, the ASD group responded equally 
quickly when judging the attractiveness of closely-matched faces.  
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People with ASD made similar preference choices compared to the control group. Preference 
choices were correlated between the two groups, and the ASD group chose the higher-rated 
image with generally the same frequency as controls across all conditions.  Additionally, 
attractiveness ratings for the post-rated subset of stimuli were strongly correlated between 
groups (see Table 3.3), which strongly suggests the initial ratings used to define difficulty level 
are also appropriate for the ASD group.  In other words, face pairs that were defined as equally-
attractive face pairs based on non-autistic pre-ratings were also likely to be considered equally 
attractive by ASD subjects. 
With respect to visual behavior, when we examined mean fixation durations and mean fixation 
rates, no significant group differences were detected in the details of the gaze pattern.  
Moreover, both the ASD and control groups replicated the gaze cascade effect observed in the 
original paper (S. Shimojo et al., 2003).  That is, the feedback loop linking visual orienting with 
preference decisions is intact in ASD, which was not expected given the literature on atypical 
gaze to faces in autism.  This indicates that the ASD group used similar preference decision-
making processes compared to neurotypicals even with social stimuli. Lastly, comparison of 
the four parameters of the gaze cascade curves using permutations testing revealed no 
significant differences between the groups in any of the conditions.  Thus, the process of visual 
orienting to the preferred stimulus and the temporal profile of fixations leading up to the choice 
exists in the ASD group independent of stimulus and decision type. 
Despite the lack of differences in decision outcomes and orienting behavior, the ASD group 
was significantly faster in making preference decisions overall.  This effect may seem 
incompatible with the lack of difference in gaze cascade fits, but the gaze cascade model is 
time-locked to the final response (decision), not the onset of the stimulus, and thus the model is 
relatively insensitive to variances in total performance time (RT), as well as the initial response 
(gaze) to the stimulus. The source of the speeded responses is unclear, but the data do contain 
some suggestive clues. First, the lack of significant group differences in the gaze cascade model 
fits strongly suggests that the processing advantage is not due to an abbreviated or otherwise 
abnormal feedback loop linking foveation and eventual preference. Second, post-hoc tests 
indicated that the main reaction time advantage stemmed mainly from faster response times in 
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preference decisions for faces, as opposed to the objective face decisions or the decisions for 
natural scenes, and that there was a complete lack of a reaction time advantage in the 
geometrical shape discrimination. This suggests that the mechanism lies in a higher-level 
component of preferential decision-making for faces, rather than in low-level motor, visual, or 
executive factors. 
Our other analyses of fixation behavior did not point to a particular source of the speeded 
responses.  However, we did find an isolated effect of shorter latencies to first face fixation in 
the Timed condition for ASD (see Figure 3.3-C).  A future study focusing on this high-pressure 
condition may be able to uncover more informative results regarding the early phases of 
preference formation. 
Given the faster reaction times in ASD, we also examined whether the difficulty of the decision 
affects reaction times.  Interestingly, the ASD group was insensitive to the difficulty of the 
decision, whereas controls had slower reaction times when images were similarly rated, as 
expected.  Most intriguingly, this insensitivity was strongest for face preference decisions: 
difficulty did increase RTs for face roundness judgments in ASD.  Our failure to find any 
robust RT differences in the nature scenes condition may have been due to lack of statistical 
power.  It is worth noting that even in controls there was not a strong effect of difficulty for 
nature scenes.  Thus, RTs in the ASD group seem to be particularly insensitive to decision 
difficulty for social preference decisions.  
We found no evidence to indicate the faster RTs were due to inattention or a random or rushed 
decision-making process. The ASD group’s preferences were not divergent from or noisier than 
the control group’s preferences.  The strong correlation of the ASD group’s choices with both 
the control group’s choices and the attractiveness pre-ratings from a separate non-autistic group 
indicates the ASD group used similar or convergent criteria to evaluate attractiveness.  Finally, 
the lack of a group difference in inverse efficiency scores reflects that faster RTs were not 
accompanied by a disproportionately large decrease in accuracy in ASD (i.e., there was not a 
corresponding loss in performance).  Thus, one possible explanation could be that a choice 
criterion is reached in social decisions regardless of the discriminability of the options, although 
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the fundamental mechanism underlying the choice decision may be shared between groups.  
Future studies with more formal modeling approaches than the methods used here would be 
needed to test this hypothesis. 
There is precedent for the idea that people with ASD may be faster on certain kinds of timed 
visual/perceptual tasks.  A study by Hayashi and colleagues reported that children with 
Asperger’s Syndrome scored higher than typically developing children on the Raven’s 
Standard Progressive Matrices test (RSPM) (Hayashi, Kato, Igarashi, & Kashima, 2008), a 
nonverbal intelligence test in which subjects identify the missing geometric element that 
completes a specific pattern.   Another study using the RSPM found that while people with 
autism performed the test with the same accuracy as controls (Soulières et al., 2009), their 
response times were significantly faster, suggesting that in certain situations visual processing 
was enhanced in ASD.  There is also evidence to indicate people with ASD can outperform 
neurotypicals in tasks involving mental rotation (Soulières, Zeffiro, Girard, & Mottron, 2011), 
visual search (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Keehn et al., 2008) and visual discrimination 
(Joseph, Keehn, Connolly, Wolfe, & Horowitz, 2009). The explanations given for such results 
include an underlying local processing advantage, lack of engagement with stimuli allowing for 
more efficient processing, or perhaps fundamental differences in motivational state.  
One contrast between the above results and our results is that our task is ostensibly social in 
nature, a domain in which people with ASD are generally thought to be at a disadvantage. 
There are a few related factors that could help to interpret this discrepancy. First, it is known 
that individuals with autism can mitigate social deficits using explicitly and implicitly guided 
compensatory strategies, masking social impairments in spite of atypical processing of social 
stimuli.  The effectiveness of such explicit top-down strategies has been found in tasks 
involving facial discrimination and emotion recognition (Rutherford & McIntosh, 2006; 
Teunisse & de Gelder, 2001; Wong et al., 2008).  Similarly, implicit compensatory strategies, 
such as prioritizing of local over configural information (Dawson et al., 2005; Rondan & 
Deruelle, 2007) are reported to underlie the performance advantage observed in ASD relative 
to controls in certain types of face perception tasks (Hobson et al., 1988; Langdell, 1978; 
Tantam et al., 1989).  Second, it may be that the face preference task does not involve higher-
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level social judgments.  The task regarded personal preferences, and did not require mental 
state inferences or social attributions regarding the face or other potential viewers, domains in 
which high-functioning individuals are more likely to show impairments compared to lower-
level social processes that are often spared. In that sense, the task might even have been 
approached as a perceptual task, rather than a social one. This would be consistent with the 
faster RTs observed in ASD, and also the insensitivity of RTs to the relative attractiveness of 
the faces. Finally, it could be the case that face processing deficits in high-functioning ASD 
become apparent only when there are more complex attentional demands, such as in real-life 
situations, or when there is competing visual information, such as with dynamic stimuli. This 
could also occur if attentional demands become too great to sustain explicit or implicit 
compensatory strategies. 
The current study had several limitations.  First, while the use of computer-generated faces is 
favorable in terms of controlling for potential confounds (e.g., facial expression), social stimuli 
with greater ecological validity (such as photographs or dynamic stimuli) may be more likely to 
elicit atypical gaze behavior, particularly in individuals with high-functioning autism.  Second, 
the difficulty factor was predefined based on ratings obtained from a separate group of non-
autistic participants.  Due to time limitations during the actual experiment, we obtained post-
ratings for only a small portion of the stimuli that were used. While we chose images that 
reflected a range of attractiveness ratings, people with ASD may have different face 
preferences that were not captured by the stimuli presented in the post-rating set. Future 
directions include gathering ratings for all stimuli to be presented in the study and using these 
ratings to determine face pairings separately for each group, in order to eliminate the possibility 
that the two groups perceived task difficulty differently. 
In summary, individuals with high-functioning autism have a similar gaze cascade and also 
made similar preference choices across the stimuli compared to neurotypicals.  We can 
therefore conclude that in individuals with high-functioning autism, the preference formation 
mechanism linking gaze orienting and eventual choice is intact.  With these similarities in 
mind, however, there were two major differences between groups: reaction times in the autism 
group were faster compared to controls, and furthermore they were insensitive to the difficulty 
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of the choice. Thus, more detailed analysis of task difficulty, reaction times, and even face 
preferences would help here, and in the future, to determine whether subjective decisions about 
faces systematically differ in people with ASD. It may be worth especially paying attention to 
the initial phase of orienting and perceptual processing leading up to the preference decision, as 
discussed above.  In future work, researchers might investigate the extent to which deficits in 
processing social information affect preference decisions using dynamic or emotional stimuli.  
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3.3 Gaze Cascade Study in Amygdala Lesion Patients 
Here, we tested three patients with rare amygdala lesions to examine whether social 
processing impairments would affect preference decisions for faces and the temporal 
evolution of those decisions.  Due to the small sample size, group comparisons lacked the 
statistical power to allow us to draw quantitative conclusions.  Considering, however, the rarity of 
testing amygdala lesion patients, we decided to report the results here and discuss qualitative 
trends in the data worthy of future investigation. 
3.3.1 Materials and methods 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
AP, AM, and BG are three female participants with bilateral amygdala lesions caused by 
Urbach-Wiethe disease (Mage = 34.3 years, SD = 6.4, age range = 27-38). Two of the 
participants, AM and BG, are monozygotic twins. The anatomical scans of the lesions for the 




Figure 3.6. Anatomical scans of the amygdala lesion patients. Red arrows indicate 
location of the amygdala calcification damage. (Source: Mike Tyszka, Caltech Brain 
Imaging Center). 
 
The comparison group consisted of 3 healthy female controls (Mage = 34.0 years, SD =4.6, age 
range = 29-38), group-matched for age and IQ (as measured by the Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence; (Wechsler, 1999), with no family history of psychiatric illness. Table 3.7 
summarizes demographic and diagnostic information for participants. 
Independent samples t-tests showed that the groups did not significantly differ in terms of age, 
t(4) = 0.07, p = .945) and IQ (t(4) = -2.30, p = .083.  All participants gave written informed 
consent to participate under a protocol approved by the Institutional Review Board of the 
California Institute of Technology. 
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Table 3.7. Demographic information for amygdala lesion and control participants in 
the gaze cascade study. 
 
a. Verbal IQ and full-scale IQ from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; 
AQ: Autism Quotient.  
3.3.1.2 Stimuli and apparatus 
Stimuli were identical to the stimuli described in the Methods section of the Gaze Cascade 
study in autism participants (for details, see section 3.2.3.2  Stimuli and apparatus).  Stimuli 
consisted of either pairs of social stimuli (computer-generated human faces) or pairs of non-
social stimuli (nature scenes sourced from a google image search for “desert” and 
“mountain”).  Face images, generated using Facegen (Singular Inversions, Vancouver, 
Canada), were front-facing with neutral emotional expression and direct eye contact.  Stimuli 









AP 27 92 98 20 
AM 38 94 96 21 
BG 38 99 101 18 
Mean 34.3 95.0 98.3  








1 35 108 107 - 
2 29 116 116 9 
3 38 104 102 11 
Mean 34.0 109.3 108.3  
SD 4.6 6.1 7.1  
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Images were presented on a 23” TFT monitor with a pixel resolution of 1920 x 1080.  The 
stimuli in each test pair were presented simultaneously on the left and right side of the screen.  
At a viewing distance of approximately 62 cm, each stimulus pair had an overall size of 36.5 
(width) x 14.4 (height) degrees of visual angle. 
A desk-mounted Tobii TX300 eye tracker (Tobii Technology, Falls Church, VA, USA) was 
used to collect gaze data.  Stimuli were presented using Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA) and 
the Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997), and the T2T-Talk2Tobii toolbox (Deligianni, 
Senju, Gergely, & Csibra, 2011).  Corneal and pupil reflection were recorded at a sampling 
rate of 300 Hz.  At the beginning of each block, a 9-point calibration was performed.  Each trial 
began by requiring subjects to fixate on a central drift correction dot.  After the eye-tracker 
registered a successful fixation, participants pressed the space bar to start the trial.  
3.3.1.3 Procedure 
Experiment procedure was identical to the procedure described in the Methods section of the 
Gaze Cascade study in autism participants (for details, see section 3.2.3.3  Procedure).  
Subjects performed various 2-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) tasks while eye-gaze was 
tracked (see Figure 3.7 for summary of experimental conditions and example stimuli).  The 
same conditions were tested as in the study with autism participants, with the exception of 
Faces with Closed Eyes, which we omitted here. Each amygdala participant was tested twice 












































Figure 3.7. Summary of experimental conditions and example stimuli. 
 
3.3.1.4 Analyses 
Analyses were identical to the analyses described in the Methods section of the Gaze Cascade 
study in autism participants (see section 3.2.3.4  Analyses), unless noted here.  The general 
methods of the analyses are described below again for convenience, but for further detail, 
please refer to Chapter 3.2.   
Data from the amygdala group and from the control group were each fit with a four-
parameter sigmoid regression curve for each condition, with four parameters representing the 
following: (1) bottom plateau – baseline comparison probability between the two stimuli, (2) 
top plateau – gaze bias at which the participant made the conscious behavioral choice, and (3 
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& 4) point of inflection and slope at point of inflection – timescale indicating the quickness 
of the decision.  Finally, 95% confidence intervals were calculated for each of the four 
parameters estimated.   
Due to the small sample size in this study, the permutations test that was performed in the ASD 
subjects was determined to lack power and therefore was not performed.  For the comparisons 
presented here, differences between groups were considered significant when confidence 
intervals did not overlap. 
Analysis of accuracy was limited to low difficulty trials because only low difficulty trials had 
an objectively correct (i.e., higher-rated) image for the preference tasks, allowing us to define 
accuracy.   
Since the distributions for reaction times (RT) were positively skewed, log-transformations 
were conducted prior to statistical analysis.  Raw values are reported in the text and figures.  
Trials were excluded if reaction times were greater than 3 SD outside the group mean, if no 
valid button press was registered, or if more than 20% of the eyetracking data was invalid (< 
4% of the data). 
3.3.2 Results 
3.3.2.1 Fixation behavior 
A preliminary analysis between groups comparing mean fixation durations, fixation rates, and 
latency to first fixation on an image revealed no significant interactions (ps > .292) or main 
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82 
Figure 3.8. Mean fixation duration (A) mean fixation rate (B) and latency to first fixate 
on an image (C) for the amygdala (red) and control (blue) groups.  Error bars denote 
standard error. 
 
3.3.2.2 Preference choices  
A correlation analysis was conducted to assess the agreement between preference choices in 
the amygdala and control groups (see Table 3.8).  There was a weak correlation in the Open 
Eyes condition and a moderate correlation in the Roundness condition.  Only the latter result 
survived correction for multiple comparisons.  
 
Table 3.8. Between-group correlation of preference choices in low and high difficulty 
trials combined. 
 Open Eyes Timed Roundness Nature Scenes 
Pearson’s r .355  .253     .505 * -.172 
p value .024 .115 < .001   .288 
a. * p < .01 (corrected for multiple comparisons).  Note that the listed significance is 
uncorrected. 
To examine the degree to which each groups’ preference choices agreed with the attractiveness 
ratings made by the pre-rating group, a binary logistic regression analysis was carried out for 
the low difficulty trials, regressing the dependent variable of preference decision against the 
consensus-preferred image, and t-tests were performed on the resulting beta weights (see Table 




Table 3.9. Results of the binary logistic regression model for low difficulty trials, 
regressing the dependent variable of preference choice against the consensus-preferred 
image as defined by the pre-rating group (beta weight means and standard errors, and 
p values from 2-tailed t-tests).  
 Open Eyes Timed Roundness Nature Scenes 
 Mean β SE Mean β SE Mean β SE Mean β SE 
Control 0.56 0.45 1.08 0.43 0.50 0.87 1.70 0.47 
Amygdala 1.26 0.51 1.48 0.37 0.33 0.06 1.69 1.00 
p value .36  .52 .86  .99 
 
 
3.3.2.3 Gaze cascade effect  
Individual subject curves 
The likelihood that an observer’s gaze was on the to-be-chosen picture was plotted against 
time before decision (see Figure 3.9).   Analysis of individual subjects’ likelihood curves 
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Figure 3.9. Sigmoid fits for individual control subjects (blue) and amygdala lesion 
subjects (red) for (A) Open Eyes, (B) Timed, (C) Roundness, and (D) Nature Scenes. 
Large figures depict group averages, small figures depict individual subject fits. Dots 
represent raw data averaged across trials and subjects for each time point.  
Group curves 
The results showed that the gaze cascade effect was present for both groups in all four 
conditions (see Figure 3.10).  In the Open Eyes condition, the time course of the gaze cascade 
was shorter and reached a higher plateau in the amygdala group compared to the control 
group, as indicated by the lack of overlap of 95% confidence bounds at the points of 
inflections and peaks. 

















































































































Figure 3.10. The likelihood that a participant's gaze is directed at the to-be-chosen 
stimulus is plotted against time to decision for the amygdala lesion group (red) and 
control group (blue) for (A) Open Eyes, (B) Timed, (C) Roundness, and (D) Nature 
Scenes.  Dots represent raw data averaged across trials and subjects for each time point.  
Four-parameter sigmoids (solid lines; Parameters: bottom plateau, top plateau, point of 
inflection, slope at point of inflection) were fit to each likelihood curve (all R2s > .757).  
Shading denotes 95% confidence bounds of the sigmoid fit. 
 
For each group, a four-parameter sigmoid function (parameters: bottom plateau, top plateau, 
point of inflection, slope at point of inflection) fit the likelihood curves well in all four 
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conditions. Coefficient parameters for the sigmoid fits and 95% confidence intervals for 
parameter estimates are summarized in Table 3.10. 
 
Table 3.10. Summary table of coefficient estimates for four-parameter sigmoid fits 
(parameters: bottom plateau, top plateau, point of inflection, slope at point of 
inflection), and 95% confidence intervals for estimates.  
  Control group Amygdala group 
 Condition Parameter Estimate 95% CIs Estimate 95% CIs 
 Open Eyes Bottom Plateau 0.440 [0.426, 0.453] 0.459 [0.455, 0.462] 
 POI 125.8 [120.7, 130.9] 195.8 [193.2,198.3] 
 Slope 0.001  0.002  
 Top Plateau 0.728 [0.709, 0.748] 0.801 [0.789, 0.811] 
 R2 0.980  0.986  
Timed Bottom Plateau 0.519 [0.505, 0.518] 0.469 [0.463, 0.474] 
 POI 234.5 [226.6, 242.5] 220.2 [213.7, 226.6] 
 Slope 0.003  0.002  
 Top Plateau 0.732 [0.702, 0.761] 0.799 [0.772, 0.826] 
 R2 0.757  0.949  
Roundness Bottom Plateau 0.511 [0.505, 0.516] 0.477 [0.471, 0.482] 
 POI 204.1 [197.9, 210.3] 219.6 [214.4, 224.7] 
 Slope 0.002  0.003  
 Top Plateau 0.743 [0.724, 0.761] 0.812 [0.788, 0.835] 
 R2 0.912  0.939  
Nature Scenes Bottom Plateau 0.514 [0.508, 0.520] 0.468 [0.463, 0.474] 
 POI 230.8 [218.6, 242.9] 224.2 [218.7,229.7] 
 Slope 0.002  0.003  
 Top Plateau 0.776 [0.736, 0.815] 0.800 [0.773, 0.824] 










3.3.2.4 Reaction times 
A one-way ANOVA comparing baseline reaction times in the preliminary geometrical shape 
recognition task confirmed the amygdala and control groups did not differ in basic motor 
response times, F(1,4) = 0.26, p = .640. 
Reaction times for the experimental conditions were first analyzed using a 2 x 4 ANOVA, 
comparing all four experimental conditions (see Figure 3.11).  There was no group difference 
in RTs (p = .838, η2 = .01) and no interaction between group and condition (p = .225, η2 = .29).  
 
 
Figure 3.11. Mean reaction times for the preliminary geometrical shape recognition 
task and experimental conditions, for the amygdala (red) and control (blue) groups.  
Error bars denote standard error. 
 
To investigate RT differences between groups in the Open Eyes condition in comparison to the 
other conditions, a (2 x 2 x 2) repeated-measures ANOVA (factors: group x condition x 
difficulty) was calculated each time comparing the Open Eyes condition to each of the other 





























and a two-level factor of decision difficulty (high difficulty, low difficulty).  Means and 
standard errors for RTs in the individual conditions are shown in Table 3.11.   
 
Table 3.11. Mean reaction times in seconds (non-transformed values) and standard 
errors for high and low difficulty trials, and mean accuracy scores for the low difficulty 
trials. 
  Control group Amygdala group 
  Reaction Time Accuracy Reaction Time Accuracy 
 Condition  Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Shape Recognition  0.78 0.23 100% 0.00 0.61 0.08 100% 0.00 
 Difficulty Level         
Open Eyes          
 High  1.94 0.26 - - 2.38 0.70 - - 
 Low  1.97 0.26 57.5% 0.05 2.29 0.59 63.8 % 0.05 
Timed          
 High 1.33 0.32 - - 1.62 0.23 - - 
 Low 1.40 0.34 61.7% 0.04 1.73 0.35 60.0% 0.03 
Roundness          
 High 1.96 0.14 - - 2.13 0.41 - - 
 Low 1.82 0.19 83.3% 0.07 1.50 0.30 96.7% 0.01 
Nature Scenes           
 High 1.87 0.24 - - 1.97 0.53 - - 
 
Low 1.81 0.22 71.3% 0.06 1.90 0.52 68.3% 0.10 
 
Face Preference: Timed vs. Untimed 
The ANOVA comparing the Timed condition to the self-paced Open Eyes condition revealed 
no significant interaction effects nor a main effect of group (all ps > .283).  
Face Preference vs. Face Roundness 
The ANOVA comparing the Roundness condition to Open Eyes revealed a significant 
interaction between group and difficulty, F(1,4) = 11.92, p = .026, η2 = .749, indicating that 
decision difficulty had a different effect on RTs in the control group than on those in the 
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amygdala group. There was also an interaction between condition and difficulty, F(1,4) = 
12.46, p = .024, η2 = .757, and a main effect of difficulty, F(1,4) = 23.68, p = .008, η2 = .855.   
To examine the effect of decision difficulty on RTs in each group, within-group comparisons 
were performed on pooled data from the Roundness and Open Eyes conditions.  Paired-
samples t-tests showed the amygdala group took longer to make decisions in high difficulty 
trials (M = 2.23, SE = 0.54) compared to low difficulty trials (M = 1.89, SE = 0.44), t(2) = -
10.81, p = .008, whereas there was not a significant effect of difficulty on RTs in the control 
group (High difficulty: M = 1.95, SE = 0.17; Low difficulty: M = 1.89, SE = 0.23), t(2) = -0.78, 
p = .515.  
Social vs. Non-social Preference   
The ANOVA comparing the Nature Scenes condition to Open Eyes revealed no significant 
interactions, nor a main effect of group (ps > .118).  
Inverse Efficiency Scores   
Lastly, we checked for a speed-accuracy tradeoff by analyzing RT and accuracy together, 
computing inverse efficiency scores (i.e., reaction time divided by accuracy) for each 
participant and condition in the low difficulty trials.  A 2 x 4 ANOVA with a between-subjects 
factor of group and within-subjects factor of condition indicated there was no interaction 
between condition and group (p = .292) and no significant difference between groups (p = 
.838). 
3.3.3 Discussion 
We tested three patients with rare amygdala lesions to examine whether social processing 
impairments would affect preference decisions for faces and the temporal evolution of those 
decisions.  Interestingly, amygdala lesions patients demonstrated an intact feedback loop 
linking gaze and preference for faces and made similar preference choices as controls. There 
were, however, hints in the fixation behavior of the amygdala group, suggesting that there are 
underlying differences in the pattern of gaze towards faces.  
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Due to the small sample size, group comparisons lacked the statistical power to allow us to 
draw quantitative conclusions.  There were, however, notable qualitative trends in the data 
worthy of discussion that I will review briefly in this section. 
At the individual level, the gaze cascade effect was observed for each of the amygdala subjects 
in all four conditions, indicating that the feedback loop between preference and foveation is 
normal and intact in the amygdala lesions subjects.  At the group level, the sigmoid curves fit to 
the raw data were generally similar between groups.  With the exception of the Open Eyes 
condition, inspection of the confidence bounds did not reveal any significant differences in the 
four parameters describing each group’s sigmoids. In the Open Eyes condition, the sigmoid for 
the amygdala group rose more rapidly than it did for controls, and also reached a higher 
plateau.  This suggests there may be an underlying difference in the time course of face 
preference formation in the amygdala group.  Moreover, the sigmoid curves appeared similar 
across the four conditions in the amygdala group whereas the sigmoid curves are notably 
different across conditions for healthy controls, indicating that the amygdala group 
demonstrated relatively invariant gaze during decision-making, regardless of task or stimulus 
type.  Preference decisions were also similar between groups, at least in the low difficulty trials, 
as indicated by the relatively similar beta weights resulting from the linear regression in the low 
difficulty trials.  While between-group correlations for preference choice in the low and high 
difficulty trials did not reach significance in the preference decision tasks, this is likely due to 
an issue of the statistics being underpowered.   
Analysis of gaze behavior indicated that fixation patterns towards faces were likely different in 
patients with amygdala lesions relative to controls.  First, fixation durations were longer for the 
amygdala group than the control group, particularly for preference decisions regarding faces.  
In both the Open Eyes condition and the Timed condition, the amygdala subjects made longer 
fixations relative to controls, while in the Nature Scenes condition, they made shorter fixations 
than controls.  Moreover, when we compared fixation rates in each condition (fixations per 
second), there was a trend for noticeably slower fixation rates in the Open Eyes condition and 
Timed conditions, marginally slower rates in the Roundness conditions, and no difference in 
the Nature Scenes condition.  In other words, the amygdala group made fewer and longer 
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fixations for decisions involving face preference, but not nature scenes or objective decisions 
for faces.  Longer fixations are generally believed to be an indication of difficulty extracting 
information (Fitts, Jones, & Milton, 1950; Goldberg & Kotval, 1998; Rayner et al., 2007).  On 
the other hand, they could also indicate increased engagement with the stimuli (Poole & Ball, 
2014).   Moreover, fixation rates might also simply reflect the speed of processing in mental 
tasks (Kahneman, 1973).  Hence, there is at least weak (however, non-significant) evidence for 
preference decisions involving faces to be associated with amygdala-functioning. 
There was also a trend for longer latency to first fixation on a stimulus in the amygdala group 
compared to controls.  This effect was observed in all four conditions, which could be 
associated with slower mental processing or could suggest a lack of interest in initially 
engaging with the task.  Though there were no differences in basic motor response times, the 
longer reaction times in the Open Eyes and Timed conditions suggest that the amygdala 
subjects were slower to make preference decisions for faces but not for nature scenes or face 
roundness.  
The lack of systematic group differences in the gaze cascade curves and the relatively similar 
preferences in the amygdala lesion group relative to controls suggests that the amygdala is not 
required for forming preferences for social stimuli.  While the amygdala plays a crucial role in 
processing faces and emotions, lesion effects might be stronger for tasks involving emotional 
processing rather than general face processing, since general face processing relies more on the 
fusiform gyrus and superior temporal sulcus (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2002).  
Alternatively, it may be the case that other brain regions have compensated for the processes 
impaired by amygdala lesions.  Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that some amygdalar 
functions can be partially compensated for, such that certain aspects of social processing, such 
as theory of mind (Shaw et al., 2004) and fear recognition (Becker et al., 2012) appear to 
remain intact or only moderately impaired (Brierley, 2004). 
In sum, while there were qualitative trends in the data suggesting there are underlying 
differences in patterns of face gaze in amygdala participants, the comparisons of gaze behavior 
and reaction time did not yield significant group differences with the exception of the gaze 
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cascade curve for the Open Eyes condition.   The absence of significant effects in our study 
may have been due to small sample sizes.  Only significantly large effects would be detectable 
in such a small group comparison and it may be the case that differences would be observed 
with a larger sample size.  Thus, while our findings suggest that the amygdala does not play a 
critical role in face preference formation, future studies using larger sample sizes will be 




3.4 Familiarity versus Novelty Study in Autism 
3.4.1 Introduction 
In a paradigm by Park, Shimojo, and Shimojo (2010), which we applied in an adapted version 
for the present study, researchers showed participants pairs of faces and pairs of nature scenes 
and asked them to judge the pictures for preference (Park et al., 2010).  In each pair, one 
picture was novel, and the other picture was familiar (i.e., the picture was presented in every 
trial).  They found that for nature scenes, participants demonstrated a “novelty bias” in that 
participants grew to prefer the novel nature scenes over the familiar nature scenes. However, 
for the pictures of faces, they found that participants demonstrated a “familiarity bias” in that 
participants developed a preference for the familiar face and were more likely to choose the 
familiar face over the novel faces. A follow-up study further refined these results, reporting that 
familiar faces were preferred both in contexts where those faces were passively viewed and 
when an explicit judgment had to be made about them, whereas the novelty preference for 
nature scenes occurred only in the latter context (Liao et al., 2011).   
Several interacting factors have been proposed in order to explain the differential preference 
principles seen in the different stimulus categories.  One is the level of experience we have with 
certain types of stimuli.  People are subconsciously driven to acquire more knowledge about 
faces than virtually any other object categories from birth to adulthood (Fagan, 1972; Goren et 
al., 1975; Walton & Bower, 1993).  Given the larger range of within-category variability for 
nature scenes compared to faces, and the relative lack of nature scene expertise compared to 
face expertise (and by implication, the brain regions and networks attuned to evaluating them), 
it could be that people orient toward novel rather than familiar nature scenes in an attempt to 
understand the naturally-occurring parameters of such stimuli (Park, 2010).  In contrast, faces 
are relatively invariant, and as such, the bounds might be much more easily and quickly 
determined.  One could imagine then that while it would be valuable for survival to attend to 
novel nature scenes to acquire expertise regarding one’s environment, it would similarly be 
advantageous to orient toward familiar faces and learn to evaluate them for subtle differences to 
enrich and refine discrimination skills.  Furthermore, as a result of life-long orienting toward 
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social stimuli, we acquire a vast amount of knowledge about how to read faces.  In this 
respect, social attention and one’s level of face expertise could influence the preference for 
familiar faces.  Forming a familiarity preference also requires memory for faces (and by 
extension, the ability to form category representations of faces), because the face must be 
encoded to memory in order for it to be recognized as familiar when it is encountered again.  
Another factor is the level of processing demands of each stimulus category. Social processing 
requires the evaluation of faces, and for most people, evaluating faces occurs automatically, 
holistically, and subconsciously. In contrast, people are not often asked to make evaluations of 
nature scenes and as such the processing load may be higher for nature scenes than faces. This, 
in turn, could influence whether we prefer a familiar or novel stimulus.  On the other hand, one 
could also argue that social stimuli such as faces are more complex than non-social stimuli, and 
as such, require greater attention than nature scenes, which could also influence our preference.  
Thus, there are a variety of factors strongly linked to social saliency that could interact to 
produce a familiarity preference for faces (and not for non-social stimuli), including social 
attention, level of face expertise, social memory, and processing abilities. 
As discussed previously in Chapter I, aspects of social processing that are compromised in 
ASD might be linked to amygdala dysfunction.  Faces are less likely to draw the attention of 
people with autism, who show reduced social orienting and social attention to social stimuli 
than their neurotypical counterparts (Dawson et al., 2004).  It has been argued that these 
deficits could stem from a failure of the amygdala to assign social saliency to faces (Aggleton, 
Burton, & Passingham, 1980) and signal feedback pathways necessary for processing social 
stimuli (Schultz, 2005).   
While the evidence is mixed, there are also some studies that show that deficits in social 
processing could directly affect face recognition abilities (for a review, see Weigelt, Koldewyn, 
& Kanwisher, 2012).  Studies have reported that individuals with autism show impaired 
memory for faces (Arkush, Smith-Collins, Fiorentini, & Skuse, 2013; Hauck, Fein, Maltby, 
Waterhouse, & Feinstein, 1998; Klin et al., 1999) and impaired immediate and delayed recall 
for faces and social scenes but not for non-social objects, though whether this impairment 
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applies only to unfamiliar faces is less clear (Boucher & Lewis, 1992).  People with ASD 
also demonstrate abnormal face coding mechanisms (Pellicano, Jeffery, Burr, & Rhodes, 2007) 
and are impaired in their ability to form abstract representations of categories for both faces and 
non-face stimuli (Gastgeb, Rump, Best, Minshew, & Strauss, 2009; Klinger & Dawson, 2001), 
which would likely contribute to impairments in encoding and consolidating memory for faces.  
And finally, people with ASD show less accurate memory awareness for faces, meaning that 
even when they show deficits in face recognition, they have difficulty recognizing their own 
impairment (Wilkinson, Best, Minshew, & Strauss, 2010). 
Given the deficits in social processing in autism, we examine whether face preference 
formation according to familiarity is impaired in autism.  Subjects were shown pairs of social 
and pairs of non-social stimuli and asked to make a 2-alternative forced choice for which 
stimulus was preferred.  For each image subcategory, one stimulus in a pair was repeated in 
every trial.  We found similar patterns of preference segregation in the ASD group relative to 
controls, for both types of stimuli: ASD subjects showed a preference bias for face stimuli and 
a novelty bias for nature scene stimuli.  The results suggest that face preference formation for 
familiar faces might be spared from social processing deficits typically observed in autism. 
3.4.2 Materials and methods 
3.4.2.1 Participants 
Participants were a group of n =12 high-functioning subjects with a DSM-IV diagnosis of 
Autism Spectrum Disorder ranging in age from 22 – 58 years old (Mage = 33.0 years, SD = 
12.5) and included 9 males and 3 females.  Sample size was determined by participant 
availability.  DSM-IV diagnosis was confirmed by the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS; (Lord et al., 2000) and either the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised 
(ADI-R; (Lord et al., 1994) or the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; (Rutter et al., 
2003).  The autism comparison group consisted of 12 healthy controls ranging in age from 21 – 
59 (Mage = 31.7 years, SD = 11.2), and included 10 males and 2 females. The comparison group 
was matched on age, gender, and IQ, with no family history of psychiatric illness.  




Table 3.12. Demographic and diagnostic information for autism and control 
participants in the Familiarity/Novelty study. 
Autism group Autism group: ADOS 
 Sex Age Verbal IQ Full scale IQ AQ SOC COM+SOC 
1 F 22 102 107 28 14 21 
2 M 30 111 106 30 11 17 
3 M 57 119 102 33 8 12 
4 M 31 127 124 22 7 11 
5 M 29 117 115 39 14 20 
6 F 37 135 133 41 9 13 
7 M 26 89 93 31 7 10 
8 M 23 90 100 22 10 16 
9 F 19 128 124 31 6 9 
10 M 32 97 99 34 10 14 
11 M 32 50 91 26 11 15 
12 M 58 118 126 34 7 9 
Mean  33.00 102.50 108.50    
SD  12.48 22.40 13.03    
Control group	    
 Sex Age Verbal IQ Full scale IQ AQ   
1 M 44 122 116 -   
2 M 59 109 105 -   
3 M 23 123 123 12   
4 M 21 120 121 -   
5 M 37 108 120 -   
6 M 34 125 132 -   
7 M 25 106 107 8   
8 F 33 104 97 11   
9 M 21 104 109 25   
10 M 21 104 101 18   
11 M 31 95 104 15   
12 F 31 97 91 12  
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13 M 44 122 116 -   
Mean  31.67 106.62 105.54    
SD  11.23 9.43 7.04    
a. Verbal IQ and full-scale IQ from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; 
AQ: Autism Spectrum Quotient; ADOS: Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; 
SOC: social interaction subscale; COM+SOC: communication+social interaction 
subscales 
T-tests showed that the groups were not significantly different in terms of age t(22) = -0.22, p = 
.832, IQ, t(22) = .094, p = .493, as measured by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(Wechsler, 1999), or gender (p = .10, 2-sided Fisher’s Exact Test).  All participants gave 
written informed consent to participate under a protocol approved by the Institutional Review 
Board of the California Institute of Technology. 
3.4.2.2 Stimuli and apparatus 
Stimuli consisted of pairs of social stimuli (computer-generated human faces) or pairs of non-
social stimuli (nature scenes).  Male and female face images were generated using Facegen 
(Singular Inversions, Vancouver, Canada), and were shown front-facing with neutral emotional 
expression and direct eye contact.  Nature scenes were sourced from a google image search for 
“desert” and “mountain”. 
To control for preference bias due to differences in baseline attractiveness of the stimuli, all 
images were drawn from a larger set of face and nature scene stimuli pre-rated for 
attractiveness by a separate group of non-autistic participants on a scale of 1 (very unattractive) 
to 7 (very attractive) (n = 20, Females = 8; Mage = 28.2 years, SD = 7.5).   
We created 20 image pairs in each of the four subcategories (male faces, female faces, 
mountain scenes, desert scenes) using the following procedure for each subcategory: we 
selected the median-rated image in each subcategory as the “familiar” image and presented it in 
every trial, pairing it with a “novel” image chosen from the same subcategory.   Images were 
paired such that in half of the trials, the familiar image was more attractive, and in half of the 
trials, the familiar image was less attractive.  To control for preference bias based on 
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attractiveness, within each each group, pairs were presented such that half the participants 
saw the familiar image paired with a more attractive image, and half saw the familiar image 
paired with a less attractive image. Each image pair was presented in randomized order once 
per block, and the location of each image in a pair was left-right randomized. 
Images were presented on a 21” CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 100 Hz and pixel resolution 
of 1152 x 864.  The stimuli in each test pair were presented simultaneously on the left and right 
side of the screen.  At a viewing distance of approximately 57 cm, each stimulus pair had an 
overall size of 36.2 (width) x 14.4 (height) degrees of visual angle. 
Stimuli were presented using Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA), the Psychophysics toolbox 
(Brainard, 1997), and the Eyelink toolbox (Cornelissen et al., 2002).  Gaze data was collected 
using a head-mounted Eyelink II eye-tracking system (SR Research, Osgoode, Canada).  
Corneal and pupil reflection were recorded at a sampling rate of 250 Hz.  At the beginning of 
each block, a 9-point calibration was performed.  Each trial began by requiring subjects to 
fixate on a central drift correction dot.  After the eye-tracker registered a successful fixation, 
participants pressed the space bar to start the trial.  
3.4.2.3 Procedure 
Subjects performed a 2-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) task, making self-paced preference 
decisions while eye-gaze was tracked (see Figure 3.12).  Subjects inspected a pair of 
simultaneously presented stimuli, then made a 2AFC choice by pushing either the left or the 
right button. 
Experimental design consisted of two blocked conditions in which participants viewed pairs of 
social stimuli (Faces) or pairs of non-social stimuli (Nature Scenes).  There were 2 
subcategories in each category (Faces: male, female; Nature Scenes: mountains, desert), and 20 
trials in each subcategory (see Figure 3.12 for summary of experimental conditions and sample 





















Figure 3.12. Summary of experimental conditions and example stimuli.  Median-rated 
picture is shown on the left. 
3.4.2.4 Analyses 
Each subject’s preference choice was converted to a familiarity or novelty score, “1” if the 
familiar picture was chosen, and “-1” if the novel picture was chosen.  Familiarity-novelty 
scores were then averaged across subcategories and across subjects in each group for each 
sequential trial. 
For statistical analysis of the familiarity-novelty scores, we ran repeated-measures ANOVAs 
with a between-subjects factor of group (ASD, control), and within-subjects factor of image 
category (Face versus Nature Scene) or subcategory (female versus male; desert versus 
mountain).  To compare the initial preference in the first trial to the final preference in the last 
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trial across image categories, we ran one repeated-measures ANOVA with within-subjects 
factors of time (first trial, last trial) and image category (faces, nature scenes).   
To compare the initial stage of preference development to the later stage of preference 
development in the image categories, we averaged the first five trials and the last 15 trials in 
each category and ran an ANOVA, using a within-subjects factors of time (first five trials, last 
15 trials) and image category (faces, nature scenes).  To compare stages of preference 
development in the subcategories, we re-ran a similar ANOVA on the averages of the first 5 
trials and the last 15 trials in each subcategory, using a within-subjects factor of image 
subcategory (female faces, male faces, nature scenes, desert scenes).  
Second, we explored initial gaze by analyzing the eye-tracking data in two ways: analyzing the 
proportion of first fixations that were made to the novel image versus the familiar image, and 
the proportion of first fixations that were made to the eventually chosen image versus the 
unchosen image.  For each of these two measures, we carried out a repeated-measures ANOVA 
using as within-subjects factor of image subcategory and between-subjects factor of group.   
Lastly, we carried out one-sample t-tests in each subcategory to determine if any of the 
proportions differed significantly from chance.   
3.4.3 Results 
3.4.3.1 Familiarity-Novelty scores 
The time-course of preference bias in the two stimulus categories is shown below in Figure 
3.13.  The first ANOVA comparing familiarity/novelty scores in the first trial and last trial in 
the two image categories (faces, nature scenes) indicated there were no significant interactions 
involving group (all ps > .413) and no main effect of group (p = .383), indicating the likelihood 
of preferring the familiar image in the first trial and last trial did not differ between groups in 
the two image categories.  There was an interaction between time and category, F(1,22) = 4.50, 
p = .045, η2 = .170, indicating that, regardless of group, there was a stronger familiarity 
preference for faces in the final trial relative to the first trial, (First trial: M = -.125, SE = .164; 
Last Trial: M = .125, SE = .154), whereas there was a stronger novelty preference for nature 
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scenes in the last trial compared to the first trial (First trial: M = .000, SE = .136; Last Trial: 
M = -.458, SE = .122).  None of the main effects were significant. 
The ANOVA comparing the first five trials and last 15 trials across the two image categories 
also indicated there were no interactions involving group (all ps > .156) and no main effect of 
group (p = .365), signifying that preference development in the stimulus categories did not 
differ between groups in the initial trials nor the later trials.  There was a significant interaction 
between time and category, F(1,22) = 10.48, p = .004, η2 = .323, revealing a significant 
difference in preference bias within the first five trials, for familiarity in the face category but 
novelty in the nature scenes category, (Faces: M  = .142, SE = .083; Nature scenes: M  = -.233, 
SE = .088; t(23) = -2.67, p = .014).  The respective biases were also significantly different in 
the last 15 trials, (Faces: M  = .300, SE = .077; Nature scenes: M  = -.431, SE = .063; t(23) = 
7.71, p < .001).  Furthermore, within image categories, there was a stronger familiarity bias for 
faces in the last 15 trials than in the first five trials, t(23) = -2.05, p = .052, whereas there was a 
stronger novelty bias for nature scenes in the last 15 trials than in the first five trials, t(23) = -
3.55, p = .002. 
Lastly, there was a significant main effect of category, F(1,22) = 25.67, p < .001, η2 = .539, 
indicating a stronger familiarity preference for faces regardless of time or group, and a stronger 
novelty preference for nature scenes regardless of time or group (Faces: M = .553, SE = .109; 




Figure 3.13. Time-course of familiarity/novelty preference bias over 20 trials, collapsed 
across sub-categories in each image category.  The two categories consist of Face (sub-
categories: female and male), and Nature Scenes (sub-categories: desert scenes, 
mountain scenes). 
The time-course of preference bias in the four image subcategories is shown below in Figure 
3.14. The ANOVA comparing the first five trials and last 15 trials across the four image 
subcategories indicated that there were no interactions involving group (all ps > .156) and no 
main effect of group (p = .365), meaning preference development in the image subcategories 
did not differ between groups in the initial trials nor the later trials.  There was a significant 
interaction between time and subcategory, F(3,66) = 4.16, p = .009, η2 = .159, which we 
followed up with pairwise comparisons. 
Pairwise comparisons between image subcategories for the first five trials indicated there was a 
significant difference in preference bias between female faces and mountain scenes (Female 
faces: M  = .067, SE = .112; Mountain scenes: M  = -.333, SE = .107; t(23) = 2.18, p = .040) , 
and between male faces and mountain scenes (Male faces: M  = .217, SE = .103; Mountain 
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scenes: M  = -.333, SE = .107s; t(23) = 3.45, p = .002).  None of the pairwise comparisons 
involving desert scenes were significant. 
Pairwise comparisons of subcategories in the last 15 trials also indicated that all four 
subcategories differed significantly from each other.  Participants demonstrated the strongest 
familiarity preference for male faces (M = .433, SE = .071), followed by female faces (M = 
.167, SE = .111), and a moderate novelty preference for desert scenes (M = -.294, SE = .112), 
as well as a strong novelty preference for mountain scenes (M = -.567, SE = .062). 
 
Figure 3.14. Time-course of familiarity/novelty bias in the ASD group (top) and Control 
group (bottom) divided by sub-categories. 
 
 














































































3.4.3.2 Likelihood of initial fixation on novel image 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out comparing the proportion of trials in which the 
first fixation on an image was on the novel image, using as within-subjects factor image 
subcategory and as between-subjects factor group.  There was no significant interaction 
between group and subcategory (p = .717) or a main effect of group (p  = .275).  There was, 
however, a main effect of subcategory, F(3,66) = 13.53, p < .001, η2 = .381, showing that 
regardless of group, participants were significantly more likely to initially fixate on the novel 
nature scene image (M = 65.8 %, SE = 2.5) than the novel face image (M = 50.3 %, SE = 1.4).  
Follow-up comparisons indicated that there were no differences in first fixation likelihood 
between images in the same sub-category. 
One-sample t-tests in the face category indicated that the likelihood of initial gaze to the novel 
image did not differ significantly from chance for either female faces (M = 50.7%, SE = 1.7; 
t(23) = -0.32, p = .749), or male faces, (M = 50.0%, SE = 1.8; t(23) = 0.00, p = 1.00), whereas 
in the nature scenes category, participants were significantly more likely to make the initial 
fixation to the novel image, for both desert scenes, (M = 68.9%, SE = 3.5; t(23) = -5.28, p < 
.001), and mountain scenes, (M = 62.8%, SE = 2.5; t(23) = -4.98, p < .001) .  Results are 






        
 
Figure 3.15. The probability of initial gaze on the novel image plotted against stimulus 
type.  Dashed line indicates chance (50/50) likelihood.  Error bars denote standard error.                        
 
3.4.3.3 Likelihood of initial fixation on eventually-chosen image 
A repeated-measures ANOVA comparing the proportion of trials in which the first fixation on 
a stimulus was on the eventually chosen image indicated that there was no significant 
interaction between group and category, no main effect of group, and no main effect of 
category (all ps > .547). 
One-sample t-tests indicated participants were significantly less likely to make the initial 
fixation to the image eventually chosen in all image subcategories, for female faces (M = 
36.3%, SE = 2.9; t(23) = -4.70, p < .001), male faces, (M = 37.1%, SE = 3.2; t(23) = -3.99, p = 
.001), desert scenes, (M = 33.4%, SE = 3.2; t(23) = -7.11, p < .001), and mountain scenes, (M = 
















































            
 
Figure 3.16.  The probability of initial gaze on the image that was eventually chosen 
plotted against stimulus type.  Dashed line indicates chance (50/50) likelihood.  Error bars 
denote standard error. 
3.4.4 Discussion 
In the present study, we explored category-specific familiarity and novelty principles in high-
functioning autism.   We found there were similar patterns of preference segregation between 
groups, such that people with ASD developed a familiarity preference for faces and a novelty 
preference for nature scenes, similar to controls’ preferences.  In addition, we found that 
patterns of initial gaze did not differ significantly between groups, such that both groups made 
similar proportions of their initial fixations to the familiar stimulus, and to the image that was 














































Repeated visual exposure to stimuli often increases preference for those stimuli.  This 
familiarity preference has been shown to be specific to certain object categories, such as faces, 
whereas a novelty preference has been observed for non-social images.  Here we found a strong 
familiarity preference, with no difference between groups, for the face that was presented in all 
20 trials.  There was also a strong preference in the opposite direction with nature scenes for the 
novel image also presented in each of the trials.  The overall results replicate the segregation of 
preference bias reported by Park et al.’s (2010) original study.   
The familiarity preference for faces and nature scenes was apparent quickly (within the first 5 
trials), again with no significant difference between the autism and control group.  It is 
interesting to note, however, that while the male and female faces differed significantly from 
the mountain scenes, none of the pairwise comparisons involving the desert scenes were 
significant, indicating a lack of initial bias for the desert images.  This may be because desert 
images generally show less variability in color range and contrast than mountain images, 
making them less visually appealing, or perhaps because the images that were chosen were not 
particularly compelling enough to inspire a preference bias in the initial stages. 
On average, the preference biases for familiar faces and novel nature scenes were present 
through the remainder of the trials, with participants showing the strongest familiarity 
preference for male faces, followed by female faces, and the strongest novelty preference for 
mountain scenes, followed by a weaker novelty preference for desert scenes.  Since these 
results did not differ between groups, they suggest that the ability to form category-specific 
preferences, as well as maintain those preferences, is not significantly compromised in high-
functioning autism. 
Evidence in support of intact preference formation is also seen in the lack of group differences 
in likelihood of initial gaze to the familiar image.  Participants were more likely to make the 
initial fixation in a trial on the novel nature scene image than the novel face image, suggesting 
first that the use of top-down attentional strategies can likely be ruled out since these 
differences were apparent at the first fixation, presumably before participants had the 
opportunity to foveate on the images and determine consciously which image was the familiar 
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one.  Second, the similarity between groups in likelihood of initial fixation to the familiar 
image also suggests there is a shared underlying mechanism functioning pre-attentively to 
direct visual attention, rather than a post-hoc attentional strategy.  While the findings reported 
here are mostly negative (i.e., n.s.) relative to the controls, there are significant implications 
owing to the baseline positive results in the controls. Once again, it indicates that despite social 
impairments in ASD, certain aspects of face processing remain intact or can be compensated 
for by people with ASD to result in similar preference decisions as those made by controls. 
While our findings point to normal preference formation in autism, there are several open 
questions for future studies.  Given the significant amount of noise in each trial for both groups, 
averaging across a larger number of subcategories could reduce the variability and perhaps 
reveal differences in the time-course of preference development that were obscured in the 
present study.  This could be achieved by running either more repetitions of the existing 
subcategories or using a greater number of sub-categories.  
Future studies could also investigate individual familiarity and novelty preferences within 
subjects.  Given the putative preoccupation with non-social stimuli in autism, familiarity 
preferences may occur in different object categories for different subjects.  A study in which 
pre-ratings are obtained from each participant for different stimuli categories, and then used to 
construct image pairs could be informative to understanding if there are subject-specific areas 
of “expertise” that would elicit a familiarity bias similar to faces.  Future studies could also use 
multiple social stimuli to provide greater ecological validity, since many social situations 
involve more than one or two others.  It could be the case that deficits are only present, or 
become apparent, when there are more visual and social stimuli competing for attention.   
Lastly, it is unclear even in neurotypicals, whether the face familiarity preference is restricted to 
realistic faces and whether it would extend to face-similar categories, such as schematic faces, 
paintings of faces, or “man on the moon” type visual effects.  Would people with autism see 
faces in non-face objects (face-similar objects)?  In other words, what level of abstraction 
would be necessary to eliminate the preference bias for faces? Moreover, where is the boundary 
between face and non-face in autism and in neurotypicals?  It would be enlightening for our 
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understanding of face processing, both in neurotypicals and in individuals with autism, to 
explore to what degree of abstraction the brain will still respond to by forming a familiarity 
preference, as it would suggest what some of the necessary elements are for face perception and 




In this chapter, I explored whether social processing deficits in people with autism and 
amygdala lesions would also affect subjective preference formation for faces.  I found that the 
feedback loop between foveation and preference formation remained intact in people with 
autism and amygdala lesions, and furthermore, that they made similar preference decisions as 
controls.  I also found similar patterns of preference bias segregation in the ASD group relative 
to controls, for both social and non-social stimuli: ASD subjects demonstrated a familiarity bias 
for face stimuli and a novelty bias for nature scene stimuli.  However, I also found that people 
with autism had faster reaction times for face preference decision, and their reaction times were 
insensitive to decision difficulty.  The findings indicate that while face preference formation is 
spared from social processing deficits typically observed in autism, there are differences in the 
behavioral strategy used by individuals with autism. 
The results from these studies are consistent with findings showing high-functioning autistic 
individuals’ ability to process more basic social information is not reliably affected by the face 
processing deficits commonly observed in autism.  One explanation for the lack of impairment 
in face preference formation is that face perception in a subjective context could require less 
complex social processing compared to face perception in an objective decision-making task, 
or in complex social interactions.  For example, a lower level of face processing ability may be 
sufficient to form a face preference versus correctly identifying a familiar face, which requires 
explicitly relating face identity to contextual and biographical knowledge.  In this sense, less 
complex aspects of social processing such as the recognition of basic emotions or the formation 
of preference for certain faces might be spared from deficits commonly observed in processing 
of more involved aspects of facial and emotional expressions, such as recognizing intentions or 
judging more complex mental states. 
An alternative issue to consider given the relatively high-functioning ability of the autism 
subjects in the current studies is the issue of compensatory functioning, both in the neural sense 
and in the behavioral sense.  Face preference formation could very well appear to operate 
normally despite an underlying impairment in processing.  There are multiple pathways for 
processing of social information, some of which could partially compensate for social 
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processing functions that are compromised in autism and amygdala lesion patients.  
Compensatory social processing from other brain regions could be sufficient for the formation 
of social preference.  
Moreover, the ability to process more basic social information in high-functioning autism can 
also be facilitated with the use of atypical, and perhaps top-down, compensatory behavioral 
strategies.  I found evidence for this possibility in the faster reaction times for face preference 
decisions in the autism group, and the insensitivity of their reaction times to the difficulty of the 
preference decision.  Given the lack of preferential attention to social stimuli, the use of 
atypical compensatory strategies might allow for a choice criterion to be reached in ASD 
quickly and without regard to the relative attractiveness of the faces.  The possibility that 
atypical or compensatory strategies could mitigate the appearance of social deficits of course 
poses challenges for how to study impairments in face processing, a topic which we examine in 




 C h a p t e r  I V  
TASK-DEPENDENT MODULATION OF FACE GAZE 
4.1 Overview 
The third and final study in this dissertation is the “Don’t Look” study.  The purpose of this 
experiment was to investigate the flexibility of face scanning strategies used by individuals 
with high-functioning autism and amygdala lesion patients.  Participants were instructed to 
view faces while avoiding specific facial features, so we could investigate strategies for face 
exploration and the ability to update those strategies under changing viewing contexts.   
In exploring why some aspects of gaze and preference behavior in ASD appeared no different 
from healthy controls in the prior studies, I became familiar with a growing discussion in the 
literature regarding inconsistent findings of social impairments in autism, particularly as they 
relate to deficits in face processing.   As discussed in the Introduction of this dissertation, there 
are a variety factors that contribute to seemingly divergent findings for face processing in 
autism, including task demands and the characteristics of stimuli that are used.  For example, 
differences in stimuli can affect the severity of social impairments in ASD, possibly due to the 
greater cognitive effort required to process more complex social stimuli.  Similarly, some 
studies have reported differences in eye gaze become more prominent in cognitively 
demanding tasks.  
Another (not mutually-excusive) factor that can mitigate the effect of social deficits is the use 
of compensatory strategies during social processing in ASD.   There is evidence to suggest that 
people with autism, particularly those who are high-functioning, compensate for social deficits 
by using atypical cognitive and visual strategies which give the appearance of behavior that 
differs very little from the behavior demonstrated by neurotypicals.  Though these strategies are 
usually not as flexible or adaptive in situations that are unusual or require high cognitive effort, 
they are often sufficient for many other day-to-day situations. 
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Given that in the Gaze Cascade study, people with ASD demonstrated rather normal face 
gaze and faster reaction times relative to neurotypicals when making face preference decisions, 
we suggested that people with ASD may have approached the task as a perceptual task rather 
than a social one, i.e., the decision-making aspect of the task had mitigated or circumvented the 
effect of social impairments on gaze and attention.  This is why, in the Don’t Look study, our 
aim was to examine face gaze separate from an explicit decision-making task in order to 
understand how people with autism spontaneously look at faces. 
To examine spontaneous face scanning strategies and the flexibility of those strategies, we 
designed a task in which we manipulated viewing strategies by giving instructions that were 
unrelated to our actual variables of interest: gaze to salient features of the face and propensity 
for face exploration. Subjects were instructed to avoid looking at the eyes while gaze to the 
remainder of the face was permitted, to avoid the mouth while gaze to the remainder of the face 
was permitted, or to look at the face without any restrictions.  
The primary questions of our investigation were: 1) How do people with social processing 
impairments spontaneously explore the face (i.e., decoupled from social or explicit decision-
making)? 2) How flexibly can face scanning strategies be adapted to changing social contexts? 
And 3) if face gaze strategies can mitigate the appearance of atypical face scanning, could these 
strategies be engaged elsewhere to elicit differences in viewing behavior?  
The amygdala group demonstrated similar gaze patterns to salient face regions as controls and 
appeared equally flexible in gaze strategies.  There was, however, a tendency in the amygdala 
group to look away from the salient parts of the face less often than controls, and also to look 
off the head less than controls.   
There were notable differences in the autism group relative to controls.  We found that while 
the general pattern of gaze on the screen and to salient features of the face appeared normal in 
high-functioning autism, there were differences between groups in the details of the ASD 
group’s gaze pattern, and in the strategies they used in response to the viewing restrictions.  
Similar to controls, the ASD group spent the majority of gaze time looking on the face (rather 
than off the face), and in the conditions in which gaze to the eyes was allowed, both groups 
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spent the most time looking at the general eye region regardless of stimulus type.  However 
we found that people with ASD showed impairments in orienting to the parts of the eye region 
that communicate the most information, instead showing a bias for looking between the eyes 
and at the nose.  Furthermore, people with ASD showed deficits in adapting their usual 
strategies for face scanning while simultaneously adhering to the task restriction to avoid 
specific features, indicating there was reduced flexibility of those strategies in people with 
high-functioning autism.  In summary, while individuals with ASD, at least superficially, did 
not appear to differ in the general pattern of gaze to larger regions of the face, there was clear 
evidence to indicate atypical face gaze in the details of visual behavior and in the flexibility of 
gaze strategies.  The results from these studies suggest that face scanning utilizes general 




4.2 Don’t Look Study in Autism 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder characterized by a triad of 
deficits, consisting of impaired social interaction, impaired communication, and restricted 
interests and repetitive behaviors.  Deficits in orienting toward and prioritizing social 
information are widely implicated in the social deficits observed in ASD. Studies have found 
that individuals with ASD demonstrate unusual attentional and viewing patterns towards social 
stimuli, showing reduced interest in socially salient stimuli, and particularly for faces, relative 
to their typically developing counterparts.  People with ASD are slower to orient toward social 
stimuli (Fletcher-Watson et al., 2009; Freeth, Foulsham, & Chapman, 2011), are impaired in 
prioritizing social cues over non-social cues (Kikuchi et al., 2011; Klin et al., 2002), which 
could be accompanied by an attentional bias for non-social stimuli (Elison, Sasson, Turner-
Brown, Dichter, & Bodfish, 2012; Pierce & Courchesne, 2001; Sasson, 2006) and show 
reduced interest in exploration of social stimuli (de Wit, Falck-Ytter, & Hofsten, 2008). 
Face processing impairments are a characteristic symptom of Autism spectrum disorder, and 
behavioral abnormalities in this domain have been well-documented.  Individuals with autism 
have difficulty with emotion recognition (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Hobson, 1986; Klin et al., 
1999; Tantam et al., 1989), poor memory for faces (Boucher & Lewis, 1992; Klin et al., 1999; 
Teunisse & Gelder, 1994; Weigelt et al., 2012), and impaired perceptions of trustworthiness 
(Adolphs et al., 2001). The behavioral abnormalities are also supported by reports of abnormal 
brain activation during face processing in ASD (Dalton et al., 2005; Gotts et al., 2012; Koshino 
et al., 2008; Schultz, 2005; Whalen et al., 2004) implicating dysfunction in multiple 
neuroanatomical regions that are involved in face processing in typically developing 
individuals, including the fusiform face gyrus, amygdala, and superior temporal sulcus.  In 
sum, people with ASD demonstrate impairments in processing and evaluating the social 
information conveyed by face stimuli.    
Atypical social judgments in ASD might stem for abnormal gaze to faces.  Overall, the current 
research indicates there are abnormalities in face gaze, however the results regarding the exact 
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nature of these abnormalities are mixed. Some studies have reported people with ASD pay 
more attention to atypical parts of faces, such as the nose and mouth, rather than the eye region 
as neurotypicals usually do (Hobson, 1986; Klin et al., 2002; Yi et al., 2013).  However, there 
is also evidence to suggest that there is not a gaze bias for the mouth region (Bar-Haim, 
Shulman, Lamy, & Reuveni, 2006; Dalton et al., 2005; Rutherford & Towns, 2008).  Similarly, 
while there is evidence of reduced gaze to all “core” features of the face (de Wit et al., 2008; 
Pelphrey et al., 2002), meaning the eyes, nose, and mouth, other studies have found no 
significant differences in gaze patterns to features of the face (van der Geest, Kemner, 
Camfferman, Verbaten, & van Engeland, 2002a; van der Geest, Kemner, Verbaten, & van 
Engeland, 2002b). 
A key element of social impairment in ASD may be abnormal gaze to the eyes, though again 
the results have been mixed.  While some studies failed to find differences in gaze to the eye 
region (de Wit et al., 2008; Fletcher-Watson et al., 2009; Rutherford & Towns, 2008; Sawyer, 
Williamson, & Young, 2012), other studies have reported diminished gaze to the eye region 
(Corden et al., 2008; Dalton et al., 2005; Klin et al., 2002; Pelphrey et al., 2002; Speer, Cook, 
McMahon, & Clark, 2007; Sterling et al., 2008).  There is evidence to suggest that diminished 
eye gaze could be driven by a tendency to avoid direct eye contact and the general eye region, 
perhaps due to an underlying aversion to direct gaze (Dalton et al., 2005; Kliemann, Dziobek, 
Hatri, Steimke, & Heekeren, 2010; Tanaka & Sung, 2013).  According to the theory of 
amygdala hyper-arousal, direct eye contact could cause a discomforting state of over-activation 
in the amygdala for individuals with ASD, which is subsequently compensated for by 
avoidance of direct eye contact (for a review of eye contact mechanisms in ASD, see Senju and 
Johnson, 2009).  In contrast, people with autism might simply demonstrate a lack of preference 
for direct eye contact rather than actively avoiding it (Hernandez et al., 2009), due to hypo-
arousal in response to social stimuli.  The hypo-arousal account suggests amygdala under-
activation results in reduced reward value (Dawson et al., 2004; Kohls et al., 2013) or reduced 
saliency of stimuli (Grelotti, Gauthier, & Schultz, 2002). Consequently, people with ASD 
might not learn to orient toward the eyes for social information, and as such do not develop a 
bias for the eye region.  A refinement to this latter concept (Senju & Johnson, 2009; Senju, 
Tojo, Yaguchi, & Hasegawa, 2005; Senju, Yaguchi, Tojo, & Hasegawa, 2003) proposes that 
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there is no impairment in eye gaze in ASD but rather a lack of a facilitative effect of direct 
eye contact.  Behavioral studies by Senju et al. report that people with ASD were equally 
efficient as controls in detecting averted gaze.  With direct gaze, however, controls were faster 
and more accurate than with averted gaze, whereas people with ASD did not show an 
advantage for direct gaze relative to averted gaze. These results led the authors to suggest that 
direct gaze enhances performance in controls but not in people with ASD, and suggesting the 
putative eye gaze impairment in ASD was actually a lack of facilitative effect of direct eye 
contact.   
It is important to note the results of many studies are often based on gaze to the general eye 
region, or gaze to the left and right eye combined.  The results of a recent study (Yi et al., 2013) 
reported that while people with ASD did not differ from controls when comparing gaze to the 
eye region or both eyes combined, there were divergent results when the left and right eyes 
were analyzed separately.  Several of the studies investigating gaze to the eye region use a 
single eye ROI approach (Bal et al., 2009; Fletcher-Watson et al., 2009; Klin et al., 2002; 
Sawyer et al., 2012) or combine the left and right eyes (Pelphrey et al., 2002; Sterling et al., 
2008), which could confound differences in lateralization of gaze. 
There are several experimental factors that likely contribute to the discrepancy in findings 
regarding social processing in ASD.  One explanation is the effect of stimulus type and task 
demands used in the studies.  A study by Speer, Cook et al. (2007) that directly tested the 
differential effects of stimulus types found that in contrast to studies reporting face processing 
deficits with simpler stimuli, people with ASD showed impairments only with complex 
dynamic stimuli, leading the authors to speculate that the impairments are associated with the 
greater cognitive demands for complex stimuli but not simple stimuli (Speer et al., 2007).  
Another possibility is that in structured experimental contexts (and presumably explicit task 
instruction), people with high-functioning autism do not experience the same difficulty 
attending to facial features and processing social information as they do in spontaneous and 
unstructured situations.   In line with both of these ideas, it may be the case that face processing 
deficits in high-functioning autism would become apparent or more pronounced in situations 
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that require greater cognitive effort, for example when using more complex stimuli or 
unusual experimental paradigms.   
Gaze to salient features may also change based on compensatory strategies, obfuscating 
spontaneous gaze tendencies. There is already evidence for the use of compensatory strategies 
in ASD, particularly in people who are high-functioning, that minimize the appearance of 
social impairments, for example, by relying on cognitive and verbal abilities during emotion 
recognition (Grossmann, 2000) and theory-of-mind tasks (Hadwin, Baron-Cohen, Howlin, & 
Hill, 1997; Ozonoff & Miller, 1995).  There is growing evidence to indicate compensatory 
strategies also extend to face gaze.  Some of these skills might consist of more effortful rule-
based strategies that have been learned, for example increasing gaze to the mouth (Joseph & 
Tanaka, 2003) or eyes (Faja, Webb, Merkle, Aylward, & Dawson, 2009; Rice et al., 2012), 
while others may have been taught through interventional therapies for social skills (Tanaka et 
al., 2010; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2001) to facilitate social interactions.  There is also evidence 
for the implicit (i.e., subconscious) use of visual strategies that can partially compensate for 
impaired social processes (Krysko & Rutherford, 2009; Leung, Ordqvist, Falkmer, Parsons, & 
Falkmer, 2013; Spezio et al., 2007). 
While people with ASD may be able to use atypical strategies to partially compensate for social 
deficits, there is evidence to indicate that these strategies likely do not facilitate the processing 
and understanding of implicit social and emotional information in the same manner as in 
neurotypicals.  For example, people with ASD who show little impairment in emotion 
recognition over a long response window still demonstrate impairments relative to controls 
during shorter response windows, indicating that the compensatory strategies being used were 
likely slower and more effortful (Celani, Battacchi, & Arcidiacono, 1999).  Another study 
examining facial expression strategies found that the use of rule-based strategies in autism 
results in a greater tolerance for unnaturally exaggerated expressions (Rutherford and 
McIntosh, 2006), suggesting there is still an altered perception of emotions despite the use of 
these strategies.  Consequently, people with autism may learn or acquire skills, which allow 
them to minimize the appearance of social deficits, but without developing an accompanying 
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understanding of the meaning of the strategy, making these strategies less flexible and 
adaptive than those used by neurotypicals.  
The aim of the present study was to examine one of the most basic elements of social 
interaction, face scanning, to investigate atypical face gaze strategies that have been reported to 
compensate for social deficits and in particular, the flexibility of those strategies in response to 
changing viewing contexts.  Specifically, we sought to examine gaze to salient regions of the 
face and the spontaneous tendency for face exploration under atypical viewing instructions. 
Eye-tracking was used to investigate gaze behavior in adults with high-functioning autism 
during a face viewing task which was decoupled from an explicit decision-making task.  We 
utilized face stimuli depicting open eyes as well as closed eyes to investigate whether there was 
an effect of eye contact on face gaze.  Participants viewed either faces one at a time and were 
given instructions to view the face freely or to look at the face while avoiding either the eyes or 
the mouth.  
We hypothesized that for open-eyed stimuli, people with ASD would not show differences in 
gaze to salient facial features compared to controls.  Consistent with evidence showing 
diminished sensitivity to the eyes rather than avoidance of the eyes in ASD, we also predicted 
that gaze behavior in ASD would remain the same for closed eyes stimuli as for open eyes 
stimuli.  In the “Avoid the Eyes” condition we hypothesized that both groups would increase 
gaze to the mouth relative to the free-viewing condition and that the two groups would show 
little difference in gaze to remaining regions of the face.  In line with reports of top-down 
strategies for face gaze in ASD, we predicted that in the “Avoid the Mouth” condition, 
cognitive control would be engaged avoiding the mouth.  Consequently, there would be little 
spontaneous tendency for people with ASD to look at the eyes whether they were open or 
closed, whereas controls would look at the eyes as they did in the unrestricted condition.  
Therefore, we hypothesized that the ASD group would look less at the eyes relative to their eye 
gaze in Free View, and also relative to controls in this condition since cognitive strategies are 
engaged elsewhere.  While there was a superficially normal tendency for people with ASD to 
look in the general eye region, we found differences in the distribution of gaze to the center of 
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the eye region and the right eye, and reduced flexibility of the strategies used for face 
scanning in ASD. 
4.2.2 Materials and methods  
4.2.2.1 Participants 
Participants in the current study consisted of n = 12 (9 males, 3 females) high-functioning 
subjects with a DSM-IV diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder ranging in age from 22-58 
(Mage = 31.8 years, SD = 11.5).  One additional ASD participant was tested but excluded from 
analysis due to equipment malfunctioning.  Sample size was determined by participant 
availability.  Diagnosis was confirmed using Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; 
(Lord et al., 2000), the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R;  (Lord et al., 1994), or 
the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ;  (Rutter et al., 2003).  ADOS Calibrated 
Severity Scores (Gotham, Pickles, & Lord, 2009), a metric for measuring symptom severity, 
were available for all but one of the ASD participants.   
The comparison group consisted of n =13 healthy controls (10 males, 3 females) ranging in age 
from 24-54 (Mage = 34.9 years, SD = 11.6), group-matched for age, gender, and IQ, with no 
family history of psychiatric illness.  All participants also completed the Autism Spectrum 
Quotient scale, or AQ (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001).  Table 
4.1 summarizes demographic and diagnostic information the participants in the autism and 
control group, respectively.  
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Table 4.1. Demographic and diagnostic information for autism and control 
participants in the Don’t Look study. 
Autism group Autism group: ADOS 










1 M 26 131 133 32 9 13 9 9 
2 F 26 123 125 35 4 7 5 6 
3 M 48 115 109 37 6 8 7 9 
4 M 42 80 93 20 14 20 10 10 
5 M 25 87 103 21 11 16 10 10 
6 M 58 118 126 36 7 9 7 7 
7 M 30 111 106 28 11 17 -- -- 
8 M 26 94 106 28 8 12 8 7 
9 F 22 101 102 33 13 20 10 10 
10 F 22 102 107 32 14 21 10 10 
11 M 33 50 91 31 11 15 9 8 
12 M 24 118 101 14 7 12 6 5 
Mean  31.83 102.50 108.50 28.92     
SD  11.51 22.40 13.03 7.13     
Control Group     




IQ AQ     
1 F 38 104 102 11     
2 F 29 116 116 9     
3 M 32 119 117 18     
4 M 45 85 97 18     
5 F 24 95 100 11     
6 M 24 111 109 12     
7 M 52 111 108 17     
8 M 25 106 107 11     
9 M 24 97 94 26     
10 M 27 108 111 15     
11 M 54 113 109 5     
12 M 51 108 102 15     
13 M 29 113 100 6     
Mean  34.92 106.62 105.54 13.38     
SD  11.63 9.43 7.04 5.65     
a. Verbal IQ and full-scale IQ from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; 
AQ: Autism Spectrum Quotient; ADOS: Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; 
SOC: social interaction subscale; COM+SOC: communication + social interaction 
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subscales; CSS SA: calibrated severity score – social affect; CSS Overall: calibrated 
severity score – overall. 
Independent samples t-tests showed that the groups were not significantly different in terms of 
age (t(23) = 0.67, p = .511), gender (p = .637, 2-sided Fisher’s Exact Test), and IQ (t(23) = -
0.72, p = .482), as measured by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 
1999).  All participants gave written informed consent to participate under a protocol approved 
by the Institutional Review Board of the California Institute of Technology. 
4.2.2.2 Stimuli and apparatus 
Stimuli consisted of 144 computer-generated male and female faces, created with Facegen 
(Singular Inversions, Vancouver, Canada).  Faces were front-facing with a neutral emotional 
expression (see Figure 4.1-A for sample stimuli).  Half of the faces shown depicted open eyes 
and direct eye contact, and the other half depicted closed eyes. Each block had an equal number 
of faces with open eyes and closed eyes, and an equal number of male and female faces.  No 
faces were repeated.   
Images were presented on a 21” CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 100 Hz and pixel resolution 
of 1152 x 870.  The stimuli were shown individually in the center of the screen for five 
seconds.  At a viewing distance of approximately 52 cm, each face stimulus had an overall size 
of 22.9 (width) x 22.9 (height) degrees of visual angle. 
Stimuli were presented using Matlab 2010a (Mathworks, Natick, MA), the Psychophysics 
toolbox (Brainard, 1997), and the Eyelink toolbox (Cornelissen et al., 2002).  Gaze data was 
collected using the Eyelink 1000 remote eye-tracking system (SR Research, Osgoode, Canada).  
Corneal and pupil reflection were recorded at a sampling rate of 500 Hz.  At the beginning of 
each block, a 9-point calibration was performed.  Each trial began by requiring subjects to 
fixate on a central drift correction dot.  After the eye-tracker registered a successful fixation, 





Images were presented in three blocks, with 48 trials in each block.  Images were shown 
individually in the center of the screen for five seconds each while eye-gaze was tracked.  
Experimental design consisted of three blocked conditions where viewing instructions were 
varied for each (see Figure 4.1-B for summary of experimental conditions).  In one condition, 
viewing was unrestricted (Free View), and in the two remaining condition viewing was 
restricted (Avoid Eyes, Avoid Mouth).  At the start of each block, subjects were instructed to 
examine the faces while following one of the following three viewing instructions: 1) avoid the 
eyes (“Avoid Eyes” condition), 2) avoid the mouth (“Avoid Mouth”), or 3) view the images 
freely (“Free View”).  Lastly, to insure the faces were being inspected in the “Avoid” 
conditions, subjects were told they might be asked to answer questions about the faces at the 
end of the experiment, though no actual post-experiment evaluation took place.  Instruction 























Avoid the Eyes 
(48 Trials)  




Avoid the Mouth 
(48 Trials) 
 
Figure 4.1. (A) Example stimuli showing Open Eyes (top) and Closed Eyes (bottom) faces, 
and (B) summary of experimental conditions. 
4.2.2.4 Analyses 
Data were analyzed using custom scripts written in Matlab.  Trials in which more than 20% of 
eye-tracking data was missing (due to blinks and/or signal loss) were excluded from analyses 
(< 3% of trials).  Raw eye-tracking data was pre-processed to extract fixation locations and 
durations.  Fixations were defined as gaze points falling within 1 degree of visual angle for a 




Because face stimuli differed in their locations of socially salient features, faces and the 
fixations on each face were normalized onto a template face using a morphing procedure (see 
Figure 4.2).  Each face was manually labeled with 94 anatomical landmark points (including 
eyes, mouth, nose, and head outline), and transposed using Delaunay Triangulation onto 
identical points marked on a prototypical template face.  Fixation locations were subsequently 
morphed from their locations on the stimulus face to the equivalent locations on the template 
















































































































































































Figure 4.2. Morphing procedure to transpose fixations from all stimuli onto a 
prototypical template face. (A) Template face labeled with 94 anatomical landmark 
points. (B) Analogous points marked on the template face (left) and a stimulus face 
(right). (C) Triangulation used to transpose fixation locations from the stimulus face 
onto equivalent locations on the template. 
 
To analyze gaze behavior, fixation heatmaps (or density maps) were calculated for each subject 
and condition by weighting fixation location by its duration, then spatially smoothing using a 
Gaussian kernel with sigma = 13, or 0.5 degrees of visual angle.  Heatmaps were averaged 
across trials and subjects, and the resulting group maps were used for the ROI analyses 
described next. 
We defined the following seven regions of interest (ROIs) on the template face: Left Eye, Right 
Eye, Eye Region Total, Nose, Mouth, Head Remainder, and Off-Head (see Figure 4.3 for a 
depiction of all regions on the template face).  With the exception of Eye Region Total, which 
included Left Eye and Right Eye, ROIs were mutually exclusive.  Designations for left and 




Figure 4.3. Template face with all regions of interest defined: yellow- left eye, magenta – 
right eye, blue – eye region total, gray – nose, orange – mouth, green – head remainder, 
red – off-head.  With the exception of eye region total, which includes the left and right 
eyes, all regions were mutually exclusive. 
We conducted three analyses examining the following: 1) the proportion of gaze in all ROIs, 2) 
the distribution of gaze when it was in the eye region, and 3) center bias in the eye and mouth 
regions.  Each analysis used a different subset of ROIs (see Figure 4.4).  
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Figure 4.4. ROI configurations used for the various analyses. (A) Gaze proportions to 
all regions of interest, (B) Gaze proportion to the eye region only, (C) Center Bias – 
average distance to the horizontal and vertical midlines. 
For the first analysis examining gaze to all ROIs, we calculated the proportion of gaze time in 
each of the seven regions, summing the density map in each ROI then dividing by the sum of 
the entire on-screen density map.   
Given that total gaze to the eye region might be diminished in ASD, we then conducted a 
second analysis comparing where gaze was distributed only in the eye-related ROIs (Left Eye, 
Right Eye, and the remainder of the Eye Region ellipse), calculating the proportion of time in 
each relative to total gaze in the eye region only (i.e., Eye Region Total) rather than total gaze 
on-screen. This analysis would indicate whether the distribution of gaze among the three eye-
related ROIs differed between groups. 
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Finally, for the analysis of center bias, we analyzed the two ROIs defining the socially 
salient regions of the face (Eye Region Total and Mouth).  For the Eye and Mouth ROIs, we 
calculated the Euclidean distance for each point within the ROI to the vertical and horizontal 
midlines of the ROI, weighting each distance by gaze duration (i.e., the heatmap value for the 
point).  Next, we summed these values, and then divided by the sum of gaze in the ROI to 
obtain the average gaze distance to the horizontal and vertical midlines. 
Statistical analyses were conducted by carrying out repeated-measures ANOVAs for each ROI 
in the analysis subset, with a between-subjects factor of group (ASD, Control) and within-
subjects factors of condition (Free View, Avoid Eyes, Avoid Mouth) and stimulus type (Open 
Eyes, Closed Eyes).  In order to investigate the relationship of the two restricted conditions 
(Avoid Eyes, Avoid Mouth) against the unrestricted condition (Free View), appropriate 
contrasts were also conducted for gaze to the Right Eye, Left Eye, Eye Region Total, and 
Mouth.  Lastly, we calculated Pearson correlations between AQ and proportion of gaze to ROIs 
across all subjects, and ADOS-CSS-Overall scores and proportion of gaze to ROIs for the 
autism subjects only. 
4.2.3 Results 





































































Figure 4.5. Heat maps for the Autism and Control groups, and condition with Open 




function to spatially smooth each duration-weighted fixation point, then maps were 
averaged across trials and subjects.  Warmer colors represent longer total fixation time. 
 
4.2.3.1 Gaze proportions in all regions of interest  
The first set of analyses focused on gaze to the different regions of interest (see Figure 4.4-A 
for ROIs).  A repeated-measures ANOVA with between-subjects factor of group and within-
subjects factors of condition and stimulus was conducted for each of the seven ROIs (see 
Figure 4.6). 
 
Figure 4.6. Proportion of fixation time in the ROIs in the ASD (red) and control (blue) 
groups.  Error bars denote standard error. 
 
Right Eye 
The ANOVA for the right eye revealed a significant main effect of group on gaze time, F(1,23) 
= 5.56, p = .027, η2  = .195.  Overall, ASD looked less at the right eye than Controls regardless 
of stimulus type or condition (ASD: M = 7.7%, SE = 1.1; Controls: M = 11.4%, SE = 1.1).  
While the interaction between group and stimulus did not reach significance, F(1,23) = 2.77, p 



























































































































































































































































































































































































= .109, η2  = .108, the effect size indicates there is likely a greater sensitivity of stimulus 
type on Controls than ASD, such that the decrease in gaze between open and closed eyes is 
larger in the Control group than the ASD group (ASD: 2.1%; Controls: 4.0%). 
There was also a marginally significant interaction between condition and group, F(1.59,36.61) 
= 2.86, p = .081, η2  = .111.  A planned contrast comparing the unrestricted condition to Avoid 
Eyes and Avoid Mouth indicated there was a significant interaction between condition and 
group for Avoid Eyes – Free View, F(1,23) = 10.78, p = .003, η2  = .319, but not for Avoid 
Mouth – Free View, F(1,23) = 0.42, p = .521, η2  = .018.  While Controls looked more to the 
right eye than ASD in the Free View condition (ASD: M = 9.3%, SE = 1.6; Controls: M = 
15.5%, SE = 1.5; t(23) = 3.05, p = .006), there was no group difference in “Avoid Eyes,” (p = 
.992).  
Left Eye  
The ANOVA for the left eye revealed no significant interactions involving group (all ps > 
.627), nor a main effect of group (p = .228).   
Eye Region Total  
The ANOVA for the total eye region revealed no significant interactions involving group (all 
ps > .309), and no main effect of group (p = .783).   
Mouth 
The ANOVA for the mouth region indicated there was a marginally significant interaction 
between group and condition, F(1.08,25.03) = 3.58, p = .067, η2  = .135. There was also a 
marginally significant interaction between group and stimulus, F(1,23) = 3.36, p = .080, η2  = 
.127, suggesting a greater influence of stimulus type on gaze to the mouth in Controls than 
ASD .  There was not a significant main effect of group (p = .473).   
Contrasts comparing the unrestricted condition to Avoid Eyes and Avoid Mouth revealed a 
significant interaction between group and condition for both Avoid Eyes – Free View, F(1,23) 
= 4.90, p = .037, η2  = .176, and Avoid Mouth – Free View, F(1,23) = 5.93, p = .023, η2  = .205.  
Both effects were driven by a significant group difference in the Free View condition, with 
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ASD looking less at the mouth than Controls (ASD: M = 4.5%, SE = 1.0; Controls: M = 
9.6%, SE = 1.0; t(23) = 3.05, p = .006), but no group differences in either of the other two 
conditions (ps > .153).  In other words, while ASD looked less at the mouth in Free View than 
Controls, both groups significantly increased gaze to the mouth in the Avoid Eyes condition 
and decreased gaze to the mouth in the Avoid Mouth condition relative to Free View. 
Nose 
The ANOVA for gaze to the nose revealed a marginally significant interaction between group 
and condition F(2,46) = 3.19, p = .074, η2  = .122.  There were no other significant interactions 
involving group (all ps > .381) and no main effect of group (p = .871).   
The contrast comparing Free View to Avoid Mouth revealed a significant interaction between 
group and condition, F(1,23) = 5.41, p = .029, η2  = .190, indicating that the ASD group looked 
more at the nose than Controls in Free View, (ASD: M = 18.7%, SE = 4.1; Controls: M = 
12.7%, SE = 1.7) but less than Controls in Avoid Mouth (ASD: M = 5.6%, SE = 1.1; Controls: 
M = 8.4%, SE = 2.0).  Both Controls and ASD also decreased gaze to the nose region in the 
Avoid Mouth condition compared to Free View, but that decrease was greater in ASD.   
Head Remainder 
The ANOVA for the head remainder revealed no significant interaction effects involving group 
(all ps > .327), and no main effect of group (p = .343).  
Off-Head 
The ANOVA for gaze off-head revealed no significant interaction effects involving group (all 
ps > .438), and no main effect of group (p = .934). 
4.2.3.2 AQ and ADOS correlations with gaze to ROIs 
AQ Correlations Across Groups  
In the Free View condition, AQ was negatively correlated with gaze to the right eye for Open 
Eyes stimuli (r = -.459, n = 25, p = .021), and gaze to the mouth for Closed Eyes stimuli (r = -
.463, n = 25, p = .020).  Also, in Free View there was a negative correlation with gaze to the 
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Head Remainder for Closed Eyes stimuli (r = -.401, n = 25, p = .047).  In the Avoid Eyes 
condition, AQ was positively correlated with gaze to the left eye for Open Eyes stimuli (r = 
.460, n = 25 p = .021).  No correlations were significant in the Avoid Mouth condition.    
 ADOS CSS-Overall Correlations in Autism Group 
In the Avoid Mouth condition, there was a negative correlation between ADOS severity scores 
and gaze to the right eye for Open Eyes stimuli (r = -.681, n = 11, p = .021), as well as a 
correlation for gaze off-head, for both Open Eyes stimuli (r = .670, n = 11, p = .024), and 
Closed Eyes stimuli (r = .664, n = 11, p = .026).  Also in Avoid Mouth, there was a positive 
correlation for gaze to the head remainder for Open Eyes stimuli, (r = .615, n = 11, p = .044), 
and a negative correlation with gaze to the nose for Closed Eyes stimuli (r = -.679, n = 11, p = 
.022).  None of the remaining correlations reached significance in any of the conditions. 
4.2.3.3 Gaze distribution in eye region  
To examine the distribution of gaze in the eye region, we calculated the proportion of gaze time 
in each eye ROI relative to the total gaze time spent in the entire eye region (see Figure 4.4-B 
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Figure 4.7. (A) Heatmaps and gaze proportions in the eye-related ROIs in the ASD (red) 
and control (blue) groups collapsed across condition and stimulus type.  (B) Gaze 
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proportions in the eye-related ROIs in the ASD (red) and control (blue) groups 
divided by condition and stimulus type. Error bars denote standard error. 
 Right Eye 
The ANOVA for the right eye revealed a marginally significant interaction between group and 
condition, F(2,22) = 3.09, p = .066, η2  = .219.  There was also a significant main effect of 
group, F(1,23) = 9.07, p = .006, η2  = .283, indicating the ASD group spent a significantly 
smaller proportion of gaze to the eye region fixating on the right eye relative to Controls, 
regardless of condition (ASD: M = 18.0%, SE = 2.5; Controls: M = 28.4%, SE = 2.4). 
Planned contrasts comparing the unrestricted condition to the two restricted conditions revealed 
that there was a significant interaction between group and condition in Avoid Eyes – Free 
View, F(1,23) = 6.45, p = .018, η2  = .219, indicating the ASD group  spent a smaller 
proportion of time in the eye region looking at the right eye in Free View (ASD: M = 18.2%, 
SE = 2.8; Controls: M = 33.6%, SE = 1.9; t(23) = 3.52, p < .001) but not in Avoid Eyes, p 
= .507. 
 Left Eye 
The ANOVA for the left eye revealed no significant interactions involving group (all ps > .448) 
and no main effect of group (p = .927). 
 Eye Region Remainder 
The ANOVA for the remainder of the eye region revealed no significant interactions involving 
group (all ps > .168).  There was, however, a significant main effect of group, F(1,23) = 5.54, p 
= .027, η2  = .194, indicating that the ASD group spent a greater proportion of their gaze in the 
eye region fixating between the eyes (ASD: M = 64.9%, SE = 3.1; Controls: M = 54.8%, SE = 
3.0). 
4.2.3.4 Center bias to horizontal and vertical midlines  
To compare average gaze distance (measured in degrees of visual angle) from the vertical and 
horizontal midlines in the socially salient regions of the face, we conducted two repeated-
measures ANOVAs for the Eye Region and Mouth ROIs (see Figure 4.4-C for ROIs). 
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 Eye Region 
The ANOVA for the eye region revealed a main effect of group for distance to the vertical 
midline, F(1,23) = 5.89, p = .024, η2  = .204, indicating the average horizontal distance to the 
midline was significantly less in the ASD group relative to the Control group (ASD: M = 1.49 
dva, SE = .08; Controls: M = 1.75 dva, SE = .07).  Center bias for gaze to the vertical midline in 
the eye region is shown in Figure 4.8.  
There were no significant interactions involving group for distance to the horizontal midline 
(all ps > .497).  There was, however, a marginally significant effect of group, F(1,23) = 3.32, p 
= .081, η2  = .126, for greater vertical distance to the midline in the ASD group (ASD: M = .84 
dva, SE = .03; Controls: M = .77 dva, SE = .03). 
 
Figure 4.8. Mean distance to the vertical midline in the Eye Region, collapsed across 
stimulus type and condition. Distance is measured in degrees of visual angle. Dots 




The ANOVA for the mouth did not reveal any significant interactions involving group for 
distance to the vertical midline (all ps > .291), nor a main effect of group (p = .799). There were 
also no significant interactions involving group for distance to the horizontal midline (all ps > 
.737), nor a main effect of group (p = .970). 
4.2.4 Discussion 
In this study, we investigated one of the basic building blocks of social processing, face 
scanning, to examine atypical face gaze in high-functioning autism as well as the flexibility of 
atypical fixation behavior.  We found differences between groups in the details of the gaze 
pattern, though gaze to some of the general regions were similar, as well differences in how the 
ASD group updated face scanning strategies in response to ROI restrictions.  We found that 
people with ASD exhibit a similar pattern of gaze to the face and off the face as controls, 
showing a preference for examining the face over non-face areas of the screen, and when 
looking at the face, favoring the most socially salient part, the general eye region.  Both groups 
also performed equally well in avoiding the eyes and mouth in the Avoid Eyes and Avoid 
Mouth conditions, respectively. Similar to the controls’ gaze behavior, when the eyes were to 
be avoided, the ASD group also increased gaze to the mouth, indicating that the ASD group 
recognized the significance of looking to these two regions for information, whether or not 
there is difficulty in subsequently processing that information.  There were two key differences 
in the details of gaze distribution to the face however: first, the ASD group demonstrated a 
significant center bias when looking to the eye region, spending more time looking between the 
eyes and less time looking at the right eye than controls.  Second, the ASD group also spent 
significantly less time than controls looking at the mouth.  
In contrast to studies that have reported avoidance of or reduced direct eye contact (Boraston, 
Corden, Miles, Skuse, & Blakemore, 2007; Kliemann et al., 2010), we found that for both faces 
with open eyes and faces with closed eyes, the proportion of gaze time spent in the eye region 
did not differ between ASD and controls, and people with ASD did not significantly change 
gaze to the eye region between open-eyed and closed-eyes faces, indicating that there was no 
avoidance of the eye region, nor an avoidance of direct gaze.   
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It is important to note, however, that there are hints of a differential effect of stimulus type 
on the two groups, supported by two marginally significant interactions (between group and 
stimulus) for the right eye and mouth ROIs.  These interactions suggest that the ASD group 
maintains their gaze to the eye and mouth regions in similar proportions regardless of stimulus 
type, whereas controls decrease gaze to the right eye and increase gaze to the mouth when the 
eyes are closed compared to open.  The suggestion of reduced sensitivity to the type of social 
stimuli is further supported by the negative correlations between AQ and gaze to eyes and 
mouth in the Free View condition, for open eyes and closed eyes stimuli respectively.  The 
controls seem to recognize the diminished social significance of closed eyes relative to open 
eyes, and adjust gaze behavior accordingly, shifting gaze to gather information from the next 
most socially-salient feature of the face.  The absence of a comparable gaze shift in ASD 
coupled with otherwise normal proportions of gaze to the eye region implies that there is 
relatively invariable gaze behavior with a failure to update viewing strategy in response to 
changes in information in the eye region.  The results also provide support for the idea that 
atypical gaze could be driven by diminished sensitivity to the quality of information in the eye 
region rather than an avoidance of direct gaze, or aversion to the eye region in general.   
This interpretation is consistent with previous studies that report diminished significance of 
visual social cues due to amygdala hypo-arousal (Senju & Johnson, 2009) rather than a hyper-
arousal/aversion account (Dalton et al., 2005).  It is known that gaze to the eyes is associated 
with amygdala activation in neurotypicals (Adolphs et al., 1998; Schultz, 2005; Whalen et al., 
2004).  The hyper-arousal model proposes that direct gaze is aversive to people with autism, 
perhaps due to hyper-activation in the amygdala in response to eye contact, and therefore 
diminished eye contact is an adaptive response meant to alleviate that discomfort.  The model 
would predict then that people with autism would actively avoid eye gaze, and also 
demonstrate greater avoidance of direct gaze relative to indirect gaze or closed eyes. On the 
other hand, the hypo-arousal claims there is under-activation in the amygdala in response to eye 
contact, the result of which is reduced reward value and saliency of the eyes.  The latter model 
would predict a reduced preference for rather than an active aversion of the eyes, and no 
difference in response to direct gaze and indirect gaze or closed eyes.   In line with the hypo-
arousal model for ASD, our results showed relatively normal gaze to the eye region in the 
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conditions in which eye gaze was permissible, indicating there was virtually no avoidance 
of the eye region or of direct gaze.  However, there was also little shifting of gaze to the mouth 
and eye regions based on stimulus type, suggesting that people with ASD had difficulty 
perceiving there was diminished quality of information with closed eyes.  
Interestingly, there was little difference between groups in the proportion of on-screen gaze 
devoted to the total eye region and to the left and right eye combined, but in comparing the left 
and right eye separately there were two notable differences.  First, the ASD group distributes 
gaze evenly between the left and right eye, whereas controls show a significant bias for the 
right eye over the left eye.  Second, the ASD group looks significantly less to the right eye than 
controls regardless of stimulus type and condition.  The discrepancy in interest in the right eye 
is further underscored by the finding that, while controls favored the right eye more than any 
other facial feature in Free View (followed by the nose, left eye, then mouth), people with ASD 
showed an unusually strong preference for a different facial feature, the nose, looking at it 
twice as long as the right eye (and four times as long as the mouth).   
When people with ASD looked at the eye region, the distribution of gaze time in the three eye-
related ROIs (left eye, right eye, remainder of eye ellipse) also revealed differences in eye gaze 
strategy.  An analysis comparing the relative distribution of gaze amongst the three regions, i.e., 
dividing gaze in each eye-related ROI by total gaze in the eye region, rather than by total gaze 
on-screen, confirmed there were differences in gaze to the right eye and to the eye region 
remainder.  First, the reduced interest to the right eye was maintained even after accounting for 
total time spent in the eye region, which was not surprising given the relatively comparable 
gaze time spent in the total eye region between the two groups.  The lack of right eye bias is 
consistent with findings from a recent study (Yi et al., 2013) which reported significantly less 
gaze to the right eye in children with ASD compared to controls.  Second and more strikingly, 
there was a significant difference in gaze to the remainder of the eye region, which consists 
largely of the region in between the eyes.  Compared to the controls, the ASD group devoted a 
greater proportion of gaze time in the eye region looking between the eyes, regardless of 
stimulus type or condition.  Our results demonstrate a lateralization of gaze to the eye region in 
controls that is absent in people with ASD.  
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Our analysis of center bias in the eye region revealed a tendency for people with ASD to 
look closer to the vertical midline in the eye region, but further away from the horizontal 
midline than controls.  Behaviorally, this amounts to participants with ASD looking above and 
below the pupil region rather than looking directly at the pupil, and looking between the eyes 
rather than lateralizing gaze to either eye (also supported by the results of our analyses above).  
The center bias in ASD together with a reduced reliance on the right eye demonstrates a 
diminished tendency for the ASD group to maximize perception of social information by 
lateralizing gaze to the eye region when eye gaze is allowed.  The results from our study are 
consistent with findings from an unpublished study (Wang et al., in preparation) that found 
people with ASD had a stronger bias toward the center of images, which they suggest could be 
attributable to a combination of factors, including slower saccade velocity and reduced saliency 
perception of faces and social cues.   
Gaze to the mouth also differed between groups in the unrestricted condition.  Though the ASD 
group did explore the mouth region in the unrestricted condition, they did so significantly less 
than controls.  Decreased gaze to the mouth contrasts with some studies reporting increased 
reliance on the mouth in ASD (Klin et al., 2002; Neumann et al., 2006; Spezio et al., 2007), but 
is consistent with others that have found reduced gaze to the mouth (Pelphrey et al., 2002).  Our 
results showing diminished mouth gaze in the unrestricted condition could be due to the use of 
static stimuli, which might result in reduced saliency of the mouth relative to dynamic stimuli 
(Irwin & Brancazio, 2014; Senju & Johnson, 2009). 
There was also a striking difference in gaze to the mouth in the Avoid Eyes condition relative 
to Free View.  In contrast to the minimal mouth gaze observed in Free View, the ASD group 
significantly increased mouth gaze when instructed to avoid the eyes, spending nearly a third of 
their gaze time in this region.  Furthermore, while gaze to the eyes and nose was equivalent 
between groups for the Avoid Eyes condition, the ASD group spent more time on the mouth 
than controls in this condition, whereas controls explored the head and face remainder more 
than ASD.  While controls did increase gaze to the mouth, they did so less drastically, 
continuing instead to explore the face by also increasing gaze to the remainder of the face.  
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The substantial bias toward the mouth appears to be driven by a strict adherence to the 
Avoid Eyes instruction rather than a gaze shift driven by inherent saliency of the mouth or an 
updated strategy to continue exploring the face for information:  that the ASD group originally 
showed little interest in the mouth in Free View makes it highly unlikely that they originally 
perceived the mouth as the next most informative feature.  Furthermore, the notable decrease in 
nose gaze between Free View and Avoid Eyes signifies the ASD group did not rely upon the 
feature they found so salient in the unrestricted condition.  This points to the use of a new 
strategy rather than an updating of the strategy used in Free View, one that involves avoidance 
of the eye region and the regions near it by fixating on the mouth at the expense of exploring 
the face.  
In the Avoid Mouth condition, the ASD group adhered to the ROI restriction by avoiding the 
mouth and regions near it.  People with ASD deviated from the scanning approach they used in 
Free View, spending significantly less time on the nose region than they had in the unrestricted 
condition, whereas controls generally returned to the behavior they demonstrated in the 
unrestricted condition with the exception of avoiding the mouth.  Moreover, correlations with 
ADOS severity scores suggest there may be different viewing strategies in ASD associated 
with the severity of impairment.  First, high-scoring participants spent less time on the nose of 
closed-eyes stimuli and more time looking off the head for both stimuli, which indicates high-
scoring participants make greater changes to their behavior relative to the unrestricted 
condition.  Furthermore, it is important to note that these changes do not appear to be socially 
adaptive, given the positive correlation with off-head gaze.  Second, while high-scoring 
subjects were more likely to look at the remainder of the face, they also looked less at the right 
eye of open-eyed stimuli.  In other words, high-scoring subjects were less likely to attend to the 
most salient feature of the face, even though they were not instructed to avoid it in this 
condition. 
If face scanning strategies remained similar in the restricted conditions to the ones used in Free 
View, gaze to the facial features typically relied upon for social cues would change very little 
with the exception of the restricted ROI.  The scanning approach adopted by controls when 
instructed to avoid the eyes or mouth demonstrates a flexible ability to update viewing 
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strategies to accommodate ROI restrictions, while also continuing to explore the face.  The 
ASD group, on the other hand, appears to have difficulty adapting the approach they used in 
Free View, instead changing their strategy for each condition. In the Avoid Eyes condition, the 
ASD group fixates on the mouth at the expense of exploring the rest of the face and in the 
Avoid Mouth condition the ASD group also avoids the nose even though they relied upon it 
heavily in the unrestricted condition.   
There are several (potentially interdependent) factors that could contribute to the group 
differences in viewing strategy.  One explanation for the differences in gaze behavior might be 
that the approach used by the ASD group in the unrestricted condition could not be easily 
adapted to the ROI restricted condition if it relied heavily on gaze between the eyes and on the 
nose, which is indeed consistent with our findings.  A second possibility is that exploring the 
face for social information might not be a natural, spontaneous tendency in ASD, but instead 
requires top-down engagement that is otherwise being utilized in the restricted conditions to 
avoid specified face features.  The possibility of diminished automatic face exploration would 
also be in line with our observations of a center bias in the eye region, reduced face exploration 
in the Avoid Eyes condition, and the change in strategy in the Avoid Mouth condition.    
With regard to the significant change in mouth gaze between conditions, it may be the case that 
looking at the eyes, mouth, and nose is part of a rule-based strategy for salient features that 
becomes imbalanced when instructed to avoid the eyes, the region to which people with ASD 
may normally try to attend to the most.  People with autism may also inhibit a tendency to 
naturally fixate on the mouth in the Free View condition by focusing on the eye region.  When 
the eyes must be avoided, the propensity for mouth gaze could become more apparent, possibly 
due to the high cognitive load experienced in an atypical social gaze task such as the one in the 
present study.  This interpretation would be consistent with reports of people with ASD 
demonstrating greater face processing impairments in more cognitively demanding tasks, but 
less so in simpler tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Evers, Kerkhof, Steyaert, Noens, & 
Wagemans, 2014; Klin et al., 2002). 
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The lack of a right eye bias in ASD suggests that people with autism are less responsive to 
the differences in quality and/or quantity of social information communicated by the two sides 
of the face.   One theory that has been suggested for why controls show a right eye bias is that it 
is associated with the greater emotional expressivity communicated by the left hemiface, or 
right side of the face from the observer’s perspective (Powell & Schirillo, 2009).  Indeed, 
studies have demonstrated that the left hemiface is more involved in the expression of facial 
emotion, expressing emotions (and negative ones in particular) more intensely than the left side 
of the face (Borod, Haywood, & Koff, 1997; Sackeim, Gur, & Saucy, 1978).  In this respect, 
that the ASD group does not show a right eye bias suggests there is impairment in responding 
to the difference in expressivity.  One question that remains to be answered, however, is at what 
stage of perception and processing the impairment might occur.  One can imagine at least two 
possibilities: one, that people with ASD have difficulties perceiving any difference in 
expressivity in the first place, or two, that the impairment is not in perception of the 
information but rather what to do with it.  In other words, people with ASD may recognize that 
there is a difference in the quality of social information conveyed by the halves of the face, but 
have difficulty processing that information and relating it to social precepts, and as such, do not 
show a preference for the right side of the face.  
Moreover, our findings suggest that part of the atypical viewing strategy in ASD consists of 
fixating on the region between the eyes and on the nose, a strategy that can easily impart an 
impression of neurotypical gaze behavior in social interactions, as well as in certain 
experimental settings.  The underlying source of this gaze behavior is unclear, but a variety of 
influencing factors can be assumed.  One possibility is that subjects may have participated in 
interventional therapies for improving social skills (Faja, Aylward, Bernier, & Dawson, 2007; 
Tanaka et al., 2010; Rao, Beidel, & Murray, 2008), which teach people with autism to look 
between the eyes during social interactions to improve the quality of face-to-face interactions.  
Another possibility is that gaze between the eyes is a learned behavior (either implicit or 
explicit) that individuals with autism have learned can approximate normal social behavior, and 
additionally, may even help processing of social cues.  Several studies have demonstrated that 
high-functioning individuals are able to develop or adopt compensatory strategies to improve 
social skills (Bauminger, 2002; Yirmiya, Pilowsky, & Solomonica-Levi, 1999).  Though these 
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strategies are often not as flexible or adaptive in situations that are unusual or require high 
cognitive effort, they are often sufficient for many other day-to-day situations. 
Our results indicate that in the two restricted conditions, people in the ASD group were 
significantly impaired in their ability to simultaneously adhere to the ROI restriction and also 
update gaze behavior to continue exploring the face.   The difficulty in adapting gaze behavior 
could very well be associated with published reports of deficits in the domains of cognitive 
flexibility and cognitive switching, perhaps due to difficulty integrating and using new 
information (Geurts, Corbett, & Solomon, 2009; Hill, 2004).  One consequence of the 
impairment is the restricted and repetitive behaviors that are a characteristic feature of autism.  
Cognitive rigidity is observed in a variety of behavior, from a preoccupation with specific, 
limited interests (and objects), to perseveration in rituals, routines, and motor movements.  
Another notable outcome of this inflexbility is that people with ASD have difficulty updating 
behavioral strategies to adapt to new social situations and cues.  That is not to say that the 
ability to adapt is absent, but rather impaired or inflexible, such that they have difficulty 
interpreting and responding appropriately to the shifting contextual demands of a social 
interaction.  People with autism are known to compensate for some of these impairments using 
compensatory behavioral and processing strategies (Kasari, Chamberlain, & Bauminger, 2001; 
Plaisted, Swettenham, & Rees, 1999; Rosset et al., 2008; Sigman & Ruskin, 1999; Teunisse & 
Gelder, 1994). 
Closely related to the putative difficulty updating behavioral strategies, another explanation for 
the diminished updating of face scanning strategies could be what has been called “enhanced 
logical consistency” in autism (De Martino, Harrison, Knafo, Bird, & Dolan, 2008).   The 
results of De Martino’s study suggested people with ASD to show reduced integration of 
emotional and social information into decision-making processes, relying instead on more 
logical, rational patterns of decision-making.  While our task did not involve decision-making, 
it did involve coordinating social behavior to task instruction, which involves an element of 
(implicit or explicit) decision-making and therefore is susceptible to a decision-making bias, 
during which people with ASD may fail to incorporate social and emotional cues into their 
viewing strategy.  Instead, people with autism may have become task-focused, and prioritized 
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adhering to the task restrictions.  In this sense, “succeeding” at the task of avoiding salient 
regions also may come at the cost of reduced behavioral flexibility. 
We can draw two over-arching conclusions from the results of the present study.  First, the 
group differences in viewing strategy in response to task demands and social stimuli highlight 
the flexible updating of viewing strategies in controls, which aim to maximize the amount of 
social information gathered.  Our findings of a center bias toward the eyes and increased 
fixation on the nose indicate this tendency is compromised in ASD.  Second, our results also 
demonstrate that viewing strategies in ASD are less flexible and adaptive than controls’, 
particularly in a changing social context.  Our findings of reduced face exploration in the 
restricted conditions and significant deviation from the strategy used in the unrestricted 
condition by people with ASD support this conclusion. In sum, it appears that the ability of 
people with ASD to adjust and update viewing strategies is impaired, whereas controls 
demonstrate greater flexibility by exploring the face while avoiding the specified regions.  
These findings demonstrate a possible approach for assessing social functioning skills in a 
manner that circumvents the use of compensatory strategies, and which requires them to adapt 
to new situations, reflecting the challenges experienced in daily social functioning. 
Our findings suggest some clear future directions.  First, gaze behavior in the Avoid Mouth 
condition was more similar between groups than in Free View, though what conclusions can be 
drawn from this are uncertain at the moment.  Given the known heterogeneity in ASD, there 
are likely sub-types of individuals that exhibit similar behavior, as well as individual variations 
in behavior, that are obfuscated in a group level analysis.  While the sample size in the present 
study was too small to examine possible ASD sub-types, future studies should investigate 
whether there are distinct cognitive profiles in ASD that could be characterized by measures of 
flexibility in viewing behavior.  Second, people with ASD, particularly those who are high-
functioning, may respond differently to dynamic stimuli compared to the static stimuli we used 
in the present study, or to stimuli that require great cognitive effort to process.  Pilot results 
from our research group indicate face gaze impairments might be more pronounced in live 
social interaction (Wang, Shimojo, & S. Shimojo, 2015).  Future studies using dynamic face 
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stimuli and more complex social stimuli will be important in understanding the specific 
contexts in which social impairments occur in high-functioning autism.  
In summary, while the general gaze patterns to regions of the face appeared similar, there were 
functional and qualitative differences in the details of how the ASD group looked at faces in in 
the unrestricted condition and how they adjusted gaze in the restricted conditions. People with 
autism demonstrated a clear bias for looking between the eyes and showed a tendency for 
reduced sensitivity to the right eye.  Furthermore, when a condition was imposed to avoid 
certain facial features, people with ASD demonstrate rigidity in gaze behavior that adhered to 
the ROI restriction but at the cost of extensive exploration of the face, suggesting that people 




4.3 Don’t Look Study in Amygdala Lesion Patients 
4.3.1 Materials and methods 
4.3.1.1 Participants 
AP, AM, and BG are three female participants with bilateral amygdala lesions caused by 
Urbach-Wiethe disease (Mage = 35.3 years, SD = 6.4, age range = 28-39). Two of the 
participants, AM and BG, are monozygotic twins. Anatomical scans of the lesions for the three 
participants can be seen in the Methods section of the Gaze Cascade study in amygdala lesion 
patients (section 3.3.1.1 Participants).   
The comparison group consisted of 3 healthy female controls (Mage = 30.3 years, SD = 7.1, age 
range = 24-38), group-matched for age and IQ, with no family history of psychiatric illness.  
Two of the controls were the same controls tested for the Gaze Cascade study in amygdala 
lesion patients. All participants also completed the Autism Spectrum Quotient scale, or AQ 
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). Table 4.2 summarizes 
demographic and diagnostic information for participants. 
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Table 4.2. Demographic information for amygdala lesion and control participants in 
the Don’t Look study. 
          Amygdala group 
 
 Age 





AP 28 92 98 20 
AM 39 94 96 21 
BG 39 99 101 18 
Mean 34.3 95.0 98.3  









1 24 95 100 11 
2 29 116 116 9 
3 38 104 102 11 
Mean 30.3 105.0 106.0  
SD 7.1 10.5 8.7  
a. Verbal IQ and full-scale IQ from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; AQ: Autism Quotient.  
Independent samples t-tests showed that the groups did not significantly differ in terms of age 
(t(4) = -0.73, p = .507) and IQ (t(4) = 1.46, p = .217), as measured by the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999) or the German-language adaptation.  All 
participants gave written informed consent to participate under a protocol approved by the 
Institutional Review Board of the California Institute of Technology. 
4.3.1.2 Stimuli and apparatus 
Stimuli and apparatus were identical to those described in the Methods section of the Don’t 
Look study in autism participants (see section 4.2.2.2 Stimuli and apparatus).  They are 
described again here only for convenience.   
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Stimuli consisted of 144 computer-generated male and female faces, created with Facegen 
(Singular Inversions, Vancouver, Canada).  Faces were front-facing with a neutral emotional 
expression (see Figure 4.9-A for sample stimuli).  Half of the faces shown depicted open eyes 
and direct eye contact, and the other half depicted closed eyes. Each block had an equal number 
of faces with open eyes and closed eyes, and an equal number of male and female faces.  No 
faces were repeated.   
Images were presented on a 21” CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 100 Hz and pixel resolution 
of 1152 x 870.  The stimuli were shown individually in the center of the screen for five 
seconds.  At a viewing distance of approximately 52 cm, each face stimulus had an overall size 
of 22.9 (width) x 22.9 (height) degrees of visual angle. 
Stimuli were presented using Matlab 2010a (Mathworks, Natick, MA), the Psychophysics 
toolbox (Brainard, 1997), and the Eyelink toolbox (Cornelissen, Peters, & Palmer, 2002).  Gaze 
data was collected using the Eyelink 1000 remote eye-tracking system (SR Research, Osgoode, 
Canada).  Corneal and pupil reflection were recorded at a sampling rate of 500 Hz.  At the 
beginning of each block, a 9-point calibration was performed.  Each trial began by requiring 
subjects to fixate on a central drift correction dot.  After the eye-tracker registered a successful 
fixation, participants pressed the space bar to start the trial.  
4.3.1.3 Procedure 
Stimuli and apparatus were identical to those described in the Methods section of the Don’t 
Look study in autism participants (see section 4.2.2.3 Procedure).   They are described again 
here only for convenience.   
Images were presented in three blocks, with 48 trials in each block.  Images were shown 
individually in the center of the screen for five seconds each while eye-gaze was tracked.  
Experimental design consisted of three blocked conditions where viewing instructions were 
varied for each (see Figure 4.9-B for summary of experimental conditions).  In one condition, 
viewing was unrestricted (Free View), and in the two remaining condition viewing was 
restricted (Avoid Eyes, Avoid Mouth).  At the start of each block, subjects were instructed to 
examine the faces while following one of the following three viewing instructions: 1) avoid the 
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eyes (“Avoid Eyes” condition), 2) avoid the mouth (“Avoid Mouth”), or 3) view the images 
freely (“Free View”).  Lastly, to insure the faces were being inspected in the “Avoid” 
conditions, subjects were told they might be asked to answer questions about the faces at the 
end of the experiment, though no actual post-experiment evaluation took place.  Instruction 




















Avoid the Eyes 
(48 Trials)  




Avoid the Mouth 
(48 Trials) 
Figure 4.9. (A) Example stimuli showing Open Eyes (top) and Closed Eyes (bottom) 
faces, and (B) summary of experimental conditions. 
4.3.1.4 Analyses 
Analyses were identical to those described in the Methods section of the Don’t Look study in 
autism participants (see section 4.2.2.4 Analyses).   They are described again here for 




Data were analyzed using custom scripts written in Matlab.  Trials in which more than 20% 
of eye-tracking data was missing (due to blinks and/or signal loss) were excluded from analyses 
(< 3% of trials).  Raw eye-tracking data was pre-processed to extract fixation locations and 
durations.  Fixations were defined as gaze points falling within 1 degree of visual angle for a 
minimum of 100 milliseconds.   
Because face stimuli differed in their locations of socially salient features, faces and the 
fixations on each face were normalized onto a template face using a morphing procedure (see 
section 4.2.2.2 Analyses and Figure 4.2).  Each face was manually labeled with 94 anatomical 
landmark points (including eyes, mouth, nose, and head outline), and transposed using 
Delaunay Triangulation onto identical points marked on a prototypical template face.  Fixation 
locations were subsequently morphed from their locations on the stimulus face to the 
equivalent locations on the template face.  All subsequent analyses were performed on these 
normalized fixations on the template face. 
To analyze gaze behavior, fixation heatmaps (or density maps) were calculated for each subject 
and condition by weighting fixation location by its duration, then spatially smoothing using a 
Gaussian kernel with sigma = 13, or 0.5 degrees of visual angle.  Heatmaps were averaged 
across trials and subjects, and the resulting group maps were used for the ROI analyses 
described next. 
We defined the following seven regions of interest (ROIs) on the template face: Left Eye, Right 
Eye, Eye Region Total, Nose, Mouth, Head Remainder, and Off-Head (see Figure 4.10 for a 
depiction of all regions on the template face).  With the exception of Eye Region Total, which 
included Left Eye and Right Eye, ROIs were mutually exclusive.  Designations for left and 





Figure 4.10. Template face with all regions of interest defined: yellow- left eye, magenta 
– right eye, blue – eye region total, gray – nose, orange – mouth, green – head 
remainder, red – off-head. With the exception of eye region total, which includes the left 
and right eyes, all regions were mutually exclusive. 
 
We conducted three analyses examining 1) the proportion of gaze in all ROIs, 2) the 
distribution of gaze when it was in the eye region, and 3) center bias in the eye and mouth 
regions.  Each analysis used a different subset of ROIs (see Figure 4.11).  
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Figure 4.11. ROI configurations used in the different analyses. (A) Gaze proportions to 
all regions of interest, (B) Gaze proportion to the eye region, (C) Center Bias – average 
distance to the horizontal and vertical midlines. 
 
For the first analysis examining gaze to all ROIs, we calculated the proportion of gaze time in 
each of the seven regions, summing the density map in each ROI and then dividing by the sum 
of the entire on-screen density map.   
Given that total gaze to the eye region might be diminished in the amygdala group, we then 
conducted a second analysis comparing where gaze was distributed only in the eye-related 
ROIs (Left Eye, Right Eye, and the remainder of the Eye Region ellipse), calculating the 
proportion of time in each relative to total gaze in the eye region only (i.e., Eye Region Total) 
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rather than total gaze on-screen. This analysis would indicate whether the distribution of 
gaze among the three eye-related ROIs differed between groups. 
Finally, for the analysis of center bias, we analyzed the two ROIs defining the socially salient 
regions of the face (Eye Region Total and Mouth).  For the Eye and Mouth ROIs, we calculated 
the Euclidean distance for each point within the ROI to the vertical and horizontal midlines of 
the ROI, weighting each distance by gaze duration (i.e., the heatmap value for the point).  Next, 
we summed these values, then divided by the sum of gaze in the ROI to obtain the average gaze 
distance to the horizontal and vertical midlines. 
Statistical analyses were conducted by carrying out repeated-measures ANOVAs for each ROI 
in the analysis subset, with a between-subjects factor of group (amygdala, Control) and within-
subjects factors of condition (Free View, Avoid Eyes, Avoid Mouth) and stimulus type (Open 
Eyes, Closed Eyes).  In order to investigate the relationship of the two restricted conditions 
(Avoid Eyes, Avoid Mouth) against the unrestricted condition (“Free View”), appropriate 
contrasts were also conducted for gaze to the Right Eye, Left Eye, Eye Region Total, and 
Mouth.   
4.3.2 Results 
Heat maps for the amygdala subjects and control subjects in all three conditions are 


















































































Figure 4.12. Heat maps for the amygdala and control groups, and conditions with 
Open Eyes and Closed Eyes stimuli.  Maps were generated by using a Gaussian kernel 
function to spatially smooth each duration-weighted fixation point, then maps were 
averaged across trials and subjects.  Warmer colors represent longer total fixation time. 
4.3.2.1 Gaze Proportions in all regions of interest  
The first set of analyses focused on gaze to the different regions of interest (see Figure 4.10-A 
for ROIs).  A repeated-measures ANOVA with between-subjects factor of group and within-
subjects factors of condition and stimulus was conducted for each of the seven ROIs (see 
Figure 4.13).   
 
Figure 4.13. Proportion of fixation time in the ROIs in the amygdala (red) and control 
(blue) subjects.  Error bars denote standard error. 
Right Eye 
The ANOVA for the right eye indicated there were no significant interactions involving group 
(all ps > .211), and no main effect of group (p = .578).  Neither of the planned contrasts 
comparing the unrestricted condition to the two restricted conditions was significant (ps > 



























































































































































































































































































































































































.216).  There was, however, a main effect of stimulus type, F(1,4) = 18.77, p = .012, η2  = 
.892, indicating that regardless of group, participants looked more at the right eye for Open 
Eyes stimuli than Closed Eyes stimuli (Open eyes: M = 13.4%, SD = 1.7; Closed eyes: M = 
10.7%, SD = 1.1). 
Left Eye  
The ANOVA for the left eye indicated there were no significant interactions involving group 
(all ps > .225), and no main effect of group (p = .148).  Neither of the planned contrasts 
comparing the unrestricted condition to the two restricted conditions was significant (ps > 
.218).   
Eye Region Total  
The ANOVA for the total eye region revealed no significant interactions involving group (all 
ps > .189), nor a main effect of group (p = .228).  Neither of the planned contrasts was 
significant (ps > .375).   
Mouth 
The ANOVA for the mouth indicated there were no significant interactions involving group (all 
ps > .253), and no main effect of group (p = .141).  Neither of the planned contrasts was 
significant (ps > .213). 
Nose 
 The ANOVA for gaze to the nose revealed a marginally significant main effect of group, 
F(1,4) = 4.40, p = .104, η2  = .524, suggesting greater gaze to the nose region in the amygdala 
group relative to controls (Amygdala: M = 9.4%, SD = 1.4; Controls: M = 5.4%, SD = 1.4).  
There were no significant interactions involving group (all ps > .691).   
Head Remainder 
The ANOVA for gaze to the head remainder revealed no significant interactions involving 




 The ANOVA for gaze off-head revealed no significant interaction effects involving group (all 
ps > .145), but a marginally significant main effect of group, F(1,4) = 4.38, p = .104, η2  = .523, 
suggesting there was less gaze to off the head regions in the amygdala group than in the control 
group (Amygdala: M = 1.0%, SD = 0.7; Controls: M = 3.2%, SD = 0.7).   
4.3.2.2 Gaze distribution in eye region  
To examine the distribution of gaze in the eye region, we calculated the proportion of gaze time 
in each eye ROI relative to the total gaze time spent in the entire eye region (see Figure 4.11-B 
for ROIs).  Results are summarized below in Figure 4.14. 
 
Figure 4.14. Gaze proportions in the eye region in the amygdala (red) and control (blue) 
groups.  Error bars denote standard error. 
Right Eye 
The ANOVA for the right eye indicated there were no significant interactions involving group 
(all ps > .315), and no main effect of group (p = .594).  Neither of the planned contrasts 
comparing the unrestricted condition to the two restricted conditions was significant (ps > 
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.390).  There was, however, a significant main effect of stimulus type, F(1,4) = 30.77, p = 
.005, η2  = .980, again indicating that regardless of group, participants spent a greater proportion 
of gaze in the eye region looking at the right eye for Open Eyes stimuli compared to Closed 
Eyes stimuli (Open eyes: M = 26.4%, SD = 2.8; Closed eyes: M = 21.8%, SD = 2.3).  Neither of 
the planned contrasts was significant (ps > .390). 
Left Eye 
The ANOVA for the left eye revealed no significant interactions involving group (all ps > .124) 
and no main effect of group (p = .448). 
Eye Region Remainder 
The ANOVA for the remainder of the eye region revealed no significant interactions involving 
group (all ps > .255) and no main effect of group (p = .354).  Neither of the planned contrasts 
was significant (ps > .710). 
4.3.2.3 Center bias to horizontal and vertical midlines  
To compare average gaze distance (measured in degrees of visual angle) from the vertical and 
horizontal midlines in the socially salient regions of the face, a two repeated-measures 
ANOVAs for the Eye Region and Mouth ROIs was conducted (see Figure 3.3-C for ROIs). 
Eye Region 
The ANOVA for the eye region indicated there were no interactions involving group (all ps 
>.557) and no main effect of group (p = .403) for distance to the vertical midline.  There were 
also no interactions involving group for distance to the horizontal midline (all ps >.157), and no 
main effect of group for distance to the horizontal midline (p = .581).  
Mouth 
The ANOVA for the mouth did not reveal any significant interactions involving group for 
distance to the vertical midline (all ps > .291), nor a main effect of group (p = .799). There were 
also no significant interactions involving group for distance to the horizontal midline (all ps > 




We tested three patients with rare amygdala lesions to examine whether social processing 
impairments would affect spontaneous face gaze strategies, and also the flexibility of those 
strategies in response to changing viewing contexts.  Similar to the limitations of the gaze 
cascade study in amygdala lesion subjects, group comparisons lacked the statistical power to 
allow us to draw quantitative conclusions due to the small sample size.  Overall, the amygdala 
lesion patients exhibited a similar general pattern of face gaze, preferring to explore the face 
rather than off-face regions of the screen, and in similar proportions as controls.  However, 
there were a few notable effects as well as some qualitative trends in the data that seem worthy 
of discussion. 
In the unrestricted condition, amygdala group exhibits a similar pattern of face gaze as controls, 
spending the majority of gaze time looking at the eye region the most, followed by the 
remainder of the face.  The amygdala patients also spent the same proportion of fixation time 
looking at the mouth as the nose, which was similar to the pattern observed in controls.  This 
indicates that gaze to the core features in the absence of an explicit decision-making task is 
intact in amygdala lesion subjects. Both groups also performed equally well in avoiding the 
eyes and mouth in the “Avoid Eyes” and “Avoid Mouth” conditions, respectively.  Similar to 
the controls’ gaze behavior, when the eyes were to be avoided, the amygdala group increased 
gaze to the mouth, and when the mouth was to be avoided, the amygdala group increased gaze 
to the eyes, indicating that the amygdala group likely recognizes the saliency of these two 
regions.  
There was a main effect of stimulus type for gaze to the right eye, indicating that regardless of 
group, participants looked more at the right eye with Open Eyes stimuli compared to Closed 
Eyes stimuli.  This result is interesting given our previous finding for a right eye bias in 
controls, as well as reports in the literature of greater expressivity conveyed by the left 
hemiface (Borod, Haywood, & Koff, 1997; Powell & Schirillo, 2009; Sackeim, Gur, & 
Saucy, 1978).   That the right eye bias is intact in the amygdala group suggests that they are 
sensitive to the quality of information that is conveyed by the different sides of the face. 
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In the Avoid Eyes condition, there is an interesting parallel to our findings in the autism 
group, in that both the amygdala group and control group increased gaze to the mouth 
compared to their behavior in the unrestricted condition, but the magnitude of increase in the 
amygdala group was much higher than the control group.  We found a similar effect in the 
autism subjects, who showed a disproportionally large increase in gaze to the mouth in the 
Avoid Eyes condition, while controls also distributed their gaze to exploring the remainder of 
the face.  This could indicate a similarly diminished propensity for flexible face exploration in 
the two clinical groups. 
There was an additional parallel to the autism group in gaze to the nose region, such that there 
was an overall trend for greater nose gaze in the amygdala subjects compared to control 
subjects.  We observed this trend across all three conditions in the amygdala group.  The autism 
group showed a comparable bias toward the nose region, though it was limited to the 
unrestricted condition. 
In the Avoid Mouth condition, amygdala patients, as well as control subjects, returned to the 
gaze behavior they demonstrated in the unrestricted condition for the majority of ROIs, but 
there were differences in two regions that merit future study.  First, gaze to the remainder of the 
face decreased in Avoid Eyes compared to Free View for the amygdala group, but remained the 
same in the control group, which suggests again that there may be a reduced tendency to 
explore the face.  Second, the increase in gaze to the eye region compared to “Free View” was 
also larger in the amygdala group than in controls, indicating a bias for fixating the salient 
regions more than controls in the restricted conditions. 
Finally, though the difference between groups for gaze off the head did not reach significance, 
the findings suggest that the amygdala group spent less time off the head than controls 
regardless of condition, preferring instead to continue looking at the face.  Combined with the 
larger bias for fixating socially salient ROIs in the restricted conditions, one question to be 
explored in future studies is whether people with amygdala lesions experience the same level of 
negative arousal or discomfort from looking at salient face features.  There is already evidence 
to show that the amygdala contributes to one’s sense of personal space (Kennedy, Gläscher, 
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Tyszka, & Adolphs, 2009), such that people with amygdala lesions show less discomfort 
from standing in close proximity to strangers.  It would be interesting to explore if the sense of 
smaller personal space also extends to abnormally intense face gaze, especially to the eye 
region. 
An additional question for exploration is whether the amygdala group demonstrates less of a 
center bias than controls.  The heatmaps suggest that amygdala subjects were more intensely 
focused on the pupils of the eyes compared to controls, and also explored the region between 
the eyes less than controls.  A similar effect is evident in gaze to the mouth region, such that 
fixations in the amygdala group were tightly focused in a smaller region centered on the mouth 
when compared to controls’ fixations. 
The lack of systematic group differences in gaze to the ROIs suggests that the amygdala is not 
relied upon for basic perceptual processing of faces.  The findings are consistent with studies 
pointing to a greater role of the amygdala in emotional processing of faces rather than general 
face processing, which relies more on the fusiform gyrus and superior temporal sulcus (Haxby 
et al., 2002).   
Similar to the gaze cascade study in amygdala lesion patients, the absence of significant effects 
in our study may also have been due to small sample sizes. Thus, while our findings suggest 
that the amygdala does not play a critical role in basic perceptual processing of faces, future 




In this chapter I explored face gaze strategies and the flexibility of those strategies in changing 
viewing contexts in autism and patients with amygdala lesions.  I used an implicit behavioral 
task that investigated how flexible and automatic face processing is and how well it can be 
cognitively influenced outside of the context of preference decision-making. 
I found there was a general tendency to look at the eye region in the absence of an explicit task 
in both ASD and amygdala lesion patients.  While details of gaze to the eye region in the 
amygdala group were no different from controls, the ASD group showed several notable 
differences.  Consistent with evidence of abnormal gaze lateralization, people with ASD were 
less efficient than neurotypicals in distributing gaze to the eye region, demonstrating a center 
bias for the region between the eyes and a lack of gaze lateralization to the right eye.  I also 
found that people with ASD demonstrate less flexible viewing behavior due to either a 
diminished interest or a diminished ability to continue exploring the face in the restricted 
conditions.  It is interesting to note that in the people with ASD, part of the atypical 
compensatory strategy they used consisted of a rather strong center bias to the region between 
the eyes. This is quite different from the face scanning strategy observed in the amygdala lesion 
patients, who appear to show less of a center bias toward the eye region compared to controls, 
and indeed seem to fixate on the pupils of the eyes more than controls.  A similar intensity of 
fixation was also observed in the amygdala subjects when looking at the mouth region.  
The amygdala group demonstrated a similar right eye bias as controls and appeared equally 
flexible in gaze strategies.  There was, however, a tendency in the amygdala group to look 
away from the salient parts of the face less often than controls, and also to look off the head less 
than controls, which is consistent with evidence showing reduced discomfort during violations 
of personal space. 
The results from these studies suggest that face scanning utilizes general perceptual process that 
might not be reliant upon amygdala functioning.  Moreover, the results suggest that the reduced 
flexibility of face gaze strategies observed in people with autism is not primarily based on 
amygdala dysfunction.  One possibility to be explored is that the reduced flexibility of face 
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gaze strategies in ASD may be linked to structural and functional abnormalities that have 
been reported in the superior temporal sulcus (Zilbovicius et al., 2006) and the fusiform gyrus 






 C h a p t e r  V  
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
5.1 Summary 
In this dissertation, I investigated social gaze and face preferences in people with autism and 
amygdala lesions. In Chapter III, I examined visual behavior and face preference formation, 
exploring how social processing deficits affect gaze behavior and subjective decision-making 
for faces.  In chapter IV, I explored how flexible and automatic face processing strategies were 
and how well they can be cognitively influenced outside of the context of explicit decision-
making. 
I found that people with autism and amygdala lesion patients made similar preference decisions 
as controls in judging face attractiveness, and that both groups also demonstrated similar 
preference biases as controls.   In addition, people with autism demonstrated a similar visual 
sampling process linking preference and attentional orienting.  My findings provide evidence 
for the idea that face preference formation can be preserved, or compensated for, in the 
presence of general social processing impairments. 
The findings also indicate that face preference formation appears to circumvent face processing 
deficits reported in other studies of higher-order social decision-making, possibly through 
compensation by processing and attentional strategies.  There were two key differences in the 
autism group that pointed to the use of atypical social processing strategies.  First, with respect 
to reaction times, people with autism made preference decisions for faces faster than the 
controls, and their reaction times also appeared insensitive to the difficulty of the choice when 
deciding amongst faces.  Based on the absence of a reaction time advantage in comparison 
tasks involving objective decisions or non-social stimuli, this suggests that there is a higher-
level component of preferential decision-making for faces that is altered in people with autism 
while the preference formation mechanism linking gaze orienting and eventual choice remains 
intact.  The reaction time advantage observed in ASD with respect to face preference decisions 
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suggests specific hypotheses that should be investigated in further, more refined studies, 
and may point to an advantage that arises specifically during face preference formation.  
Second, I found that in the absence of an explicit decision-making task, people with autism 
demonstrated abnormalities in face gaze patterns, looking less at the parts of the eye region that 
communicate the most information.  People with autism also demonstrated rigidity in gaze 
behavior that adhered to imposed viewing restrictions but at the cost of extensive exploration of 
the face, showing people with autism have difficulty updating pre-existing face scanning 
strategies in changing social contexts. Therefore, while deficits in social processing do not 
appear to significantly impair the preference formation process for faces, there is also evidence 
showing that people with autism use atypical processing and visual strategies when looking at 
faces, perhaps in part to compensate for these deficits.  More detailed analysis of task difficulty, 
reaction times, and even face preferences would help here, and in the future, to determine 
whether subjective decisions about faces systematically differ in people with ASD.  
What are the broader implications that can be drawn from these results? First, an implicit and 
subjective approach to investigating social processing is a valuable tool for characterizing 
social impairments in ASD.  Indeed, the term “social processing” may be too large of an 
umbrella term to apply to the deficits observed in ASD, and there may be an array of unstudied 
implicit and subjective components that are unimpaired.  Because autism is so heterogeneous, it 
will be important to investigate specific aspects of social processing to understand if they are 
actually impaired.  Second, nuanced differences at the surface could belie larger differences in 
underlying mechanism.  There may be small differences in behavior in practiced conditions but 
these behaviors could reveal a lack of ability to adapt to new constraints.  Therefore, in addition 
to measuring various aspects of social behavior, we need to also characterize how these 
behaviors are adapted when they must be updated.  Third, information-seeking strategies in 
ASD can be better characterized by including behavioral responsiveness and resilience.  Real-
life situations demand continual adjustment and responsiveness to new situations.  To fully 
understand social deficits in ASD, we cannot simply measure the baseline behavior, but must 
also test responsiveness and resilience to better characterize and treat social impairments. 
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In conclusion, an implicit and subjective approach yields important insight into social 
processing in ASD.  By using this approach, in people with specific deficits, we learn not only 
about what causes known social impairments but we also learn more about what constitutes 
normal social functioning, with the hope that we can better characterize the difficulties 
experienced in ASD. 
5.2 Limitations 
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of these studies.  First, the autism participants 
consisted of individuals who were high-functioning.  We cannot rule out the possibility that the 
findings reported here apply to a very specific sub-type of high-functioning individuals who are 
on the rather social end of the spectrum given their willingness to interact with researchers and 
participate in hours of experiments.  Consequently, it remains an open question whether the 
findings reported here would also extend to low-functioning individuals who show greater 
impairment, and often have comorbid developmental disorders that impact social and executive 
functioning. Moreover, there is a further caveat with regard to the population demographics, in 
that males were heavily over-represented in the autism group, which partially reflects a 
problem with underdiagnosis of autism in women.  Recent research shows that there are gender 
differences in the symptoms of autism (Head 2014, Frazier 2014), with females more likely to 
demonstrate social impairments but not the restricted interests and repetitive behaviors that are 
characteristic of autism, which leaves open the question of whether females with autism would 
demonstrate the same patterns social preference and gaze behavior.   
There is also a limitation with respect to the experiment stimuli that were used.  As is often the 
case in experimental design, there is a tradeoff between ecological validity and experimental 
control.  While the use of computer-generated faces is favorable in terms of controlling for 
potential confounds such as lighting and facial expression, making preference decisions for 
computer-generated stimuli might not be the same as making attractiveness judgments for real 
faces.  Social stimuli with greater ecological validity (such as photographs or dynamic stimuli) 
may be more likely to elicit atypical gaze behavior, particularly in individuals with high-
functioning autism and the use of such stimuli should be considered for future studies. 
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5.3 Future Directions 
Based on the evidence that processing of social information and the appearance of social 
impairments can vary widely in people with autism based on explicit task demands, it will be 
important for future autism studies to examine implicit social processing.  Especially, it may be 
worth paying attention to the initial phase of orienting and perceptual processing leading up to 
the preference decisions.  In future work, researchers might focus efforts on investigating initial 
orienting to social stimuli and the perceptual processes involved in social processing by 
decoupling measurements of behavior from an explicit decision-making task. 
Another important piece of the autism research puzzle is improving our understanding of the 
brain behavior link.  There is a need to trace higher-level behavioral outcomes to the implicit 
and explicit processing mechanisms underlying them.  For this reason, concomitant 
neuroimaging or EEG during preference decision-making tasks would be highly informative to 
our understanding of how social deficits affect face processing in ASD.  Given that so much of 
our response to faces occurs automatically and sub-consciously, current decision-making 
paradigms are limited in that they largely measure the conscious realization of an explicit 
judgment, rather than the subconscious evaluative processes upon which the decision is 
predicated.  As a consequence, we might be in fact measuring the ability of people with autism 
to compensate for outcomes despite an underlying impairment, rather than measuring the actual 
deficit as it exists and is experienced by people with autism.  Mapping the brain mechanisms 
preceding or taking place during these social processing tasks can strengthen our understanding 
of how social processing deficits are directly linked to attentional and behavioral strategies, as 
well as the outcome of those strategies.   
Future studies of explicit decision-making tasks might also use more trials so that comparisons 
can be made between trials in which preferences were either congruent or incongruent with the 
preferences of controls, and to examine whether there are differences in gaze behavior in trials 
that were congruent versus incrongruent. Neuroimaging or EEG would also be advantageous 
here in that brain activity can be compared between congruent and incongruent trials, to 




Studies using dynamic face stimuli and more complex social stimuli will be important in 
understanding the specific contexts in which social impairments occur in high-functioning 
autism.  It could be the case that face processing deficits in high-functioning ASD become 
evident only when there are more complex attentional demands, such as in real-life situations, 
or when there is competing visual information, such as with dynamic stimuli. This could also 
occur if attentional demands become too great to sustain explicit or implicit compensatory 
strategies.  In future work, researchers might investigate the extent to which deficits in 
processing social information affect preference decisions using dynamic or emotional stimuli. 
Symptoms, behaviors and even the underlying genetic causes of ASD are widely 
heterogeneous, which poses a significant challenge to researchers and clinicians alike.  On a 
more global level, an important future task for research and diagnosis will be to improve 
characterization of the autism phenotype.  Differences in social processing, face processing, 
decision-making are distributed across a wide range in the general population.  Research has 
shown this variability extends to ASD, with some people with autism showing no differences 
from the general population in certain tasks and others showing severe impairments.  Based on 
this evidence, a major question to consider is to what extent do the differences in people with 
autism overlap with differences observed in general population? Moreover, to what degree do 
these differences in autism really constitute a behaviorally and biologically distinct group 
versus simply being clustered at one extreme of an otherwise normal distribution?   
The considerable heterogeneity in phenotypic presentation also underscores one of many gaps 
in our understanding of ASD regarding the differences that distinguish subtypes of ASD.  
There is significant variability in the cognitive and behavioral profiles of individuals who meet 
diagnostic criteria for ASD and there is a need to identify and characterize meaningful sub-
types of ASD that map onto patterns of impairments (and the degree of those impairments) in a 
way that current diagnostic and research criteria fail to capture. 
To better diagnose each individual under the broader spectrum and develop new treatment 
approaches, future research needs to include tasks that would help identify these sub-types at a 
diagnostic level and characterize the specific social deficits experienced by the individual.  
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Consequently, it will be important in the next stage of autism research to move beyond 
group-level investigations, to examining within-group differences amongst sub-types of ASD, 
as well as drawing connections to what these sub-types mean for development and outcomes 
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